Brent v. Wayne Cnty. Dep't of Human Servs.
| Decision Date | 15 November 2012 |
| Docket Number | Case number 11-10724 |
| Parties | NATHANIEL H. BRENT, Plaintiff, v. WAYNE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
Honorable Julian Abele Cook, Jr.
In this civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the pro se Plaintiff, Nathaniel H. Brent, alleges that those individuals and entities who have been identified by him as Defendants1 are responsible for a multitude of violations of federal and Michigan law, all of which have had an adverse impact upon him.
Currently before the Court are two motions that have been filed by Brent; namely (1) a motion for reconsideration of an order in which some of the originally identified Defendants were dismissed as litigants; and (2) a motion to file supplemental authority. Also pending are four dispositive motions that have been submitted to the Court for its consideration by the following Defendants: (1) the State Defendants; (2) the Methodist Children's Home; (3) the Judson Center and its employee, Wendolyn Greene; and (4) the Children's Center of Wayne County ("Children's Center").2
Brent is the father of five minor children - three boys (ALB, RAB, and JAB), and two girls, (SAB and JAB). On January 17, 2010, RAB, then fifteen, left his home and arrived at a Detroit Police station barefoot and wearing only a pair of shorts. DPD Officer Donald Coleman (not a party to this case) submitted a report to the DHS regarding RAB's having run away from home. RAB returned to his home on the same evening.
In Brent's initial pleadings, he contends that Coleman effectively withdrew the complaint to the DHS, having advised DHS employee Mia Wenk that RAB had run away from his home as a result of his own poor decision-making. Notwithstanding, Brent asserts that Wenk completely disregarded Coleman's representations and initiated an investigation. Wenk visited his home onJanuary 20th and 21st, and thereafter made a referral of the Brent family to the Judson Center4 on February 16th. That same day, Brent's name was placed on Michigan's Central Registry for "physical neglect."
On February 18th, a petition to remove the children from the Brent home was filed with, and granted by, the Family Division of the Third Judicial Circuit Court for Wayne County ("Family Court"). That evening, DPD officers removed all five of the Brent children from their home. The female children were placed in the Davenport emergency shelter, and the male children were placed in the Wolverine emergency shelter.5 During a preliminary hearing before Referee Nicolas Bobak the following day, guardians ad litem and counsel were appointed for the Brent parents.6 Six days later (February 24th), the family court conducted a probable cause hearing, and probable cause was found to authorize the petition of removal.
On March 3rd, DHS employee Mia Trice placed the male children with Noel and Michael Chinavare and the female children with Wendy and Thomas Chinchak (not parties to this litigation). Brent states that Trice gave the Chinavares a document that claimed that they were the temporary guardians of the male children. Trice inspected the Brent home on March 10th, and deemed it to be a suitable home for the children. A pretrial hearing was held on March 12th before Referee Anthony Crutchfield, and additional pretrial hearings were held on March 23rd and 30thbefore Judge Judy Hartsfield. On March 26th, all of the children were removed from their respective placements and returned to the emergency shelters. The male children were subsequently placed at Methodist Children's Home on April 5th, whereas the female children were placed in a foster home on April 28th under the supervision of the Children's Center of Wayne County.
Subsequent pretrial hearings were held on May 3rd and May 10th. Guardians ad litem were appointed for each parent. A jury trial was conducted on May 11th, 12th, and 13th, with the jury eventually finding that one or more statutory grounds existed for the Family Court to exercise jurisdiction over the children. After a dispositional hearing on June 2nd, the children were released to their parents, along with a directive that they remain under the supervision of the DHS.7 On September 10th, upon finding that (1) the Brents had improved the conditions within their home and cooperated in receiving services, and (2) the children's needs were being met, the jurisdiction of the Family Court was terminated.
Feeling aggrieved by these circumstances, Brent commenced this lawsuit on February 22, 2011. He subsequently filed an amended complaint which, as it pertains to the Michigan DHS, seeks (1) a declaration that certain statutes and policies are unconstitutional facially and/or as applied to him; (2) injunctive relief which would prohibit further enforcement of these provisions; (3) a declaration that the procedures by which he was placed on the Central Registry were unconstitutional facially and/or as applied to him; and (4) a directive that would require his nameto be removed from the Central Registry.
With regard to the remaining Defendants, he alleged, against various sub-groups of the Defendants, (1) several claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for their interference with his rights, as guaranteed by the First, Second, Fourth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; (2) conspiracy to deprive him of his constitutional rights and conspiracy to retaliate against him for exercising those rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985; (3) failure to prevent the violation of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1986; (4) gross negligence; (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (6) a claim for failure to report medical neglect as required by Mich. Comp. Laws § 722.633(1).
The Court will initially address Brent's motion for reconsideration of an order of November 28, 2011, which, in pertinent part, granted (1) the State Defendants' motion to dismiss with respect to the Judicial Defendants; (2) the Chinavares' motion for summary judgment; and (3) Brent's motion to file an amended complaint regarding the remaining Defendants. (See Order, Nov. 28, 2011, ECF 113 ("Order")). Brent's pending motion challenges the first and second of those rulings.
The Local Rules of the Eastern District of Michigan require a party who seeks reconsideration of an order to (1) establish the existence of "a palpable defect by which the court and the parties and other persons entitled to be heard on the motion have been misled"; and (2) "show that correcting the defect will result in a different disposition of the case." E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(h)(3). A palpable defect is one that is "is obvious, clear, unmistakable, manifest, or plain." Chrysler Realty Co., LLC v. Design Forum Architects, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 2d 609, 618 (E.D. Mich.2008) (citation omitted). Furthermore, "the court will not grant motions for rehearing or reconsideration that merely present the same issues ruled upon by the court, either expressly or by reasonable implication." E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(h)(3).
Brent argues that the Court made two factual errors in its ruling. His first allegation of error relates to the following passage:
On February 18, a preliminary hearing was held before Referee Bobak, and the court issued an order to take the children into protective custody. That evening, all five children were removed from the home by DPD officers and placed into emergency shelters. At a preliminary hearing the following day, guardians at litem and counsel were appointed for the parents.
(Order at 3). Brent states that a petition for removal was filed and the order to place his children under protective custody was issued on February 18th, but that no preliminary hearing was conducted until the following day. He states that the removal order was "rubber stamped" with Judge Smith's name by a probation officer.8 Brent is correct that the Court erred with respect to the date of the preliminary hearing, and, to that extent, it amends its prior order. However, the Michigan Court Rules expressly contemplate that, barring certain circumstances not present here, the preliminary hearing must take place within twenty-four hours after the child is taken into protective custody. Mich. Ct. Rule 3.965(A)(1). There is no allegation that this action did not occur here.
Brent's second allegation of factual error relates to the following passage:
Brent does not allege - indeed, he cannot contend - that providing housing to children under a temporary guardianship arrangement is the exercise of an exclusivestate function. Cf. Reguli, 371 F. App'x at 600 ().
(Order at 20). Brent submits that the Court committed an error when it suggested that the child in question was a teenager, when in fact he was eleven years old.9 However, the Court made no such suggestion. On the contrary, the use of the signal "cf." indicates that the cited authority supports a proposition different than, but sufficiently analogous to, the main assertion (here, that providing housing to children under a temporary guardianship arrangement is not an exclusive state function). The citation to an analogous, but different, situation dealing with teenagers and court-ordered services does not "suggest" that the child in question was a teenager.10 The Court did not commit any error.
Brent also raises several objections to the application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine by the Court as it applies to the Judicial Defendants. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) ()....
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