Breslin v. Brainard, NO. 01-CA-7269 (E.D. Pa. 11/1/2002)
| Decision Date | 01 November 2002 |
| Docket Number | NO. 01-CA-7269.,01-CA-7269. |
| Parties | MICHAEL T. BRESLIN Plaintiff, v. NORTON BRAINARD, et. al. Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Plaintiff Michael Breslin brings this action against defendant David Knorr ("Knorr") and others, alleging a deprivation of his federal civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count I) and a conspiracy to interfere with his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) (Count II). Presently before the court is Knorr's motion to dismiss the complaint as to Counts I and II pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
The instant case involves allegations of a conspiracy among some union officers, certain union members and a state parole officer to violate the plaintiff's federal civil rights. The plaintiff, a union member and state and federal parolee,1 asserts that Knorr and others plotted to revoke his parole after he refused to support an opposition candidate during a battle for control of a local union. The specific facts of plaintiff's complaint are set forth below.
Sometime before February 28, 1999, several individuals allegedly agreed to a scheme in which John Morris ("Morris"), the duly elected leader of Local Union 115 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters ("Local 115"), would be ousted from certain union leadership positions. Compl. ¶¶ 19, 20. In order to accomplish this goal, these individuals struck a deal with James P. Hoffa ("Hoffa"), the president of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters ("IBT"). Under the arrangement, if Hoffa imposed an emergency trusteeship on Local 115, and thus enabled local union members and officers to oust Morris from his leadership positions, then Hoffa would be allowed to fill these vacancies with "his people." Id. at ¶ 20. Plaintiff, who had joined Local 115 as a condition of his parole, was informed of this arrangement on February 28, 1999. He was asked for his support, but he declined to provide it. Id. at ¶ 20, 31. Plaintiff's refusal to offer his support, however, did not thwart the plan. On November 15, 1999, Hoffa, as promised, imposed an emergency trusteeship on Local 115, effectively ousting Morris from his union positions. Id. ¶ 22.
One week after the change in leadership, union officers Sean Heim ("Heim"), Charles Argeros ("Argeros"), Paul Vanderwoude ("Vanderwoude") and Leo Reilly ("Reilly") went to Huff Paper Co., where plaintiff worked, and informed the present Local 115 members who supported Morris that if they did not cooperate with the new IBT leadership they would "not get any representation whatsoever." Id. at ¶ 23. At this time, Heim directly threatened the grandson of Morris with bodily harm. Id. Two days later, plaintiff and six other Local 115 members filed a grievance at the Local 115 Union Hall based on the above statements and threats. Id. at ¶ 24.
In December 1999, the Honorable John R. Padova of this court granted a preliminary injunction sought by Morris with reference to the emergency trusteeship, which led to the holding of trusteeship hearings by the IBT from January through early March 2000. Id. at ¶ 26, 27. These hearings were held in order to meet the IBT's requirements for imposing an emergency trusteeship. Id. ¶ 27. During the pendency of these hearings, plaintiff and other Local 115 members, believing the trusteeship was imposed for inappropriate reasons and that the IBT hearings were "a kangaroo court," picketed outside the Local 115 Union Hall. Id. ¶¶ 28, 29.
On March 14, 2000, in response to the preceding events, plaintiff filed charges with the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB"). Id. ¶ 30. One of the charges cited the threats that had been made to Morris' grandson. Id. The NLRB then scheduled a meeting with plaintiff for May 5, 2000. Id. The purpose of the meeting was for plaintiff to provide testimony and sign an affidavit in support of the charges. Id.
On May 3, 2000, plaintiff attended his regularly scheduled meeting with his federal probation officer, Magdelyn Baez ("Baez"). Id. at ¶ 32. At the meeting, Baez informed plaintiff that Norton Brainard ("Brainard"), the attorney for Local 115, sent her a videotape of him on the picket line and that Brainard claimed that this behavior was a violation of plaintiff's supervised release. Id. Although Baez did not believe that plaintiff had violated the terms of his federal supervised release by picketing, she did caution him to be careful about what he said and did on the picket line. Id. She also indicated to plaintiff that Brainard and Gerald McNamara ("McNamara"), an officer in Local 115, had been seeking his arrest for the past six months. Id. The next day, Knorr, plaintiff's state parole agent, left a citation at plaintiff's home directing him to appear at Knorr's office on the following day, May 5, 2000, which also happened to be the day that plaintiff was scheduled to provide testimony at the NLRB meeting. Id. at ¶ 33.
