Bridge v. New Holland Logansport, Inc.
Decision Date | 09 March 2016 |
Docket Number | No. 15–1935.,15–1935. |
Citation | 815 F.3d 356 |
Parties | William BRIDGE, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. NEW HOLLAND LOGANSPORT, INC., Defendant–Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Quincy E. Sauer, Attorney, Macey Swanson & Allman, Indianapolis, IN, for Plaintiff–Appellant.
Lyle Raymond Hardman, Attorney, Hunt Suedhoff Kalamaros LLP, South Bend, IN, for Defendant–Appellee.
Before WOOD, Chief Judge, ROVNER, Circuit Judge, and SHAH, District Judge.*
William Bridge was fired from his job at New Holland Logansport in March 2011, when he was 61 years old. Bridge sued Logansport under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., which prohibits employers from discharging individuals because of their age, id. § 623(a)(1). The statute defines "employer" as someone who has twenty or more employees for each working day, in each of twenty or more calendar weeks, in the calendar year of (or in the year preceding) the discriminatory act. Id. § 630(b). After concluding that New Holland Logansport did not have twenty or more employees, the district court granted Logansport's motion for summary judgment. We affirm.
New Holland Logansport, an Indiana-based company that sold farm equipment, was one of several commonly-owned corporations. Another was New Holland Rochester. The two companies operated as separate stores, maintained separate bank accounts, and generated their own invoices. Each company filed its own tax returns (though both used on their respective returns New Holland Rochester's address, and tax records for both companies were kept at that location). Store inventories were also maintained individually; however, Rochester employees could view Logansport's inventory (and vice-versa) through a shared computer program. According to Bridge, the two companies also shared certain equipment, such as trucks used for hauling, and ordered motor oil together in order to get a discount. Money collected at Logansport was delivered each day to the Rochester location, and a Rochester employee would take the cash to the bank for deposit. Although each company was responsible for its own advertising, both were featured on the same website (www.newholland rochester.com).
New Holland Rochester and New Holland Logansport were, as just noted, commonly owned. Jim Straeter owned all of Rochester's shares and 87.5% of Logansport's shares; Mike Stephenson, Logansport's general manager, owned the remainder of Logansport's stock. Stephenson and Straeter, along with Straeter's wife, Melinda, made up the board of directors for Logansport. The Straeters (but not Stephenson) served as directors for Rochester. There was some overlap in personnel, too: Melinda Straeter coordinated payroll for Rochester and Logansport; Bob Cannedy did human-resources work for both companies (and stored personnel files for employees of both corporations at his office in Rochester); and Stacy Conner did accounting for each. Workers at both companies were subject to the same personnel policy and enjoyed the same employee benefits, and holiday parties were combined (as were monthly sales meetings and informational meetings about changes in health insurance). Computer-training sessions for employees of both companies were held at Rochester, and Logansport's financial records were kept there, as well. Bridge's paychecks were sent to him from the Rochester location. Operations were otherwise managed separately, with Stephenson in charge at Logansport and Cannedy and Jim Straeter at the helm in Rochester.
Bridge worked at New Holland Logansport from October 2000 to March 2011, when he was terminated. Stephenson fired Bridge, though Stephenson told Bridge that the decision was actually Jim Straeter's, and that Stephenson—who did not want to let Bridge go—was merely following Straeter's instructions. At all times during the year Bridge was fired (and in the preceding calendar year), Logansport listed on its payroll fewer than 20 individuals. The payroll fluctuated between 17 and 18 employees in 2011, and between 16 and 19 employees in 2010.
Bridge sued New Holland Logansport in June 2012, alleging discrimination in violation of the ADEA. The district court granted summary judgment to Logansport, concluding that Logansport did not have enough employees to qualify as an "employer" under the statute.
We review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment, and construe all facts and draw all reasonable inferences in Bridge's favor. Burritt v. Ditlefsen, 807 F.3d 239, 248 (7th Cir.2015) (citation omitted). Summary judgment is proper when "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).
