Brentine v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.

• Decision Date: 31 March 2005
• Docket Number: No. 1-04-0430, No. 1-04-0432.
• Citation: 356 Ill. App.3d 760,826 N.E.2d 1057,292 Ill.Dec. 621
• Parties: Laurie A. BRENTINE and Krista and Larry Heiland, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

826 N.E.2d 1057

356 Ill. App.3d 760

292 Ill.Dec. 621

Laurie A. BRENTINE and Krista and Larry Heiland, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. 1-04-0430, 1-04-0432.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Fourth Division.

March 31, 2005.

Timothy V. Hoffman, Anne Cote Fung of Sanchez & Daniels, Chicago, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Scott M. Cohen of Krohn & Moss, Ltd., Chicago, for Defendant-Appellant.

Justice GREIMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiffs, Laurie A. Brentine and Krista and Larry Heiland, each filed complaints for breach of warranty against defendant, DaimlerChrysler Corp. Defendant presented settlement offers to each plaintiff, which they accepted and the circuit court enforced. Defendant appeals, contending that plaintiffs did not accept the settlement offers according to the terms it had offered. For the reasons that follow, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Plaintiffs each purchased vehicles manufactured by defendant in March 2001. Each vehicle was covered by a 3-year/36, 000-mile bumper-to-bumper warranty, and each manifested various defects soon after the date of purchase. Plaintiffs attempted to have repairs effected at various defendant dealerships, but the vehicles remained in defective condition, prompting plaintiffs to revoke their acceptances of the vehicles. They each filed suit alleging that defendant had breached both its express and implied warranties of merchantability, in violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty — Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act (15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq. (2000)).

The Brentine Suit

In October 2003, defendant sent Brentine an offer of settlement with her choice of either a 7-year/75,000-mile service contract on her vehicle or a $5,000 cash payment (inclusive of attorney fees). A few days later, defendant extended another offer of either the same service contract or a cash settlement of $7,500. The offer letter provided that plaintiff was to indicate her acceptance by noting her choice in a blank space and sending the letter to defendant via facsimile, and that defendant would send a release for Brentine to sign after it had received her acceptance. Brentine's attorney indicated that she would accept the $7,500 cash payment and transmitted the acceptance to defendant. Defendant then faxed its release form to Brentine's attorney. In response, Brentine's attorney wrote that she was accepting defendant's offer, but she desired that payment be issued in two separate checks, one in the amount of $5,000 for Brentine and the other in the amount of $2,500 for her attorney fee, and that she would sign the release upon receipt of the checks.

On receiving Brentine's letter, defendant returned it with a handwritten note indicating that it would not assent to Brentine's terms of payment and that it would adhere to the initial terms of its offer. Defendant sent its release to Brentine's attorney on two subsequent occasions without response. Brentine's attorney drafted his own release, had Brentine execute it, and sent it to defendant via e-mail. Defendant responded that the attached release was not the one it had sent and that payment would only ensue once Brentine executed the original release.

The release drafted by defendant read as follows:

"In consideration of $7,500.00, inclusive of attorney fees and costs, I/we, Laurie A. Brentine, release Daimler/Chrysler Corporation, its subsidiaries and dealerships, from all known and unknown claims, damages, costs, fees, loss of services, personal injuries and property damage related to date to a 2001 Chrysler PT Cruiser (VIN# : 3C8FY4BBX1T630569).

I/We agree to indemnify and hold the above parties harmless from all further claims, costs or expenses relating to this claim. I/We expressly agree that the only consideration I/We will receive is that listed above and that Daimler/Chrysler Corporation has made no other promises to me/us. I/We accept the consideration listed above as full satisfaction of this claim. Except as permitted by law, I/we agree not to talk about the details of this agreement and release to anyone. I/We understand that all of the above parties deny any liability for this claim I/We fully understand and freely sign this release."

The release drafted by Brentine's attorney read as follows:

"In sole consideration of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) to Plaintiff and Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($2,500.00) for Plaintiff's attorneys' fees, I, Laurie Brentine, release DaimlerChrysler Corporation, its subsidiaries and dealerships, from all known and unknown claims, damages, costs, fees, loss of services, personal injuries and property damage related to 01 Chrysler PT Cruiser, (VIN: 3C8FY4BBX1T630569).

