Breneisen v. Motorola
| Decision Date | 02 September 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 10–1982.,10–1982. |
| Parties | James P. BRENEISEN, Jr. and Anna M. Lineweaver, Plaintiffs–Appellants,v.MOTOROLA, INCORPORATED, Defendant–Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
George S. Bellas (argued), Attorney, Bellas & Wachowski, Park Ridge, IL, for Plaintiffs–Appellants.Noah A. Finkel (argued), Attorney, Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Chicago, IL, for Defendant–Appellee.Before BAUER, KANNE and EVANS *, Circuit Judges.BAUER, Circuit Judge.
The plaintiffs appeal adverse decisions below relating to their one-time employer Motorola's alleged violation of their rights under the proscriptive anti-discrimination and anti-retaliation provisions of § 2615 of the Family and Medical Leave Act (the “FMLA”). James Breneisen appeals the district court's dismissal of his claim based on a determination that he was not eligible for recovery of lost back pay, lost employment benefits, and front pay from Motorola. Anna Lineweaver appeals the district court's dismissal of her claim after Motorola tendered $3,840.00 to her, a sum which represents the full amount of her damages, but no costs or attorney's fees. For the following reasons, we affirm.
When this case first came to us in 2008, we partially reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Motorola and remanded the Breneisen and Lineweaver FMLA claims for further proceedings. A full recitation of the facts is reported at Breneisen v. Motorola, 512 F.3d 972 (7th Cir.2008), but we will briefly restate the pertinent facts relating to the remaining two plaintiffs.
Breneisen was employed at various Motorola facilities between 1994 and 2003. In January 2001, he took FMLA leave to receive treatment for gastroesophageal reflux. He returned to work twelve weeks later and was assigned to a different position, allegedly because his position had been eliminated during his leave and his former duties dispersed among several other positions. He received the same pay and benefits, but considered the change a demotion. On April 20, 2001, just weeks after returning to work, Breneisen took medical leave again, this time for esophageal surgery. He returned to work in September 2001, but in February 2002, he took leave for a third time to undergo a total esophagectomy. Breneisen never returned from this leave and was eventually terminated in June 2003. He alleges that the esophagectomy was necessary because a supervisor at Motorola caused him to suffer stress, high blood pressure, and stomach reflux, all of which exacerbated his pre-existing medical condition.
After our 2008 decision, Breneisen had three surviving FMLA claims: (1) failure to reinstate to an equivalent position when he returned to work in April 2001; (2) discrimination and retaliation when he returned to work in April 2001; and (3) retaliation by way of harassment by his supervisor from September 2001 until his final leave in February 2002.
On remand, Breneisen waived the FMLA claims with the exception of his claim for damages as a result of discriminatory and retaliatory conduct alleged to have occurred between September 4, 2001 and February 5, 2002. He sought recovery of back pay, payment for medical bills, lost employment benefits, and front pay.
In a motion in limine, Motorola sought to bar evidence of a causal connection between Breneisen's medical conditions and Motorola's alleged misconduct, arguing that the evidence was irrelevant. The judge agreed and granted the motion. He also concluded that “back and front pay awards are not available under the FMLA in this case for any time period during which Breneisen was unable to perform the functions of his previous job or one that is comparable, if he had exhausted his FMLA leave.” The FMLA allows for twelve working weeks of protected leave during any twelve-month period,1 an amount that appears to have been exhausted during Breneisen's first leave.
Lineweaver contended that she was denied a tuition reimbursement benefit in retaliation for taking FMLA leave. Following this court's decision in 2008, Motorola tendered Lineweaver a check for twice the amount she claimed Motorola owed. Lineweaver accepted the tender and moved to convert it to a judgment so that she could petition the court for recovery of costs and attorney's fees. The court denied her petition and granted Motorola's motion to dismiss, finding that her claim was made moot by virtue of Motorola's tender. Lineweaver appealed.
Breneisen disputes the district court's holdings that (1) he is barred from collecting back pay and front pay damages under the FMLA during periods when he was unable to work and his FMLA leave had been exhausted, and (2) an employer's conduct that exacerbates an employee's medical condition is not a valid grounds for an award of front pay under the FMLA.
A district court's interpretation of a federal statute such as the FMLA is a question of law which we review de novo. See Walker v. United Parcel Service, 240 F.3d 1268, 1277 (10th Cir.2001). The parties do not dispute that since February 5, 2002, Breneisen has been unable to work and that he cannot be reinstated to his former position at Motorola. Nor does Breneisen allege that he was wrongfully terminated in retaliation for taking FMLA leave. In this sense, his claim is somewhat unique from most retaliation claims brought under the FMLA. As Motorola aptly described the argument in its brief, Breneisen claims that Motorola “harassed him when he returned from an approved leave of absence ... that because of that [harassment], his medical condition became exacerbated, and that because of that [exacerbation] he could no longer work,” ultimately causing him to permanently lose his job and suffer ongoing out-of-pocket losses for his medical treatment.
