Bressman v. Farrier
| Decision Date | 30 May 1990 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 89-1186,89-1187,s. 89-1186 |
| Citation | 900 F.2d 1305 |
| Parties | Rick Dean BRESSMAN, Appellant, v. Hal FARRIER, et al., Appellees. George GOFF, Appellee, v. Crispus NIX; Harold Farrier; Deputy Warden Henry; Correctional Officer Spangler; Correctional Officer Rooney; Correctional Officer Marshall; Correctional Officer Severin; Correctional Officer Drummond; Correctional Officer Stevens; Correctional Officer Fields; Correctional Officer Dilks, Appellants. George GOFF, Appellee, v. Steve DAILEY, Superintendent of Clarinda; Correctional Officer Huskins, Appellant. Laurence BURGIN, Appellee, v. Hal FARRIER; Paul Grossheim; Crispus Nix; Ron Welder; Charles Harper; Marion Ware; John Sanders; Randall Martain; R.W. McVeigh; John Lewis; A.K. Anderson; Richard McAllon; Neal Breding; Captain Bridle; J.R. Goetz; Gerald Dolf; George Finn; Lt. Mitchell; Paul Schrock; John Dewey; Richard Larkin; George Clymax; Rick Barlow; Donell Prough; Lt. Birdsell; Steve Young; Kevin Selton; Lt. Barnard; Lt. Crowell; James Rennea; Ray Olson; Pat McLaughlin; Bob Washington, Appellants. Ronald W. BREWER and James Whited, Jr., Appellees, v. John HENRY; Sarah Coats; James Burton (Captain), Appellants. Ronald A. MAHERS, Appellee, v. Crispus C. NIX; Charles Harper; Ken Wittry; Ronald G. Welder; Paul Grossheim, Appellants. Charles O. REESE, Appellees, v. Hal FARRIER; C.C. Nix, Warden; Hedgepeth; John Henry; Ron G. Welder; Charles Harper, Appellants. Chester WALTON, Jr., Appellee, v. Crispus C. NIX; Charles Harper; Lieutenant Ship; Ronald G. Welder, Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Philip B. Mears, Iowa City, Iowa, for appellants.
Layne M. Lindebak, Des Moines, Iowa, for appellees.
Before HEANEY, * BOWMAN, and MAGILL, Circuit Judges.
These consolidated appeals draw us once more into that ambiguous borderland between habeas corpus actions and suits brought by state prisoners under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, which we first explored in Offet v. Solem, 823 F.2d 1256, 1257 (8th Cir.1987). In Offet, we held that under Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973), the appropriate vehicle for a state prisoner who is directly attacking the length of his confinement and seeking restoration of his good-time credits is a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which requires exhaustion of state remedies before coming into federal court. Offet, 823 F.2d at 1257. In addition to seeking restoration of his good-time credits, however, Offet requested declaratory relief and damages. Nevertheless, we recognized that a federal ruling in favor of Offet on the constitutional issue underlying his section 1983 claim for declaratory relief and damages would effectively establish an irrefutable claim for early or immediate release under habeas, and thereby preclude state consideration of the same issue in a subsequent state proceeding. Id. at 1258. Accordingly, we concluded the same comity which required the district court to stay Offet's section 1983 claim for restoration of his good-time credits pending exhaustion of his state remedies, also required the court to stay his claim for declaratory relief and damages. Id. at 1259.
In each of the cases now before us, one or more inmates in the Iowa prison system seek relief in federal court under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 from prison discipline that allegedly violated their constitutional rights. After our decision in Offet, the state moved to dismiss or stay further proceedings until the inmates exhausted their state remedies under Iowa Code Sec. 663A.2(6) (1987), which sets forth the procedures by which prisoners can challenge the forfeiture of good-time credits in state court. A stay was granted in the case of Bressman v. Farrier, No. 89-1186. 1 The remaining cases were consolidated, No. 89-1187, and the motions for stay were denied on May 6, 1988. 2 We granted the petitions for interlocutory appeal filed by plaintiff Bressman and by the state.
Ronald Brewer's section 1983 complaint challenges the constitutionality of his lengthy confinement in predisciplinary investigative lock-up. Because summary placement in investigative lock-up does not entail a loss of good-time credits, a finding that the prison had acted unconstitutionally would not affect the length of Brewer's confinement, and the rationale of Offet is inapplicable. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of the motion to stay, and remand for further proceedings.
James Whited was placed in investigative lock-up at the same time as Brewer and filed a similar complaint. Noting the similarity between the complaints, the district court joined the two cases under the same district court number. Although the district court's order denying the motion to stay refers only to Brewer it appears the state and Whited believe the order also applies to him. We remand for clarification of the district court's order in light of our disposition of Brewer v. Henry.
George Goff's complaint alleges the prison disciplined him in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights. Although Goff's discipline included forfeiture of sixteen days of good-time credits, the prison suspended imposition of the sanctions. Because Goff thus did not forfeit any good-time credits, a federal determination on the merits of his claim would not affect the length of his confinement, and Offet does not apply. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of the motion to stay, and remand for further proceedings.
Rick Bressman's section 1983 action seeks damages and the restoration of good-time credits that he lost as the result of a disciplinary action. Bressman alleges the prison violated his constitutional rights by disciplining him for the contents of a letter he wrote to his brother. Because a federal determination on the merits of this claim would affect the length of Bressman's confinement, the district court was correct in staying Bressman's claim. Furthermore, we do not believe Bressman's subsequent attempt to omit his request for restoration of good-time credits warrants a different result. As we noted in Offet, "the question of whether exhaustion should be required should not be determined solely by reference to the relief the plaintiff requests." Offet, 823 F.2d at 1258.
Bressman also alleges his rights were violated when the prison, in contravention of prison regulations, failed to notify his brother that it had intercepted and confiscated the letter sent to him by Bressman. Because this claim does not involve the deprivation of good-time credits, the district court correctly denied the stay as to this claim, and we affirm.
George Goff's section 1983 claim seeks a declaration that disciplinary action, resulting in the forfeiture of good-time credits and disciplinary segregation, violated his constitutional rights. Goff did not challenge his discipline in state court as provided by Iowa Code Sec. 663A.2(6), and as the district court noted, the three-year statute of limitations for bringing any state action relating to the discipline expired prior to our decision in Offet. The district court ended its analysis at this point and denied the motion to stay on the ground that any subsequent state action would be futile given the statute of limitations. Nevertheless, we believe the important principles of federalism underlying the exhaustion requirement, see Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 433, 83 S.Ct. 822, 846, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963), require the district court to dismiss Goff's federal claim unless he can establish cause for his failure to seek state relief in a timely manner. Accordingly, we remand for further proceedings.
Chester Walton's complaint, filed in 1986, challenges disciplinary action taken in 1986 that resulted in a forfeiture of good-time credits. In his answer to the state's petition for interlocutory appeal, Walton indicates that he filed a state postconviction action in 1984, which was dismissed in 1985 for failure to prosecute. He apparently did not appeal the dismissal. Walton further states he was unable to prosecute his state action because he did not have contact with his attorney and therefore was unaware of any hearings or that his action had been dismissed. Because the district court did not have this information before it, we remand to the district court with directions that Walton's complaint be dismissed unless he establishes cause for his failure to prosecute his state action or appeal its dismissal.
Charles Reese's complaint, filed in July 1987, challenges the results of disciplinary action taken between September 1984 and February 1985, and also alleges violations of his Eighth Amendment rights by reason of brutality at the hands of prison guards. Reese seeks damages, restoration of good-time credits, and expungement of disciplinary records. He filed a state postconviction action in May 1987 challenging some of the disciplinary proceedings. The action was dismissed in 1988 when Reese did not appear at a hearing. He did not appeal the dismissal. Accordingly, as in Walton v. Nix, we remand for a determination of whether Reese can establish cause for his failure to appear at the hearing or appeal the dismissal. If not, his claims arising from the disciplinary proceedings must be dismissed. Because Reese's Eighth Amendment claim does not involve good-time credits, it is not governed by Offet, and may proceed in district court.
Ronald Mahers filed his section 1983 claim seeking damages and restoration of the good-time credits he lost as the result of a prison disciplinary hearing. Mahers initiated an administrative appeal from his disciplinary hearing, and received a rehearing at which the results of the first disciplinary hearing were confirmed. H...
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