Brezinski v. Widener Univ.
| Decision Date | 28 January 2022 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 20-cv-4939-JMY |
| Citation | 582 F.Supp.3d 257 |
| Parties | Sara BREZINSKI, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v. WIDENER UNIVERSITY |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Alec M. Leslie, Joseph I. Marchese, Bursor & Fisher, P.A., New York, NY, Joseph N. Kravec, Jr., Feinstein Doyle Payne & Kravec, LLC, Pittsburgh, PA, for Sara Brezinski.
James C. Sargent, Jr., Law Offices of Lamb & McErlane, P.C., West Chester, PA, Kathleen S. O'Connell-Bell, Rocco P. Imperatrice, III, Lamb McErlane, P.C., Newtown Square, PA, for Widener University.
In reaction to government mandated closures and the life-threatening consequences of the novel coronavirus outbreak, in early 2020, Widener University shuttered its campuses. Rather than come to a grinding halt, however, Widener moved its classes online. Many would agree that these measures were prudent and unavoidable. But how Widener has managed the financial aspects of this process has become a central concern for Plaintiff and other students, who have paid thousands of dollars in tuition and fees. What followed is a putative class action complaint alleging the inability of Widener, with brick-and-mortar locations, to deliver services as promised as it transitioned from in-person courses to an online learning model. Plaintiff has alleged that because Widener cancelled all in-person activities and instruction, that she and other similarly situation students were deprived of the benefit of their bargain. In particular, Plaintiff argues that she received a materially different education of reduced value than what she and other students were promised.
This case, like many similar actions filed against educational institutions throughout the country, present novel legal issues about what happens when the unexpected occurs, and the only written expression of the parties’ agreement–such as course catalogs, registration materials and student handbooks – hardly look like a comprehensive contract. Now before this Court is Defendant Widener University's Motion to Dismiss. This matter is briefed and appropriate for disposition without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78 ; L.R. 7.1(f). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants the Motion.
Plaintiff Sara Brezinski was a full-time graduate student pursuing a Master's of Education in Human Sexuality Studies at Widener University. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) On or about January 13, 2020, classes for the spring semester began at Widener and were scheduled to end on or around May 8, 2020. (Id. at 5.) For the spring semester, Plaintiff paid $5,800 out-of-pocket to Defendant in tuition and certain mandatory fees, such as a technology, graduate student and health fee. (Id. ) Prior to enrolling in Widener's spring 2020 semester and paying tuition and fees, Plaintiff consulted Widener's course catalog and the course registration process. (Id. ) The online registration process at Widener permitted students to pick classes that were "On-Line" or at the "Main Campus" location. (Id. At 3-5.) For the classes Plaintiff registered for, none made any mention of online learning. (Id. ) Indeed, course specific syllabi included information regarding the on-campus class location such as the building and classroom number along with meeting dates and times. (Id. ). Widener's class attendance policy emphasized that "[r]egular attendance and class participation are important factors in student learning," and that faculty are "expected to articulate this idea ... [and to] ... monitor student progress and attendance regularly," but nothing implied in-person learning. (Id. ) Plaintiff alleges that her understanding and belief was that every course she was enrolled in, was to be taught in-person. (Id. ) Plaintiff also alleges that she "would not have paid as much, if any, tuition for the Spring 2020 semester at Widener had she known that the courses would not, in fact, be taught in-person." (Id. ) Plaintiff states in her Complaint that Widener's tuition and fees for in-person learning are higher than for online courses and programs.1 (Id. at 10.)
In early 2020, the Covid-19 pandemic arrived profoundly impacting the daily life of most Americans and almost every business. The educational sector was not sparred. For the benefit and safety of all, and in response to the global pandemic, on March 11, 2020 Widener announced that it was suspending all in-person classes effective March 12, 2020 and would transition to online learning for the rest of the semester on March 19, 2020. (ECF No. 1 at 3-4; ECF No. 14-3 at 116-124.) On March 19, 2020, Pennsylvania Governor Tom Wolf and the Pennsylvania Department of Health issued an order that prohibited all colleges and universities from resuming in-person instruction closing the Widener campus for the remainder of the 2019-2020 academic year. (ECF No. 14-3 at 83-86.)
