Brewster v. State

• Decision Date: 15 February 1917
• Docket Number: 23,092
• Citation: 115 N.E. 54,186 Ind. 369
• Parties: Brewster v. State of Indiana
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

115 N.E. 54

186 Ind. 369

Brewster v. State of Indiana

No. 23,092

Supreme Court of Indiana

February 15, 1917

Rehearing Denied June 8, 1917.

From Pike Circuit Court; John L. Bretz, Judge.

Prosecution by the State of Indiana against William Brewster. From a judgment of conviction, the defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

Frank Ely and J. L. Sumner, for appellant.

Evan B Stotsenburg, Attorney-General, and Thomas H. Branaman, for the State.

OPINION

Spencer, J.

Appellant was tried and convicted on an indictment which charges that he and three others, at a time and place fixed, "did then and there unlawfully, knowingly and feloniously unite combine, conspire, confederate and agree to and with each other for the object and purpose, and with the unlawful and felonious intent to then and there unlawfully and feloniously, willfully and maliciously set fire to and burn a certain store building," etc.

In prosecuting this appeal, appellant earnestly insists that the circuit court erred in overruling his motion for a new trial for the reason, among others, that the verdict of the jury is wholly unsupported by the evidence. It must be conceded that some of the evidence which was introduced in behalf of appellant tends to raise serious doubt as to the credibility of certain important witnesses for the State, but that issue has been determined by the verdict of the jury and we are now to consider that evidence on which such verdict must have been based.

It appears from the testimony of the witness Heacock, one of the alleged conspirators, that sometime prior to the attempted burning of the building in question, and during a conversation between witness and appellant, the latter expressed some feeling against the occupant of the place and offered Heacock fifty dollars to burn the store, but he refused to do so. The subject was mentioned on one or two occasions thereafter before witness agreed that he would start the fire if appellant would get one Coleman, another of the alleged conspirators, "to stand good for the money." Heacock asserted that appellant agreed to do this, and that Coleman afterwards said, to quote the witness, that "what me and that fellow were talking about was all right. He would see that I got that money when that happened." Thereupon, and without the knowledge of appellant, witness employed Harrell, the fourth alleged conspirator, to assist him in committing the act. Some features of this testimony are corroborated by that of other witnesses.

It must be borne in mind that the indictment is based on § 2647 Burns 1914, Acts 1905 p. 584, 742, and charges appellant with conspiracy to commit a felony. The term "criminal conspiracy" is not susceptible of exact definition but in general, has been said to be "a combination of two or more persons, by some concerted action, to accomplish some criminal or unlawful purpose, or to accomplish some purpose not in itself criminal or unlawful by criminal or unlawful means." 5 R. C. L. 1061, § 1. In another section of the same work, the law governing the proof of such a conspiracy is thus succinctly stated and well sustained by authority: "Conspiracies need not be established by direct evidence of the acts charged, but may and generally must be proved by a number of indefinite acts, conditions and circumstances which vary according to the purposes to be accomplished. The very existence of a conspiracy is generally a matter of inference deduced from certain acts of the persons accused, done in pursuance of an apparently criminal or unlawful purpose in common between them. The existence of the agreement or joint assent of the minds need not be proved directly. It may be inferred by the jury from other facts proved. It is not necessary to prove that the defendants came together and actually agreed in terms to have the unlawful purpose, and to pursue it by common means. If it be proved that the defendants pursued by their acts the same object, often by the same means, one performing one part and another another part of the same so as to complete it, with a view to the attainment of that same object, the jury will be justified in the conclusion that they were engaged in a conspiracy to effect that object. If, therefore, one concurs in a conspiracy, no proof of an agreement to concur is necessary in order to make him guilty." 5 R. C. L. 1088, § 37, and...