Breeland v. Southern Pacific Company
| Decision Date | 12 December 1955 |
| Docket Number | No. 14670.,14670. |
| Citation | 231 F.2d 576 |
| Parties | Norman BREELAND, Appellant, v. SOUTHERN PACIFIC COMPANY and E. D. Moody, Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Thomas C. Perkins, Sacramento, Cal., for appellant.
Burton Mason, W. A. Gregory, San Francisco, Cal., for appellees.
Before POPE, FEE and CHAMBERS, Circuit Judges.
This is an action for damages on account of claimed breach of contract whereby plaintiff was employed as a brakeman by the Southern Pacific Company. Employment was pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement between defendant and the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen. Breeland alleged that he was discharged from his employment wrongfully and without just cause and in violation of this agreement. Damages were claimed for loss of wages and seniority, pension and hospital benefits.
Before answering, Southern Pacific filed a motion for summary judgment, which was denied March 1, 1954, by Hon. Michael J. Roche, United States District Judge. Immediately after this, on March 11, 1954, Southern Pacific filed answer setting up as a separate defense that Breeland had failed to submit or process his grievance within a one-year period as required by Article 58 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement in force during the employment of plaintiff. The answer also contained a separate defense that the action was barred by the Statute of Limitations since the discharge occurred on December 2, 1949, while the complaint was not filed until December 22, 1953.
On December 29, 1954, Southern Pacific filed a second motion for summary judgment. This motion was based upon the identical affidavits and exhibits relied upon in the previous motion for summary judgment. Judgment in favor of the Southern Pacific on the second motion was granted by Hon. Louis E. Goodman, United States District Judge, on January 14, 1955. No testimony was taken in the proceeding, and the record before this Court consists of the pleadings, comprising the complaint, answer, two motions for summary judgment with affidavits in support thereof. Plaintiff raises three questions: (1) Was the order of the court denying summary relief a bar to a second motion for the same relief? (2) Had plaintiff exhausted the administrative remedies under the collective bargaining agreement under which he was employed? (3) Did the trial court err in determining the action of plaintiff to be a time claim within the purview of Article 58 of the collective bargaining agreement in the absence of any evidence as to the main or accepted interpretation of the term "time claim"? At the outset, it appears that the complaint, which was filed December 22, 1953, and which alleges that on November 30, 1949, plaintiff was unjustly accused of intoxication while on duty, taken in connection with correspondence which showed that plaintiff was notified of dismissal for this violation on December 2, 1949, was barred by the California Statute of Limitations applicable to an action founded upon a contract in writing. Sections 335 and 337 of the California Code of Civil Procedure provided that the period for commencement of such an action shall be four years. But plaintiff, in order to avoid this conclusion, has set up that he has no cause of action which is justiciable until after compliance by him with the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. His theory is that the exhaustion of the steps set out in the contract is a condition precedent to his cause of action. The record shows that, after his discharge, plaintiff and his representatives undertook to handle this claim, designated as one "for reinstatement with seniority unimpaired * * * and compensation for time lost as a result of his dismissal," in accordance with the agreement and particularly with the provisions of Article 58 thereof. If this were established, the defense of the statute of Limitations would, of course, fail since the procedure prescribed was not completed until long after December 22, 1949.
Plaintiff has adhered to that position not only in the steps which he sought to have reviewed under the contract provisions, but also by his complaint which is an action for damages for loss of time. Article 58 provides in part as follows:
"Decision by the highest officer designated by the carrier to handle claims shall be final and binding unless within one year from the date of said officer\'s decision such claim is disposed of * * * or proceedings for final disposition of the claim are instituted by the employee or his duly authorized representative * * * is interpreted to mean that the decision by the highest officer designated by the carrier to handle TIME CLAIMS shall be final and binding unless within one (1) year from the date of said officer\'s decision * * * proceedings for final disposition are instituted * * *."
If this article is binding, as apparently it is since all of the allegations of plaintiff are based thereon, then the decision of the hearing officer was no longer subject to attack upon the expiration of one year from the date thereof. Plaintiff contends that the limitation set out here relates only to time claims as distinguished from disciplinary claims. Since plaintiff has been discharged albeit he contends wrongfully, it is difficult to see how the action can be termed "disciplinary." As pointed out above, plaintiff has, in his "claim" submitted under this Article 58 and his complaint here, characterized his cause as one for loss of time. Furthermore, a reading of Article 58, Section (c), Item 5 and Item 6, set out below, is convincing that both text and commentary include a limitation on all claims submitted under Article 58. Inspection of these items is illuminating:
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