Bride v. Cathedral Art Metal Co., Inc.

• Citation: 19 A.2d 317
• Decision Date: 02 April 1941
• Docket Number: No. 1408.,1408.
• Parties: BRIDE v. CATHEDRAL ART METAL CO., INC.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island

19 A.2d 317

BRIDE

v. CATHEDRAL ART METAL CO., INC.

No. 1408.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

April 2, 1941.

Appeal from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties; Alberic A. Archambault, Judge.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Robert H. Bride, claimant, opposed by the Cathedral Art Metal Company, Inc., employer. From a decree of the superior court denying compensation, claimant appeals.

Affirmed and remanded.

Lisker, Sullivan & Lisker and Eugene J. Sullivan, all of Providence, for petitioner.

Haslam, Arnold & Sumpter and Harry A. Tuell, all of Providence, for respondent.

FLYNN, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal by the petitioner from a decree entered in the superior court denying relief prayed for under the Workmen's Compensation Act, General Laws 1938, chapter 300.

The evidence was undisputed and showed, among others, the following material facts: The petitioner was employed for many years by the respondent and about one half of each year was spent in the performance of duties usual to the employment of a traveling salesman. The respondent manufactured goods and sold them to retail store customers, and not directly to the consumer.

On April 21, 1937, petitioner made one of his customary trips to Buffalo, arriving there about 5 o'clock p. m., and established his headquarters at a hotel. He first telephoned to a customer and arranged to meet him at the hotel on the following day. Being desirous of obtaining information concerning a possible "contact" in Depew, New York, which might aid one of his customers, and possibly lead to a sale, he tried to obtain it by telephoning to another customer or friend. That person was not at home and petitioner later telephoned some friends in Buffalo, who formerly had lived in Depew, thus making an engagement to visit them that evening.

He had been friendly with them for about five years and had visited them on previous occasions when he was traveling in that vicinity. He arrived, about 8 or 8:30 p. m., at their home, where he remained until about 11 p. m., when he left to return to his hotel. While walking to a nearby corner, where he intended to board a street car, he was injured by an automobile, necessitating hospital and doctors' services, and resulting in about eleven weeks' disability. There was no direct evidence that petitioner knew, before his visit, that these friends would have the desired information, or specifically what details he desired; and his only testimony about his success in obtaining it is: "I was satisfied with the information I received, yes."

The trial justice found, in substance and effect, that the petitioner was not injured by an accident which happened in the course of his employment; that any business purpose involved in the visit to his friends that evening was purely "incidental" as distinguished from duties in the course of his employment; and that the accident did not arise out of his employment, because it had occurred on a highway where the risk of injury was common to that of the public and might have happened to him wholly apart from his employment.

The petitioner contends substantially, if we understand correctly, that the findings of the trial justice are not supported by any competent evidence, and therefore the case presents a question of law that is reviewable by this court; second, that recovery by a traveling salesman, who has been injured under...