Brennan v. Albertson
| Decision Date | 24 July 2012 |
| Docket Number | Record No. 2042-11-4 |
| Parties | SHEILA E. BRENNAN v. PAUL D. ALBERTSON |
| Court | Virginia Court of Appeals |
Present: Chief Judge Felton, Judges McCullough and Huff Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
J. Howe Brown, Judge Designate
Jacob Alzamora (Solan Alzamora, PLLC, on briefs), for appellant.
Paul D. Albertson, pro se.
The Circuit Court of Fairfax County concluded that Sheila E. Brennan was "habitually cohabiting with another person in a relationship analogous to a marriage" pursuant to Code § 20-109(A) and, therefore, the trial court granted husband's motion to terminate his obligation to pay spousal support. She assigns error to this ruling, contending that (1) the trial court "misinterpreted the term 'relationship analogous to a marriage' to include a non-sexual, non-romantic friendship between two roommates," and (2) "the trial court erred by misapplying two of the four factors outlined in Pellegrin [v. Pellegrin, 31 Va. App. 753, 525 S.E.2d 611 (2000)]." We find no error and, therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Brennan and her former husband, Paul D. Albertson, were divorced in 2007. The final decree of divorce required Albertson to pay spousal support through June 1, 2019. On April 15, 2011, he filed a motion to terminate his spousal support obligation, alleging that Brennan wasinvolved in a romantic relationship with another woman and that their relationship was analogous to a marriage.
The evidence established that Brennan and Lisa Baker met in February 2006 at an Alcoholics Anonymous meeting. They became close friends, and Baker agreed to serve as Brennan's sponsor. In April of 2006, the two spent the weekend together at the Wintergreen resort playing golf. That same year, Baker and Brennan played golf together on Mother's Day. Baker moved in with Brennan in November of 2007.
Initially, Baker signed a lease, which provided that Baker would pay Brennan monthly rent in the amount of $1,500. Brennan did not recall whether Baker ever made any payments under the lease. In January of 2008, Brennan purchased a house for $859,000. She did not receive any financial assistance from Baker in buying the property. Brennan made a down payment on this house in the amount of $470,000.
Baker immediately moved into the new home with Brennan. By deed of gift, Brennan made Baker a joint tenant with the right of survivorship. Brennan explained that she executed the deed of gift so that, in the event of her premature death, Baker would provide for Brennan's children. No agreement, however, obligates Baker to provide for Brennan's children. Instead, the arrangement is rooted in mutual trust. Baker took over the mortgage payment shortly after Brennan purchased the house. The mortgage payment is $3,169 per month. Initially, Baker occupied the basement, but later moved her room to the master bedroom upstairs. Brennan occupies her own separate bedroom upstairs.
Baker pays the electric and water bills and also carries on her cellular telephone plan Brennan's cell phone, as well as cell phones used by Brennan's children Maggee and T.J. Brennan has paid for some "big ticket" items such as an expensive landscaping bill for tree removal. NeitherBaker nor Brennan keep an accounting of the various expenditures made for the benefit of the household.
Baker and Brennan maintain separate bank, credit card, and investment accounts, and neither has access to the other's accounts. The children, rather than Baker, are the beneficiaries of Brennan's life insurance policy. Brennan's and Baker's vehicles are separately titled.
With regard to the household's social life, Brennan and Baker dine together, along with the children. Baker and Brennan share chores, such as laundry and cooking. Baker attended two of Brennan's family reunions, in 2009 and 2010. Brennan also visited Baker's family in Ohio. Baker and Brennan occasionally attend church together. Brennan and Baker have vacationed together every year, along with their children.
Brennan and Baker's lives are closely intertwined with respect to childcare. Brennan's three children, Maggee, T.J., and Matthew, live with Brennan and Baker. In January of 2008, Baker gave birth to a daughter, Riley. Brennan was present at Riley's birth. From the time of Riley's birth, Brennan has taken care of Riley, along with her own children, while Baker is at work. This arrangement allowed Brennan to care for Matthew, who was nine at the time and who needed extra attention because he suffers from Asperger's syndrome. Baker does not pay Brennan for providing childcare. Brennan and Baker have attended school functions and events of each other's children. Brennan has bought a variety of items for Riley.
Baker and Brennan both denied having a romantic relationship with each other. Brennan testified that Baker is "like a sister to me." Baker said that Brennan is "a very good friend" and "[s]he is like a sister that I never had." Maggee testified that Baker and her mother are like "best friends" or "sisters." Neither Baker nor Brennan have been involved in a romantic relationship with anyone since they have been living together.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found that "there is no evidence in this case of a sexual relationship." The court reviewed the evidence and concluded that Brennan and Baker were "intimately intertwined" and found "by clear and convincing evidence that there has been cohabitation analogous to marriage for a period of a year." The court ordered the termination of Albertson's support obligation. Brennan appeals from this ruling.
In reviewing the decision of the trial court, "we view the evidence in the light most favorable to . . . the party prevailing below, 'and grant all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom.'" Johnson v. Johnson, 56 Va. App. 511, 513-14, 694 S.E.2d 797, 799 (2010) (quoting Anderson v. Anderson, 29 Va. App. 673, 678, 514 S.E.2d 369, 372 (1999)). We review questions of law, including questions of statutory construction, de novo. Louis Latour, Inc. v. Va. Alcoholic Bev. Contr. Bd., 49 Va. App. 758, 766, 645 S.E.2d 318, 322 (2007).
COHABITING WITH ANOTHER PERSON IN A RELATIONSHIP ANALOGOUS TO MARRIAGE.
The trial court found no evidence of sexual intimacy between Brennan and Baker, but concluded that this relationship nevertheless was analogous to marriage. Brennan argues that without romance or a sexual intimacy, her relationship with Baker cannot be a relationship that is "analogous to a marriage."
In resolving this question, "[w]e look to the plain meaning of the statutory language, and presume that the legislature chose, with care, the words it used when it enacted the relevant statute." Addison v. Jurgelsky, 281 Va. 205, 208, 704 S.E.2d 402, 404 (2011) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The General Assembly did not require a relationship to be identical to marriage. Instead, the legislature employed the term "analogous" to marriage. Code § 20-109(A). "Analogous" is commonly understood to mean "susceptible of comparison either in general or in some specific detail" or "having a similar function but differing in structure and origin." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 76 (1981). In Stroud v. Stroud, 49 Va. App. 359, 378, 641 S.E.2d 142, 151 (2007), we defined "analogous" as "similar in some way" or "one thing that has a resemblance in many respects, nearly corresponds, is somewhat like, or has a general likeness to some other thing but is not identical in form and substance." Of course, sexual intimacy and romance are highly relevant in determining whether two persons are cohabiting in a relationship analogous to a marriage. The General Assembly, however, did not make romance or sexual intimacy dispositive, and we are bound by that choice.
Similarly here, the absence of sexual intimacy or romance does not categorically preclude a finding of a relationship analogous to marriage. In determining whether two persons were cohabiting, we stated in Pellegrin that "[a]n intimate relationship does not necessarily requiresexual intimacy" and that "other indicia of a couple's close, interrelated functioning are equally important." Pellegrin, 31 Va. App. at 764, 525 S.E.2d at 616. We further emphasized "no one factor is determinative" and "[i]t is within the province of the trial court to determine what weight to accord each of the factors relevant to the matter presented." Id. at 766, 525 S.E.2d at 617. See also Penrod v. Penrod, 29 Va. App. 96, 101, 510 S.E.2d 244, 246 (1999) (...
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