To qualify as an "employer" under the ADEA, one must have twenty or more employees for each working day, in each of twenty or more calendar weeks, either in the calendar year of or the year preceding the alleged discrimination. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b). Bridge was fired in 2011, and the parties agree that New Holland Logansport did not have on its payroll twenty or more employees in either 2011 or 2010. Logansport did, however, have at least seventeen formal employees during much of this time, and Bridge contends that three individuals employed by New Holland Rochester (Bob Cannedy, Stacy Conner, and Melinda Straeter) also maintained employment relationships with Logansport—thus bringing the latter within the ADEA's reach. The district court concluded that none of these individuals was employed by New Holland Logansport, and that even if they were, still they could not be counted toward the ADEA's statutory minimum because they were at most part-time employees.
Part-time status does not preclude counting an employee toward the twenty-person minimum. Whether an individual was "employed" by someone on a particular working day depends not on whether (or the extent to which) the individual actually worked that day, but on whether there was an employment relationship at that time. See Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enters., Inc., 519 U.S. 202, 206–08, 117 S.Ct. 660, 136 L.Ed.2d 644 (1997) ( ).1 The question here, then, is whether New Holland Logansport maintained an employment relationship with Cannedy, Conner, or Melinda Straeter in 2010 or 2011 (and if so, whether that relationship existed for twenty or more weeks in that calendar year).
Bridge argues that these individuals necessarily maintained employment relationships with New Holland Logansport, because they were not "independent businesspeople"—that is, Cannedy was not formally employed by a human-resources company, Conner was not employed by an outside accounting firm, and Melinda Straeter did not work for or own a separate payroll company. But the issue is not whether these individuals were "independent" from Logansport in the sense that they were self-employed or worked for non-New Holland companies: everyone agrees that these workers were directly employed by New Holland Rochester. The question is whether Cannedy, Conner, or Melinda Straeter also had an indirect employment relationship with New Holland Logansport, such that they were jointly employed by both corporations. Cf. Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1088 (7th Cir.2008) () (citation omitted). To determine whether there existed an employer-employee relationship with Logansport, we look to the economic realities of the work situation. See Love v. JP Cullen & Sons, Inc., 779 F.3d 697, 702 (7th Cir.2015). Five factors, derived from principles of agency law, are useful. They are: (1) the extent of the putative employer's control and supervision over the putative employee; (2) the kind of occupation and nature of skill required; (3) the putative employer's responsibility for the costs of operation; (4) the method and form of payment and benefits; and (5) the length of the job commitment. Id. (citing Knight v. United Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 950 F.2d 377, 378–79 (7th Cir.1991) ).
We consider first the most important Knight factor: the extent to which the putative employer controlled the alleged employee. See Love, 779 F.3d at 702–03. Control depends, to a significant degree, on the ability to hire and fire. See id. at 703 (discussing EEOC v. Illinois, 69 F.3d 167, 171 (7th Cir.1995) ). Logansport's manager, Mike Stephenson, had the authority to hire and fire Logansport employees. Cannedy, Conner, and Melinda Straeter, however, were not formally employed by New Holland Logansport, and the record is silent as to whether Stephenson could have terminated Logansport's relationship with any of them. Also relevant is whether the putative employer had the right to control and direct an individual's work, "not only as to the result to be achieved, but also as to the details by which that result is achieved." Id. (quoting Alexander v. Rush North Shore Med. Ctr., 101 F.3d 487, 493 (7th Cir.1996) ) (emphasis omitted). But Bridge points to no evidence that Stephenson had, with respect to Cannedy, Conner, or Melinda Straeter, any authority of this kind. There is no suggestion that Stephenson dictated these individuals' duties, set their schedules, or otherwise supervised the performance or execution of their work. Bridge has not shown that New Holland Logansport exercised over these individuals the kind of control indicative of an employer-employee relationship.
The second and third Knight factors concern, respectively, the type of occupation and nature of skills required for the job, and the responsibility for operating costs. If important job skills were obtained in the putative employer's workplace, this suggests an employment relationship. See Love, 779 F.3d at 704 (citing Knight, 950 F.2d at 378 ). There is no evidence that Cannedy, Conner, or Melinda Straeter...
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