When plaintiff arrived at Knorr's office on May 5, 2000, he was arrested and put in a holding cell. Id. at ¶ 34. Approximately ten minutes after being placed in the holding cell, Knorr arrived and said: Id. at ¶ 35. While plaintiff was in the holding cell, Knorr conducted an allegedly illegal search of plaintiff's car. Id. at ¶ 36. During that search, three utility knives and a cell phone were found. Id. At 2:00 p.m., Knorr and four parole officers took plaintiff to his home where they conducted an allegedly illegal search of his house. Id. at ¶ 37. Nothing was found during the search of plaintiff's home. Id. Plaintiff was then sent to Graterford Prison, where he remained for one week while Knorr prepared the parole violation charges against him. Id. at ¶ 38.
Plaintiff was subsequently charged with four violations of his state parole. Id. Upon being informed of these charges, plaintiff requested a full parole panel hearing, which was granted and set for June 6, 2000. Id. at ¶ 39. Shortly before the hearing date, an additional charge was brought against plaintiff based on an allegation by William Oswald ("Oswald"), a member of Local 115, that he had been threatened and harassed by plaintiff at work. Id. At the June 6, 2000 parole hearing, Oswald provided allegedly false testimony consistent with his allegation of plaintiff's assaultive behavior. Id. at ¶ 40. Based on this testimony, the parole board revoked plaintiff's parole and incarcerated him for thirteen months, causing him to lose his job with Huff Paper Co. Id. at ¶¶ 4, 41.
Based on the aforementioned events, on December 31, 2001, plaintiff filed the instant complaint against Knorr and other defendants. Plaintiff alleges that Knorr and various other defendants violated and conspired to violate his federal civil rights. Presently before the court is Knorr's motion to dismiss plaintiff's Section 1983 and 1985 claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
In ruling on a motion to dismiss2 for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court must accept as true all well-pleaded allegations of fact in the plaintiff's complaint, and any reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom, and must determine whether "under any reasonable reading of the pleadings, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). But a court need not credit a complaint's "bald assertions" or "legal conclusions" when deciding a motion to dismiss. In re Burlington Coat Factory Securities Litigation, 114 F.3d 1410, 1429-30 (3d Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). Claims should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) only if "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). But a court need not credit a complaint's "bald assertions" or "legal conclusions" when deciding a motion to dismiss. In re Burlington Coat Factory Securities Litigation, 114 F.3d 1410, 1429-30 (3d Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).
Plaintiff bring civil rights claims against Knorr under Sections 1983 and 1985. As set forth below, the court will grant the plaintiff leave to amend his Section 1983 claim and will dismiss plaintiff's Section 1985 claim.
Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action against any person who, acting under color of state law, deprives another of his federal rights.3 Count I of plaintiff's complaint alleges a deprivation of federal constitutional rights, in violation of Section 1983, against Knorr and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania4. Knorr moves to dismiss plaintiff's Section 1983 claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). He argues that plaintiff fails to adequately plead the elements of a Section 1983 claim.
Two allegations are required in order to state a cause of action under Section 1983. First, a plaintiff must allege that a person deprived him of a federally protected right. Second, a plaintiff must allege that the person who deprived him of the right acted under color of state law. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980) (citations omitted). Knorr argues that plaintiff's complaint fails to make a prima facie showing of the first element. The court agrees.
Without expressly mentioning any constitutional or federal statutory right, plaintiff appears to allege that Knorr violated his federal rights by conducting an illegal seizure and two illegal searches. While one might assume plaintiff is alleging a deprivation of certain Fourth Amendment rights, he does not expressly say so in his complaint. In his complaint, plaintiff concludes that the "conduct alleged in said paragraphs [¶ 33-41] constitute[s] [a] deprivation...
To continue reading
Request your trial