BREMERTON PUBLIC SAFETY ASS'N v. City of Bremerton, 24849-2-II.

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Citation: 104 Wash.App. 226,15 P.3d 688
• Decision Date: 12 January 2001
• Docket Number: No. 24849-2-II.,24849-2-II.
• Parties: BREMERTON PUBLIC SAFETY ASSOCIATION, et al., Appellants, v. The CITY OF BREMERTON, et al., Respondents.

15 P.3d 688
104 Wash.App. 226

BREMERTON PUBLIC SAFETY ASSOCIATION, et al., Appellants,
v.
The CITY OF BREMERTON, et al., Respondents

No. 24849-2-II.

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 2.

January 12, 2001.

15 P.3d 689

Randy Wallace Loun, Loun & Tyner, Bremerton, for Appellants

Glenna Lee Malanca, City Attorney's Office, David Brian St Pierre, Assistant City Attorney, Bremerton, for Respondents.

BRIDGEWATER, J.

Bremerton Public Safety Association (BPSA) appeals a grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of Bremerton (City). We hold that RCW 41.26.150 unambiguously authorizes the City to deduct medical costs payable under Part B Medicare (Medicare B) coverage from the amounts it must pay for a retiree's medical services, even if the retiree did not apply or pay premiums for this coverage. Therefore, we affirm.

BPSA, representing members of the Law Enforcement and Fire Fighters Retirement Plan I (LEOFF I), brought an action seeking declaratory judgment to establish that the City could not require LEOFF I retirees to pay for Medicare B or reduce their medical coverage by the City by the amount Medicare B would have paid.

BPSA moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of the City's obligation to pay costs for necessary medical services under RCW 41.26.150, in light of Medicare B coverage. BPSA argued that RCW 41.26.150 obligates the City to pay the retirees' premiums for coverage under Medicare B, and, therefore, the City was responsible for costs of medical services that Medicare B would cover even if the retiree failed to acquire or purchase this supplement. The City also moved for summary judgment. The court granted the City's motion for summary judgment, ruling that RCW 41.26.150(2) does not obligate the City to pay a retiree's Medicare B premiums. BPSA appeals.

We review an order of summary judgment de novo. Enterprise Leasing, Inc. v. City of Tacoma, 139 Wash.2d 546, 551, 988 P.2d 961 (1999); Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wash.2d 434, 437, 656 P.2d 1030 (1982). Summary judgment is appropriate only if the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c). We consider the

15 P.3d 690

facts and the inferences from the facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Reid v. Pierce County, 136 Wash.2d 195, 201, 961 P.2d 333 (1998); Wilson, 98 Wash.2d at 437, 656 P.2d 1030

Both parties argued below and assert on appeal that there are no issues of material fact barring an order of summary judgment. The parties only disagree regarding the superior court's interpretation of the medical expense statute, RCW 41.26.150. Statutory construction is a question of law, which we review de novo. Enter. Leasing, 139 Wash.2d at 551, 988 P.2d 961.

BPSA argues that RCW 41.26.150 is ambiguous as to whether an employer may reduce a retiree's payable medical expenses by the amount of Medicare B coverage whether or not the retiree pays the premium. We interpret statutes to give effect to the legislature's intent. Cherry v. Municipality of Metro. Seattle, 116 Wash.2d 794, 799, 808 P.2d 746 (1991). To determine legislative intent, we look first to the language of the statute. Lacey Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 128 Wash.2d 40, 53, 905 P.2d 338 (1995). If a statute is unambiguous, we may derive its meaning from the language of the statute alone. Cherry, 116 Wash.2d at 799, 808 P.2d 746. We read each provision of the statute in relation to the other provisions. Hubbard v. Dep't of Labor & Indus. of Washington, 140 Wash.2d 35, 43, 992 P.2d 1002 (2000); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Tri, 117 Wash.2d 128, 133, 814 P.2d 629 (1991).

In ascertaining the meaning of a particular word in a statute, a court must consider both the statute's subject matter and the context in which the word is used. Chamberlain v. Dep't of Transp., 79 Wash. App. 212, 217, 901 P.2d 344 (1995). We give undefined statutory terms their usual and ordinary meaning unless there is contrary legislative intent. Dennis v. Dep't of Labor & Indus. of Washington, 109 Wash.2d 467, 479-80, 745 P.2d 1295 (1987); see also Nationwide Ins. v. Williams, 71 Wash.App. 336, 342, 858 P.2d 516 (1993), review denied, 123 Wash.2d 1022, 875 P.2d 635 (1994). We may look to a dictionary for an undefined term's ordinary meaning. Gerberding v. Munro, 134 Wash.2d 188, 199, 949 P.2d 1366 (1998); Port of Seattle v. State, Dep't of Revenue, 101 Wash.App. 106, 115, 1 P.3d 607 (2000).

Moreover, the first rule of judicial interpretation of statutes is that the court assumes that the legislature means exactly what it says; plain words do not require construction. Western Telepage, Inc. v. City of Tacoma Dep't of Financing, 140 Wash.2d 599, 608, 998 P.2d 884 (2000). We do not construe unambiguous statutes. Western Telepage, 140 Wash.2d at 608, 998 P.2d 884; Whatcom County v. City of Bellingham, 128 Wash.2d 537, 546, 909 P.2d 1303 (1996). While a statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations, we are not obliged to discern an ambiguity by imagining a variety of alternative interpretations. State v. Tili, 139 Wash.2d 107, 115, 985 P.2d 365 (1999). A court may not add language to a clear statute, even if it believes the Legislature intended something else but failed to express it adequately. State v. Chester, 133 Wash.2d 15, 21, 940 P.2d 1374 (1997). We are not free to disregard the plain meaning of the statute to avoid an incongruous result. McFreeze Corp. v. State, Dept. of Revenue, 102 Wash. App. 196, 201, 6 P.3d 1187 (2000). Thus, when reading an unambiguous statute we look to the wording of the statute, not to outside sources. Western Telepage, 140 Wash.2d at 608, 998 P.2d 884; Multicare Medical Center v. State, Dep't of Social & Health Services, 114 Wash.2d 572,...