By the time universities and colleges were permitted to reopen, the spring 2020 semester had already concluded. Plaintiff asserts that the on-line learning options offered by Widener, and which she received, was in no way equivalent to the in-person education Plaintiff paid for, depriving her of the opportunity for collaborative learning and in-person dialogue, feedback, and critique. (Id. ). She also alleges that Plaintiff has not received a refund for any portion of her tuition or fees paid for this semester, despite the fact that in-person classes were shut down. (ECF No. 1 at 3-4.) As a result, on October 6, 2020, Plaintiff Sara Brezinski brought this action on behalf of herself, and others similarly situated, seeking a partial refund of tuition and fees paid to Widener University, asserting breach of contract, unjust enrichment, conversion and money had and received common law claims. On November 30, 2020, Defendant filed its Motion to Dismiss.
To survive a Rule 12(b) motion, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Igbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). A claim is plausible when the plaintiff pleads "factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. Conclusory recitation of the elements of a cause of action is not sufficient. Phillips v. Cty of Allegheny , 515 F. 3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008). Rather, the plaintiff must allege facts necessary to make out each element. Id. (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 563 n. 8, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). In other words, the complaint must contain facts which, if proven later, support a conclusion that a cause of action can be established.
In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), we first separate the factual and legal elements of a claim, accepting the well-pleaded facts as true and disregarding legal conclusions. Then, we determine whether the alleged facts make out a plausible claim for relief. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside , 578 F. 3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ). All well-pleaded allegations in the complaint must be accepted as true and interpreted in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, and all inferences must be drawn in the plaintiffs’ favor. See McTernan v. City of York , 577 F. 3d 521, 526 (3d. Cir. 2009).
In deciding a motion to dismiss, courts generally consider only the allegations of the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint and matters of public record. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc. , 998 F. 2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied , 510 U.S. 1042, 114 S.Ct. 687, 126 L.Ed.2d 655 (1994). Courts may consider documents incorporated by reference in the complaint. California Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys. V. Chubb Corp. , 394 F. 3d 126, 134 (3d Cir. 2004). However, courts may also consider "an undisputedly authentic document that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the document." Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. , 998 F.2d at 1196. Courts may do so because "the primary problem raised by looking to documents outside the complaint—lack of notice to the plaintiff—is dissipated where the plaintiff has actual notice ... and has relied upon [those] documents in framing the complaint." Schmidt v. Skolas , 770 F. 3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks, alteration, and citation omitted). "Otherwise, a plaintiff with a legally deficient claim could survive a motion to dismiss simply by failing to attach a dispositive document on which it relied." Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. , 998 F. 2d at 1196 (citing Goodwin v. Elkins & Co. , 730 F. 2d 99, 113 (3d Cir. 1984) ). Courts may consider these documents without having to convert the motion to one for summary judgment. Id.
In its Motion, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's allegations are tantamount to an educational malpractice claim, which is not cognizable under Pennsylvania law. Under Pennsylvania law, which applies in this diversity action, there is a distinction between an action for breach of a contractual obligation and one for educational malpractice; while the former may be maintained, the latter may not. See Cavaliere v. Duff's Bus. Inst. , 413 Pa.Super. 357, 605 A.2d 397, 403 (Pa. Super. 1992.) ; see also Glenn Distribs. Corp. v. Carlisle Plastics, Inc. , 297 F.3d 294, 300 n. 3 (3d Cir. 2002) (). The prohibition on educational malpractice claims stems from the court's recognition of the subjective nature of what constitutes a quality education, the lack of a workable standard of care, and the need to afford flexibility to educational institutions.
Plaintiff's Complaint, however, is not challenging the quality of...
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