Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co.

Citation553 U.S. 639,21 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 295,76 USLW 4381,128 S.Ct. 2131,2008 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8339,170 L.Ed.2d 1012,08 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6929
Decision Date09 June 2008
Docket NumberNo. 07–210.,07–210.
CourtU.S. Supreme Court
PartiesJohn BRIDGE et al., Petitioners, v. PHOENIX BOND & INDEMNITY CO. et al.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Syllabus *

Each year the Cook County Treasurer's Office holds a public auction to sell its tax liens on delinquent taxpayers' property. To prevent any one buyer from obtaining a disproportionate share of the liens, the county adopted the “Single, Simultaneous Bidder Rule” (Rule), which requires each buyer to submit bids in its own name, prohibits a buyer from using “apparent agents, employees, or related entities” to submit simultaneous bids for the same parcel, and requires a registered bidder to submit a sworn affidavit affirming its compliance with the Rule. Petitioners and respondents regularly participate in the tax sales. Respondents filed suit, alleging that petitioners fraudulently obtained a disproportionate share of liens by filing false compliance attestations. As relevant here, they claim that petitioners violated and conspired to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) through a pattern of racketeering activity involving mail fraud, which occurred when petitioners sent property owners various notices required by Illinois law. The District Court dismissed the RICO claims for lack of standing, finding that respondents were not protected by the mail fraud statute because they did not receive the alleged misrepresentations. Reversing, the Seventh Circuit based standing on the injury respondents suffered when they lost the chance to obtain more liens, and found that respondents had sufficiently alleged proximate cause because they were immediately injured by petitioners' scheme. The court also rejected petitioners' argument that respondents are not entitled to relief under RICO because they had not received, and therefore had not relied on, any false statements.

Held: A plaintiff asserting a RICO claim predicated on mail fraud need not show, either as an element of its claim or as a prerequisite to establishing proximate causation, that it relied on the defendant's alleged misrepresentations. Pp. 2137 – 2145.

(a) In 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), RICO provides a private right of action for treble damages to [a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation,” as pertinent here, of § 1962(c), which makes it “unlawful for any person employed by or associated with” a qualifying enterprise “to conduct or participate ... in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity,” including “mail fraud,” § 1961(1)(B). Mail fraud, in turn, occurs whenever a person, “having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud,” uses the mail “for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice.” § 1341. The gravamen of the offense is the scheme to defraud, and any ‘mailing ... incident to an essential part of the scheme’ ... satisfies the mailing element,” Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 712, 109 S.Ct. 1443, 103 L.Ed.2d 734, even if the mailing “contain[s] no false information,” id., at 715, 109 S.Ct. 1443. Once the relationship among these statutory provisions is understood, respondents' theory of the case is straightforward. Petitioners nonetheless argue that because the alleged pattern of racketeering activity is predicated on mail fraud, respondents must show that they relied on petitioners' fraudulent misrepresentations, which they cannot do because the misrepresentations were made to the county. Nothing on the statute's face imposes such a requirement. Using the mail to execute or attempt to execute a scheme to defraud is indictable as mail fraud, and hence a predicate racketeering act under RICO, even if no one relied on any misrepresentation, see Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 24–25, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35; and one can conduct the affairs of a qualifying enterprise through a pattern of such acts without anyone relying on a fraudulent misrepresentation. Thus, no reliance showing is required to establish that a person has violated § 1962(c) by conducting an enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity predicated on mail fraud. Nor can a first-party reliance requirement be derived from § 1964(c), which, by providing a right of action to [a]ny person” injured by a violation of § 1962, suggests a breadth of coverage not easily reconciled with an implicit first-party reliance requirement. Moreover, a person can be injured “by reason of” a pattern of mail fraud even if he has not relied on any misrepresentations. For example, accepting respondents' allegations as true, they were harmed by petitioners' scheme when they lost valuable liens they otherwise would have been awarded. Pp. 2137 – 2140.

(b) None of petitioners' arguments—that under the “common-law meaning” rule, Congress should be presumed to have made reliance an element of a civil RICO claim predicated on a violation of the mail fraud statute; that a plaintiff bringing a RICO claim based on mail fraud must show reliance on the defendant's misrepresentations in order to establish proximate cause; and that RICO should be interpreted to require first-party reliance for fraud-based claims in order to avoid the “overfederalization” of traditional state-law claims—persuades this Court to read a first-party reliance requirement into a statute that by its terms suggests none. Pp. 2139 – 2145.

477 F.3d 928, affirmed.

THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Theodore M. Becker, Chicago, IL, for petitioners.

David W. DeBruin, Washington, DC, for respondents.

Eric D. Miller, for the United States as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting the respondents.Peter Buscemi, Joseph Brooks, Michelle Park Chiu, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, Washington, D.C., Theodore M. Becker, Counsel of Record, James E. Bayles, Jr., Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, Chicago, Illinois, for Petitioners.Lowell E. Sachnoff, David C. Bohan, John W. Moynihan, Reed Smith LLP, Chicago, IL, Jonathan L. Marks, Katten Muchin Rosenmann LLP, Chicago, IL, David W. DeBruin, Counsel of Record, Ian Heath Gershengorn, Matthew S. Hellman, Carrie F. Apfel, Sharmila Sohoni, Jenner & Block LLP, Washington, DC, for Respondents.Justice THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO or Act), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968, provides a private right of action for treble damages to [a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation” of the Act's criminal prohibitions. § 1964(c). The question presented in this case is whether a plaintiff asserting a RICO claim predicated on mail fraud must plead and prove that it relied on the defendant's alleged misrepresentations. Because we agree with the Court of Appeals that a showing of first-party reliance is not required, we affirm.