I agree to indemnify and hold the above parties harmless from all further claims, costs, or expenses relating to this claim. I expressly agree that the only consideration I will receive is that listed above and that DaimlerChrysler Corporation has made no other promises to me. I accept the consideration listed above as full satisfaction of this claim. Except as permitted by law, I agree not to talk about the details of this agreement and release to anyone. I understand that all the above parties deny any liability for this claim.

I fully understand and freely sign this release."

After defendant had failed to remit payment within seven days of Brentine signing the release her attorney had drafted, Brentine moved for dismissal. On November 21, 2003, the circuit court entered an order dismissing the matter and stating that the court would retain jurisdiction in the event that the parties failed to fulfill any agreed to conditions or pay the agreed settlement amount. On November 24, 2003, Brentine filed a motion for turnover of the settlement proceeds and sanctions. In its response, filed on December 18, 2003, defendant stated that it had reached a settlement agreement but that Brentine had not upheld her obligations under the agreement because her attorney had sought payment through separate checks and had drafted and executed his own release stating as such. Defendant maintained that it was not required to tender payment because Brentine had not abided by the terms of the settlement offer and sought sanctions pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 137, arguing that her motion for turnover and sanctions was unnecessary. 155 Ill.2d R. 137.

The Heiland Suit

In the same month defendant extended its settlement offer to Brentine, it sent a letter to the Heilands, via facsimile, offering a settlement in the form of either a 7-year/75,000-mile service contract, a cash payment of $8,500 inclusive of attorney fees, or repurchase of their vehicle. The offer letter stated that the Heilands could accept the offer by indicating their preference, signing the letter, and sending it back to defendant. In response, the Heilands' attorney, from the same firm that represented Brentine, sent his own letter purporting to accept the cash settlement offer and stating that the settlement would be memorialized, "[a]s [they had] discussed," in the form of the Heilands receiving $6,250 and retaining ownership of their vehicle, and their attorney receiving a fee of $2,250, in two separate drafts.

The Heilands' attorney also drafted a release, which stated as follows:

"In sole consideration of Six Thousand Two Hundred and Fifty Dollars ($6,250.00) to Plaintiffs and Two Thousand Two Hundred and Fifty Dollars ($2,250.00) for Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, we, Larry and Krista Heiland, release DaimlerChrysler Corporation, its subsidiaries and dealerships, from all known and unknown claims, damages, costs, fees, loss of services, personal injuries and property damage related to 2001 Dodge Neon, (VIN: 1B3AS46F01D185776).

We agree to indemnify and the above parties harmless from all further claims, costs or expenses relating to this claim. We expressly agree that the only consideration we will receive is that listed above and that DaimlerChrysler Corporation has made no other promises to us. We accept the consideration listed above as full satisfaction of this claim. Except as permitted by law, we agree not to talk about the details of this agreement and release to anyone. We understand that all the above parties deny any liability for this claim.

We fully understand and freely sign this release."

The Heilands executed the release, sent it to defendant, and moved for dismissal. On November 10, 2003, the circuit court entered an order dismissing the matter and stating that the court would retain jurisdiction in the event that the parties failed to fulfill any agreed to conditions or pay the agreed settlement amount. Defendant subsequently sent the Heilands' attorney a letter indicating that their release was not acceptable.

On November 24, 2003, the Heilands filed a motion for turnover of the settlement proceeds and sanctions. In its response, filed on December 18, 2004, defendant stated that the parties had not reached a settlement agreement because the Heilands never accepted defendant's offer and had in effect rejected the terms of the offer and created their own counteroffer by drafting their own letter of acceptance as well as their own release. Defendant argued that such actions were unilateral and indicated no meeting of the minds as to settlement and again sought Rule 137 sanctions arguing that the Heilands' motion for turnover and sanctions was unnecessary and would cause needless increases in the cost of litigation. 155 Ill.2d R. 137.

On January 12, 2004, during a combined hearing on both Brentine's and the Heilands' motions, the parties admitted that each party's respective release, apart from the specific amounts to be paid to plaintiffs and the amounts to be paid to their attorneys, was identical to its counterpart as drafted by defendant. The court granted both plaintiffs' motions, finding that the amounts offered in each suit were the same as the amounts...