Brezina v. Dowdall
| Citation | 472 F. Supp. 82 |
| Decision Date | 28 June 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 79C1309.,79C1309. |
| Parties | Gladys BREZINA, Plaintiff, v. Colleen DOWDALL, Individually and in her capacity as Executive Director of the Dupage County Housing Authority, and the Dupage County Housing Authority, Defendants. |
| Court | United States District Courts. 7th Circuit. United States District Court (Northern District of Illinois) |
Leslie Robbins, Wheaton, Ill., for plaintiff.
Hartman E. Stime, Dale W. Bruckner, Peregrine, Stime & Newman, Ltd., Wheaton, Ill., for defendants.
Plaintiff Gladys Brezina brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and money damages. Defendants are Colleen Dowdall, Executive Director of the DuPage County Housing Authority, and the DuPage County Housing Authority (hereinafter, the "Public Housing Authority" or "PHA"). Plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that she was denied due process of law when the PHA denied her request for continuing participation under the United States Housing Act of 1937; 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (the "Act") and 24 C.F.R. § 882.209(e)(1), promulgated under the Act.
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. Pending before the Court is defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Rule 12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P. For the reasons set forth below, defendants' motion is denied.
Plaintiff is a 67 year-old resident of DuPage County, Illinois. Defendant DuPage County Housing Authority was created pursuant to Ill.Rev.Stat. (1977) ch. 67½, §§ 1, et seq., to provide or assist in providing safe, decent, sanitary housing for the benefit of DuPage County residents. As a Public Housing Authority, it receives funds from the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") and is obliged to adhere to rules and regulations promulgated by HUD under 42 U.S.C. § 1437f.
In August 1977, plaintiff applied to the PHA for certain benefits. She was found to meet the eligibility requirements under the Act and its regulations. On August 25, 1977, the PHA issued plaintiff a Certificate of Family Participation, which authorized her to receive housing assistance payments if she entered into a lease within 60 days. On September 1, 1977, plaintiff entered into a lease for an apartment. She received payments of $173 from the PHA to assist her to meet her $200 per month rent.
On August 18, 1978, the PHA orally informed plaintiff that her housing assistance payments would terminate upon the expiration of her lease on August 31, 1978. Plaintiff alleges that she requested continuation of her benefits to enable her to obtain other housing, pursuant to 24 C.F.R. § 882.209(e). Without written notice or hearing, the PHA allegedly denied plaintiff continued benefits. Plaintiff alleges that without housing assistance payments, she cannot afford private housing.
Defendants argue that plaintiff fails to allege that she had submitted a written, signed application for a Certificate of Family Participation, as required by 24 C.F.R. § 882.209(a)(3). Therefore, defendants contend, plaintiff fails to state a claim that she was wrongfully denied benefits under 24 C.F.R. § 882.209(e). The gist of defendants' argument is that because plaintiff failed to comply with the procedural requirements for applying for housing assistance payments, therefore waiving any property right she may have had in the benefits, due process was not required for their denial. Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that plaintiff's complaint alleges compliance with 24 C.F.R. § 882.209(e).
24 C.F.R. § 882.209(a)(3), relied upon by defendants, provides that "every applicant for a Certificate shall complete and sign the form of application prescribed by HUD." 24 C.F.R. § 882.209(e)(1) provides in pertinent part:
If an assisted Family notifies the PHA that it wishes to obtain another Certificate of Family Participation for the purpose of finding another dwelling unit within the area in which the PHA has determined that it is able to enter into Contracts or that it has found another such unit to which it wishes to move, the PHA shall . . . issue another Certificate or process a Request for Lease Approval, as the case may be, . . .
It is clear that plaintiff does not allege that she completed and signed the form of application prescribed by HUD for obtaining another Certificate of Family Participation. It is not clear, however, that the subsection of the regulation requiring formal applications (a)(3) applies to subsection (e)(1), which specifies only that an assisted family "notify" the PHA for continuing participation. We therefore look to the purpose of the Act and its regulations to interpret § 882.209.
42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a) provides:
For the purpose of aiding lower-income families in obtaining a decent place to live and of promoting economically mixed housing, assistance payments may be made with respect to existing, newly constructed, and substantially rehabilitated housing in accordance with the provisions of this section.
24 C.F.R. § 882.101(a)(1) provides:
The policies and procedures contained herein are applicable to the making of Housing Assistance Payments on Behalf of Eligible Families Leasing Existing Housing pursuant to the provisions of section 8 of the U.S. Housing Act of 1937 ("Act").
It is apparent, from the statutory language and the regulations promulgated to effect the Act, that the purpose of the Act is to enable poor and elderly persons, like plaintiff, to take full advantage of housing assistance offered by the federal government. The stated purpose of the Act compels this Court to look beyond a strict interpretation of the formal requirements of the regulations.
Although defendant is correct that plaintiff fails to allege that she applied for a new Certificate, plaintiff does allege that she notified the PHA that she sought continuation of benefits to enable her to obtain other housing. The pleadings and memoranda are silent as to the method plaintiff employed in making her alleged §...
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Holbrook v. Pitt, 80-1006
...termination of their certificates of family participation in the Section 8 subprogram for existing housing. 36 See also Brezina v. Dowdall, 472 F.Supp. 82 (N.D.Ill.1979). And, in Ressler v. Landrieu, No. A77-228C (D.Alas. March 6, 1980), the court extended due process protection to prospect......
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