I

Each year the Cook County, Illinois, Treasurer's Office holds a public auction at which it sells tax liens it has acquired on the property of delinquent taxpayers.1 Prospective buyers bid on the liens, but not in cash amounts. Instead, the bids are stated as percentage penalties the property owner must pay the winning bidder in order to clear the lien. The bidder willing to accept the lowest penalty wins the auction and obtains the right to purchase the lien in exchange for paying the outstanding taxes on the property. The property owner may then redeem the property by paying the lienholder the delinquent taxes, plus the penalty established at the auction and an additional 12% penalty on any taxes subsequently paid by the lienholder. If the property owner does not redeem the property within the statutory redemption period, the lienholder may obtain a tax deed for the property, thereby in effect purchasing the property for the value of the delinquent taxes.

Because property acquired in this manner can often be sold at a significant profit over the amount paid for the lien, the auctions are marked by stiff competition. As a result, most parcels attract multiple bidders willing to accept the lowest penalty permissible—0%, that is to say, no penalty at all. (Perhaps to prevent the perverse incentive taxpayers would have if they could redeem their property from a winning bidder for less than the amount of their unpaid taxes, the county does not accept negative bids.) The lower limit of 0% creates a problem: Who wins when the bidding results in a tie? The county's solution is to allocate parcels “on a rotational basis” in order to ensure that liens are apportioned fairly among 0% bidders. App. 18.

But this creates a perverse incentive of its own: Bidders who, in addition to bidding themselves, send agents to bid on their behalf will obtain a disproportionate share of liens. To prevent this kind of manipulation, the county adopted the “Single, Simultaneous Bidder Rule,” which requires each “tax buying entity” to submit bids in its own name and prohibits it from using “apparent agents, employees, or related entities” to submit simultaneous bids for the same parcel.2 id., at 67. Upon registering for an auction, each bidder must submit a sworn affidavit affirming that it complies with the Single, Simultaneous Bidder Rule.

Petitioners and respondents are regular participants in Cook County's tax sales. In July 2005, respondents filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, contending that petitioners had fraudulently obtained a disproportionate share of liens by violating the Single, Simultaneous Bidder Rule at the auctions held from 2002 to 2005. According to respondents, petitioner Sabre Group, LLC, and its principal Barrett Rochman arranged for related firms to bid on Sabre Group's behalf and directed them to file false attestations that they complied...

To continue reading

Request your trial
1045 cases
  • In re Chrysler-Dodge-Jeep Ecodiesel Mktg.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of California
    • March 15, 2018
    ...Out-of-Circuit Decisions...963d. RICO Injury Summary...9642. Proximate Cause...965a. Fraud-on-the-Regulators Theory...965i. Bridge , Anza , and Rezner ...965ii. Application...966b. Direct Relationship Requirement...967c. Difficulty Apportioning Damages...968d. Fraud on the Market...969B. Me......
  • City of S.F. v. Purdue Pharma L.P.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of California
    • September 30, 2020
    ...flexible concept that does not lend itself to 'a black-letter rule that will dictate the result in every case.'" Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 654-55 (2008) (quoting Holmes, 503 U.S. at 272 n.20). Three main cases guide this Court's analysis of direct causation: Bridge,......
  • Cal. Equity Mgmt. Grp., Inc. v. Sinclair (In re Sinclair)
    • United States
    • United States Bankruptcy Courts. Ninth Circuit. U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Eastern District of California
    • November 29, 2017
    ..."requires the plaintiff to establish proximate cause in order to show injury 'by reason of a RICO violation.'" Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 654 (2008). Civil RICO allows for joint and several liability. See Beneficial Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Madariaga, 851 F.2d 271, ......
  • Aarp v. American Family Prepaid Legal Corp., Inc., Case No. 1:07cv202.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina
    • February 25, 2009
    ...because of a lack of first-party reliance (Doc. 20 at 9-10; Doc. 36 at 7-9) has been rejected by Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 2131, 2145, 170 L.Ed.2d 1012 (2008), which issued after briefing was 7. It is difficult to conclude that the court's statement in Ent......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 firm's commentaries
21 books & journal articles
  • Racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations.
    • United States
    • American Criminal Law Review Vol. 46 No. 2, March 2009
    • March 22, 2009
    ...will enforce the law as private attorneys general, there is little need to deal with indirect injury problems. Id. at 269-70. (317.) 128 S. Ct. 2131 (2008). (318.) Id. at 2138 (holding that bidders in a tax lien public auction were not required to establish reliance in their suit against de......
  • Racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations.
    • United States
    • American Criminal Law Review Vol. 47 No. 2, March 2010
    • March 22, 2010
    ...will enforce the law as private attorneys general, there is little need to deal with indirect injury problems. Id. at 269-70. (321.) 128 S. Ct. 2131 (322.) Id. at 2138 (holding that bidders in a tax lien public auction were not required to establish reliance in their suit against defendant ......
  • Fraud and Misrepresentation
    • United States
    • ABA Antitrust Library Business Torts and Unfair Competition Handbook Business tort law
    • January 1, 2014
    ...v. Ciba Specialty Chems. Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1238 (S.D. Ala. 2009) (citation omitted). 215. Bridge v. Phx. Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 661 (2008). 204 Business Torts and Unfair Competition Handbook misrepresentation.” 216 But that “does not transform reliance itself into an el......
  • Racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations.
    • United States
    • American Criminal Law Review Vol. 49 No. 2, March 2012
    • March 22, 2012
    ...Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 256-57 (1994) (quoting [section] 1961(1)); but see Bridge v. Phx. Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 653-54 (2008) (requiring RICO plaintiffs to demonstrate that predicate acts were a proximate cause of their (37.) These acts include "murde......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT