Brett v. Jefferson County, Ga.

• Decision Date: 01 April 1996
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. CV193-144.
• Citation: 925 F. Supp. 786
• Parties: Herbert E. BRETT, David Hannah, Wayne D. Hattaway, and Jerry O. Hudson, Plaintiffs, v. JEFFERSON COUNTY, GEORGIA, and Charles Gary Hutchins, individually and in his official capacity as Sheriff of Jefferson County, Georgia, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia

925 F. Supp. 786

Herbert E. BRETT, David Hannah, Wayne D. Hattaway, and Jerry O. Hudson, Plaintiffs, v.JEFFERSON COUNTY, GEORGIA, and Charles Gary Hutchins, individually and in his official capacity as Sheriff of Jefferson County, Georgia, Defendants.

Civil Action No. CV193-144.

United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Augusta Division.

April 1, 1996.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Marcia Borowski, Megan Gideon, Stanford, Fagan & Giolito, Atlanta, GA, John Paul Batson, Augusta, GA, for plaintiffs.

Michael Allen O'Quinn, Margaret E. Sanders, Barnhart, O'Quinn & Williams, Atlanta, GA, for defendants.

ORDER

BOWEN, District Judge.

Before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.For the reasons stated herein, the motion is GRANTED.

I.BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs are former deputy sheriffs of Jefferson County, Georgia.They filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, contending Defendants violated their First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution when they were terminated from their employment.Plaintiffs assert similar state law claims based upon the Georgia Constitution.Plaintiffs also allege a cause of action under the Comprehensive Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161, et seq.¹Defendants seek summary judgment against Plaintiffs on the federal constitutional claims and the COBRA claim.

The operative facts are as follows.Early in 1992, Zollie Compton, then Sheriff of Jefferson County, Georgia, announced that he would not seek reelection in November.At the time, each Plaintiff had served as a deputy sheriff in the Jefferson County Sheriff's Department for a number of years.

Following Sheriff Compton's announcement, three Democratic candidates announced they would seek election as Sheriff of Jefferson County.Those candidates were DefendantCharles Gary Hutchins, PlaintiffWayne D. Hattaway and PlaintiffJerry O. Hudson.²Both PlaintiffsHerbert E. Brett and David Hannah actively campaigned for Plaintiff Hudson during the Democratic primary and run-off elections.Plaintiff Hudson was Defendant Hutchins' primary opponent.In August, Defendant Hutchins defeated Plaintiff Hudson in the Democratic run-off.The Plaintiffs did not support Defendant Hutchins in the general election.In November, Defendant Hutchins was elected Sheriff of Jefferson County.

There is some dispute about the nature of Plaintiffs' campaign activities in the primary and general elections.The parties' respective allegations in this regard are presented exhaustively in the record and, for reasons that will be evident, I need not recite and review the particulars of each side's version of events.The summary judgment evidence will be explored as necessary and in appropriate detail later.For now, it is sufficient to note that Defendants contend Plaintiffs' activities during the primary and general elections reflected more than a lack of support for Defendant Hutchins.Defendants maintain that Plaintiffs actively campaigned against Hutchins, often in a disparaging and hostile manner.

Having prevailed in the election, Defendant Hutchins wrote each Plaintiff on November 24, 1992, to advise him that his employment as a deputy with the Jefferson County Sheriff's Department would end with Sheriff Compton's term of office on December 31, 1992.Plaintiffs received no pre- or post-termination hearing in connection with the decision not to reappoint them as deputy sheriffs.Defendant Hutchins became sheriff on January 1, 1993.

Plaintiffs allege their termination without a hearing violated their procedural due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.³Plaintiffs also allege that Defendant Hutchins violated their First Amendment rights by terminating them for actively campaigning against him.Defendants seek summary judgment on these two constitutional claims.

II.ANALYSIS

A.Requirements for Summary Judgment

The Court should grant summary judgment only if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).In this case, the non-movingparty has the burden of proof at trial.Thus, the moving party may carry its burden at summary judgment either by presenting evidence negating an essential element of the non-moving party's claim or by pointing to specific portions of the record which demonstrate that the non-moving party cannot meet its burden of proof at trial, seeClark v. Coats & Clark, Inc.,929 F.2d 604, 606-08(11th Cir.1991)(explainingAdickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142(1970), andCelotex Corp. v. Catrett,477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265(1986)); merely stating that the non-moving party cannot meet its burden at trial is not sufficient, id. at 608.Any evidence presented by the movant must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.Adickes,398 U.S. at 157, 90 S.Ct. at 1608.

If — and only if — the moving party carries the initial burden, then the burden shifts to the non-moving party"to demonstrate that there is indeed a material issue of fact that precludes summary judgment."Clark,929 F.2d at 608.The non-moving party cannot carry its burden by relying on the pleadings or by repeating conclusory allegations contained in the complaint.Morris v. Ross,663 F.2d 1032, 1033-34(11th Cir.1981), cert. denied,456 U.S. 1010, 102 S.Ct. 2303, 73 L.Ed.2d 1306(1982).Rather, the non-moving party must respond by affidavits or as otherwise provided in Fed.R.Civ.P. 56."The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor."Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513, 91 L.Ed.2d 202(1986).

The clerk has given the non-moving party notice of the summary judgment motion, the right to file affidavits or other materials in opposition, and of the consequences of default; thus, the notice requirements of Griffith v. Wainwright,772 F.2d 822(11th Cir.1985), are satisfied.The time for filing materials in opposition has expired, and the motion is ripe for consideration.The Court will proceed to review the applicable substantive law and inquire whether the moving parties — and, if necessary, the non-moving parties — have carried their burden as set forth above.SeeClark,929 F.2d at 609 n. 9.

B.Summary Judgment in this Case

Plaintiffs assert their federal claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.Section 1983 creates a federal remedy for a deprivation of any federal right.Wideman v. Shallowford Community Hosp., Inc.,826 F.2d 1030, 1032(11th Cir.1987).An actionable § 1983 claim requires proof of a deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States and that the deprivation was by a person or persons acting under color of law.Id.That Defendant Hutchins acted under color of law is undisputed.Plaintiffs contend that Defendant Hutchins, acting under color of law, violated their First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

In this summary judgment motion, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs had no property interest in their position as sheriff's deputies, and therefore Plaintiffs were not denied procedural due process.Defendants further contend that the sheriff's interest in running an effective and efficient law enforcement agency outweighs Plaintiffs' First Amendment interests.Finally, Defendant Hutchins argues he is entitled to qualified immunity on all claims.

Plaintiffs' Procedural Due Process Claim

There is no dispute that Plaintiffs were not afforded a pre- or post-termination hearing.To establish a due process violation, however, Plaintiffs must show they had a protected property interest.Board of Regents v. Roth,408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548(1972).Thus, the issue is whether Plaintiffs had a protected property interest in their positions as deputy sheriffs of the Jefferson County Sheriff's Department as determined by the applicable state law.Seeid.

Under Georgia law, a public employee has a property interest in continued employment if the employee can be terminated only for cause.Brownlee v. Williams,233 Ga. 548, 212 S.E.2d 359(1975).Because O.C.G.A. § 15-16-23⁴ confers upon Georgia sheriffs complete and exclusive discretion to appoint deputies, traditionally, sheriffs deputies serve at the sheriffs pleasure.Wayne County v. Herrin,210 Ga.App. 747, 437 S.E.2d 793(1993).

In 1983, the Georgia Constitution was amended to provide that "the General Assembly may by general law authorize the establishment by governing authorities of civil service systems covering county employees or covering county employees and employees of the elected county officers."Ga. Const., Art. IX, Sec. I, Par. IV.Consequently, the General Assembly passed O.C.G.A. § 36-1-21 in 1986, which authorizes county authorities to establish civil service systems for county employees.Thus, county employees covered by a civil service system that provided for termination only for cause would have a property interest in continued employment.See, e.g., Brownlee,233 Ga. 548, 212 S.E.2d 359.

Section 36-1-21(b) provides that a county's civil service system would apply only to departments subject to the jurisdiction of elected county officials, such as the sheriff's department, if the elected official makes written application for such action and the county governing authority approves of such application by ordinance or resolution.O.C.G.A. § 36-1-21(b).

According to the record, Jefferson County's Personnel Manual was drafted in April 1984.There is some question about whether the Personnel Manual was ever officially and formally adopted by the County as a civil service system, but there is no dispute that the materials were distributed to and used by Jefferson County officials, including the Sheriff.On October 24, 1989, Sheriff...