Breen v. CARLSBAD MUN. SCHOOLS

• Decision Date: 12 February 2003
• Docket Number: No. 859., No. 858, No. 22
• Citation: 67 P.3d 908,2003 NMCA 58,133 N.M. 618
• Parties: Christy Ann BREEN and Dahlia Carrasco, Claimants-Appellants, v. CARLSBAD MUNICIPAL SCHOOLS, and New Mexico Public Schools Insurance Authority, Respondents-Appellees.
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

67 P.3d 908

133 N.M. 618

2003 NMCA 58

Christy Ann BREEN and Dahlia Carrasco, Claimants-Appellants, v. CARLSBAD MUNICIPAL SCHOOLS, and New Mexico Public Schools Insurance Authority, Respondents-Appellees.

Nos. 22,858, 22,859.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

February 12, 2003.

Certiorari Granted April 1, 2003.

Freddie J. Romero, Cusack, Jaramillo, Romero & Associates, P.C. Roswell, NM, for Appellants.

Phyllis S. Lynn, Yenson, Lynn, Allen & Wosick, P.C., Albuquerque, NM, for Appellees.

Certiorari Granted, No. 27,950, April 1, 2003.

OPINION

PICKARD, Judge.

{1} This is a consolidated appeal from orders of the Workers' Compensation Judge (WCJ) denying Workers' applications for supplementary compensation orders. In it, we consider whether provisions in the Workers' Compensation Act (WCA), NMSA 1978, §§ 52-1-41 (1999) and -42 (1990), that limit the duration of benefit payments for those workers disabled due to mental impairment, violate the equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution and the New Mexico Constitution. We also consider whether the same provisions violate the mandate of the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 through -12213 (2000). We hold that there is neither a constitutional nor a statutory violation.

I. FACTS AND BACKGROUND

{2} In August 1999, the WCJ entered compensation orders awarding temporary total disability benefits to Workers Breen and Carrasco (Workers) for injuries that resulted in temporary total disability due to a conditioned psychological response to odors and dust. Employer Carlsbad Municipal Schools and Insurer New Mexico Public School Insurance Authority (Employer/Insurer) appealed these compensation orders to this Court, which upheld the orders in a memorandum opinion filed on May 29, 2001. Following the mandate from this Court to the district court, Employer/Insurer submitted payment to Workers that totaled 100 weeks of compensation pursuant to the WCA. See §§ 52-1-41(B); -42(A)(3).

{3} Workers then moved for supplementary compensation orders, arguing that since this Court upheld the award of temporary total disability benefits and did not limit them, Workers were due more than the 100 weeks of benefits because the WCJ's original order was "ongoing." After a hearing, the WCJ found that Workers suffered from a primary mental impairment and were due only 100 weeks of compensation under the WCA. See id. Workers now appeal the WCJ's order of 100 weeks of compensation. They raise three issues on appeal: (1) the WCJ erred in refusing to enforce his original compensation orders that were upheld on appeal, (2) the provisions in the WCA that limit benefits of workers disabled due to mental impairments violate the equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution and the New Mexico Constitution, and (3) the provisions in the WCA that limit benefits of workers disabled due to mental impairments violate the ADA. We affirm the orders of the WCJ.

II. DISCUSSION

A. ENFORCEMENT OF ORIGINAL ORDER

{4} Workers argue that the WCJ erred in awarding only 100 weeks of benefits after this Court affirmed the WCJ's original findings of compensability and temporary total disability. They claim that because the WCJ's compensation orders provided for benefits that were "ongoing" and because those orders were upheld by this Court on appeal, the WCJ's subsequent denial of benefits beyond 100 weeks pursuant to Section 52-1-41(B) contravenes this Court's order on remand.

{5} In a memorandum decision filed on May 29, 2001, this Court concluded that Workers suffered from a primary mental impairment and affirmed the WCJ's award of temporary total disability benefits to them. There is nothing in the opinion discussing the level or duration of benefits to be awarded. The subsequent mandate from this Court to the district court remanded the case "for any further proceedings consistent with said decision." Accordingly, the Employer/Insurer paid Workers for 100 weeks of disability, and the WCJ upheld this amount after a subsequent hearing.

{6} The award of 100 weeks of benefits is consistent with Section 52-1-41(B), which limits the period of compensation for total disability resulting from primary mental impairment to 100 weeks. Therefore, the trial court's award of 100 weeks of disability is entirely consistent with this Court's conclusion that Workers suffered from a primary mental impairment. We see no reason to disturb the WCJ's award of 100 weeks of benefits pursuant to this Court's mandate and to Section 52-1-41(B).