Setting aside the question of whether these allegations have any potential merit, we must first decide whether the FMLA permits recovery in a case of this nature. The magistrate judge concluded it does not. We agree.
Breneisen argues that the district court erred by granting Motorola's motion in limine to bar certain medical evidence which he believes supported his claim. The crux of Breneisen's argument is that the alleged mistreatment he received from his supervisor at Motorola upon returning from his second leave in September 2001 exacerbated his pre-existing condition and caused him to take the third leave, from which he never returned. The evidence the district court excluded was offered to prove this alleged causal link.
We review a district court's ruling on a motion in limine for abuse of discretion. Aldridge v. Forest River, Inc., 635 F.3d 870, 874 (7th Cir.2011). Evidentiary questions such as the one before us are accorded great deference because they are “peculiarly within the competence of the district court.” Id.
The district court granted Motorola's motion because it found no basis in the FMLA that would enable Breneisen to recover on his theory, even if the causal link he sought to establish proved to be true.
Though Breneisen's argument appears to be one of first impression in our circuit, it resembles the matter at issue in Edgar v. JAC Products, Inc., 443 F.3d 501 (6th Cir.2006), a Sixth Circuit case dealing with a similar “exacerbation” argument. In that case, the plaintiff was unable to return to work after her FMLA leave had expired. She alleged that her condition had persisted as a result of her employer's discriminatory and retaliatory conduct toward her. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district judge's grant of summary judgment in Edgar, finding that the FMLA does not address the cause of an employee's injury. Edgar, 443 F.3d at 516. We agree that the cause of an injury is irrelevant under the FMLA, although it would be relevant to a claim based in tort law.2
Even if the cause of an employee's medical condition were relevant under the FMLA, it would not be relevant in Breneisen's case, since the exacerbating conduct he alleges occurred after a second, unprotected leave. There seems to be no dispute that Motorola fully complied with the requirements of the FMLA during and immediately following Breneisen's first leave. At the end of that leave, his...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Credit Bureau Ctr., LLC, s. 18-2847 & 18-3310
...Cir. 2015). Finally, Brown’s challenge to the restitution award raises legal questions, which we review de novo. Breneisen v. Motorola, Inc ., 656 F.3d 701, 704 (7th Cir. 2011). A. Liability Issues The Commission sued under section 13(b) of the FTCA, which by its terms authorizes temporary ......
-
Cloutier v. GoJet Airlines, LLC
...his employment, and he would not be entitled to damages resulting from this termination." Id. ; see also Breneisen v. Motorola, Inc. , 656 F.3d 701, 705 (7th Cir. 2011) ("When serious medical issues render an employee unable to work for longer than the twelve-week period contemplated under ......
-
Emley v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
...question of fact subject to a burden of proof. It is a question of law to be determined by the Court. See, e.g., Breneisen v. Motorola, Inc., 656 F.3d 701, 704 (7th Cir. 2011); Aguirre v. Turner Const. Co., 582 F.3d 808, 814 (7th Cir. 2009). 4. The Defendants cite to 21 C.F.R. § 330.10(7)(i......
-
Michael Moore, Charles Hooks, Peggy Fechter, Jon Maier, Second Amendment Found., Inc. v. Madigan
...fees is insufficient to create a case or controversy when none exists on the merits. Lewis, 494 U.S. at 480; Breneisen v. Motorola, Inc., 656 F.3d 701, 706 (7th Cir. 2011). In summary, the Firearm Concealed Carry Act has substantially amended the UUW and AUUW statutes challenged in this cas......
-
Chapter § 1-77 29 CFR § 825.702. Interaction With Federal and State Anti-Discrimination Laws
...FMLA leave). The Seventh Circuit has an exhaustive analysis of this "claim" and why it should be rejected. • Breneisen v. Motorola, Inc., 656 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2382 (2012) (plaintiff argued that his alleged mistreatment from his supervisor upon his return fr......
-
Recent Fmla Appellate Decisions and Proposed Fmla Regulations
...Comcast Corp., 676 F.3d 768 (8th Cir. 2012). 8. Chappell v. The Bilco Co., 675 F.3d 1110 (8th Cir. 2012). 9. Breneisen v. Motorola, Inc., 656 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2011). 10. Hearst v. Progressive Foam Technologies, Inc., 641 F.3d 276 (8th Cir. 2011). 11. Degraw v. Exide Technologies, No. 10-3......