Brenner v. Ebbert
Decision Date | 23 May 1968 |
Docket Number | No. 21346.,21346. |
Citation | 398 F.2d 762,157 USPQ 609 |
Parties | Edward J. BRENNER, Commissioner of Patents, Appellant, v. Robert J. EBBERT and Design Products Corporation, Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Mr. S. William Cochran, Attorney, United States Patent Office, with whom Mr. Joseph Schimmel, Solicitor, United States Patent Office, was on the brief, for appellant.
Mr. John A. Blair, Detroit, Mich., with whom Mr. John W. Malley, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellees. Mr. William K. West, Jr., Memphis, Tenn., also entered an appearance for appellees.
Before BAZELON, Chief Judge, and WRIGHT and TAMM, Circuit Judges.
Certiorari Denied October 28, 1968. See 89 S.Ct. 259.
This case concerns a question of procedure in the Patent Office. After applying for a patent, appellee Ebbert received from the Patent Office a notice of allowance, dated April 21, 1966. It was captioned "NOTICE OF ALLOWANCE AND ISSUE FEE DUE," and among other things stated: "With the allowance of the application, the above indicated Issue Fee becomes due and payment must be made within three months of the date of this Notice or the Patent will become abandoned (forfeited)." (Emphasis supplied.) Joint Appendix at 54. The issue fee was not paid within three months because of a clerical error on the part of appellees' counsel. On February 10, 1967, appellees tendered the fee, but appellant Commissioner of Patents rejected the tender on the ground that he had no authority to accept the fee after October 21, 1966, id est, more than an additional three months after the due date of July 21, 1966, set in the notice of allowance. The Patent Office practice had been — and is now — to send applicants a "NOTICE OF FORFEITED APPLICATION" when the issue fee was not paid within the initial three month period after issuance of the notice of allowance. However the practice was suspended from August 4, 1966 until March 1, 1967, as a result of an unusually heavy workload, and no such notice was sent to appellees.
When they tendered the fee, appellees petitioned the Commissioner to revive the abandoned application. The Commissioner dismissed the petition and appellees brought suit in the District Court to set aside that dismissal. They also sought to compel revival, acceptance of the issue fee and issuance of a patent. Cross motions for summary judgment were made, appellees' motion was granted and this appeal was taken.
Two statutes, 35 U.S.C. § 133 (1964) and 35 U.S.C. § 151 (Supp. II, 1965-66), are involved. They provide:
The fourth paragraph of § 151 specifically authorizes the Commissioner to accept issue fees if they are tendered with a fee for delayed payment, "within three months after the due date * * *" and if "sufficient cause is shown for the late payment * * *." Thus it is clear that the section does not authorize acceptance of the issue fee here, tendered more than six months after the due date. Appellees argue — and the District Court found — that § 133 allows the acceptance of issue fees without time limitation, if the more strict standard of "unavoidable delay" is met.1 This position is premised on a conclusion that that section's phrase "prosecute the application" encompasses all action taken by an applicant up to and including securing issuance of a patent. The Commissioner says the two sections are mutually exclusive, that § 151 is clearly applicable and that he has no authority to accept the issue fee more than three months after the due date.2 We agree.
A stated purpose of the 1965 amendments to § 151 was "to expedite the prosecution of patent applications and thus make new technology available to the public at an earlier date." S. Rep. No. 301, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1965), U. S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1965, pp. 2315, 2316. The prior time limit fixed the due date for payment of the issue fee at six months after the notice of allowance but authorized the Commissioner to accept late payment for one year after the due date. The 1965 amendments modified these time limits, making the due date three months after the notice of allowance and authorizing the Commissioner to accept the fee for an additional three months after the due date on a showing of "sufficient cause." (The statute did not theretofore require such a showing.) If § 133 were construed as allowing an abandonment to be revived at any time, the purpose of hastening the beginning — and hence the expiration — of the seventeen year monopoly period would be frustrated.
Sections 133 and 151 are contained in separate chapters of Title 35. Chapter 12, titled "Examination of Application," contains § 133, while Chapter 14, titled "Issue of Patent," contains § 151. This dichotomy is strong evidence that the phrase "prosecute the application" in § 133 comprehends only action taken by an applicant through gaining allowance of his application, because examination of the application is completed at that point. Congress established a separate statutory framework for what remains — issuance of the patent. It is a...
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