{7} Workers rely on a decision from a Missouri Court of Appeals for the general rule that "after affirmance of a lower court judgment any subsequent orders or adjudications in the cause must be confined to those necessary to execute the judgment." McPherson Redevelopment Corp. v. Shelton, 807 S.W.2d 203, 205 (Mo.Ct.App.1991) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Rather than support Workers' argument, we find that this general rule supports our conclusion that the WCJ necessarily relied on the appropriate statute to execute our judgment that the Workers suffered from a primary mental impairment. Accordingly, we hold that the WCJ did not err in its award of 100 weeks of benefits to Workers.

B. EQUAL PROTECTION

{8} Workers argue that Sections 52-1-41(B) and 52-1-42(A)(3) treat similarly situated individuals differently: those who are temporarily totally disabled due to physical impairment and those who are temporarily totally disabled due to primary mental impairment. Because workers with physical impairments can receive up to 500 or 700 weeks of benefits and workers with primary mental impairments are capped at 100 weeks of benefits, Workers assert that Section 52-1-41(B), capping their benefits at 100 weeks, violates the equal protection rights guaranteed by the United States and New Mexico Constitutions.

1. Standard of Review

{9} The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The New Mexico Constitution also provides that no person shall be "denied equal protection of the laws." N.M. Const. art. II, § 18. The equal protection clauses in the United States and New Mexico Constitutions provide the same protections. See Valdez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1998-NMCA-030, ¶ 6, 124 N.M. 655, 954 P.2d 87. Equal protection of the laws "is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike." City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985). An equal protection challenge of a classification based on economic or social welfare distinctions is subject to a rational basis review by this Court, meaning that the statute in question must be rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970)

; see also Valdez, 1998-NMCA-030, ¶¶ 12-13, 124 N.M. 655, 954 P.2d 87 (applying rational basis standard to review of Section 52-1-25 of the Workers' Compensation Act); Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 1998-NMSC-031, ¶¶ 2-3, 125 N.M. 721, 965 P.2d 305 (holding that a constitutional challenge to the cap on damages in the New Mexico Tort Claims Act is subject to a rational basis review). A statute that distinguishes between those with mental impairments and those without mental impairments falls into this category and requires a rational basis review. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446,

105 S.Ct. 3249.

2. Analysis

{10} The threshold inquiry of an equal protection analysis is whether the statute in question, in this case Sections 52-1-41(B) and -42(A)(3), results in dissimilar treatment of similarly situated workers. Valdez, 1998-NMCA-030, ¶ 11, 124 N.M. 655, 954 P.2d 87. We hold that is does. As Workers argue, Section 52-1-41 provides lifelong compensation benefits for workers totally disabled due to physical impairments, Section 52-1-41(A), but caps compensation benefits for workers totally disabled due to mental impairments at 100 weeks, Section 52-1-41(B). Similarly, Section 52-1-42(A)(1) and (2) provides compensation benefits for permanent partial disability due to physical impairments for up to 700 weeks, but caps compensation benefits for permanent partial disability due to mental impairments at 100 weeks, Section 52-1-42(A)(3) and (4). This constitutes dissimilar treatment between those totally or permanently disabled with physical impairments and those totally or permanently disabled with mental impairments.

{11} Having determined that similarly situated workers are treated dissimilarly, our next inquiry is whether this disparity is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. We hold that it is. "Legislative acts are presumptively valid[.]" Valdez, 1998-NMCA-030, ¶ 13, 124 N.M. 655, 954 P.2d 87 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This Court has already determined that the WCA creates an objective standard that promotes predictability and certainty of benefit determination resulting in efficient delivery of benefits. Id. ¶ 15 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). That this determination was made before the Supreme Court's announcement in Trujillo, 1998-NMSC-031, ¶¶ 30-32, 125 N.M. 721, 965 P.2d 305, that rational basis review would be real review does not detract from the logical force of it. Similarly, fairness may be compromised in pursuit of predictable, efficient results, but this Court does not inquire into the "wisdom, policy or justness" of legislation under a rational basis scrutiny. Valdez, 1998-NMCA-030, ¶ 13, 124 N.M. 655, 954 P.2d 87. That some inequality results in the area of economic and social welfare from a statutory classification does not render the statute unconstitutional, as long as it is reasonable. See Sanchez v. M.M. Sundt Constr. Co., 103 N.M. 294, 297, 706 P.2d 158,...