Bridgeman v. City of Bedford Heights
| Decision Date | 03 April 2019 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 1:18 CV 2481 |
| Parties | MIA M. BRIDGEMAN, Plaintiff, v. City of Bedford Heights, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pro se Plaintiff Mia M. Bridgeman brings this action against the City of Bedford Heights ("City") asserting a variety of claims related to her employment with the City. (Doc. #: 1). Also before the Court is Plaintiff's motion to proceed with this matter in forma pauperis. (Doc. #: 2). That motion is granted.
For the reasons that follow, this case is dismissed.
Plaintiff details her claims in an eleven page attachment to the Complaint, which is a combination of narrative and numbered questions with answers (Doc. #: 1-1). Plaintiff alleges that she is an administrative assistant in the Senior/Disabilities office for the City. She was initially hired by the City in February 2008 as a part-time front desk receptionist. Plaintiff claims that she was later promoted to an administrative assistant in the senior department, but paid "almost $2.00 less than the previous employee in November 2011." (Id. at 6, ¶ 16-17).
In January 2013, her supervisor was Bill Starkey ("Starkey") (whom Plaintiff describes as a white male) and his title was Senior Coordinator. Starkey took a medical leave and Plaintiff alleges that, during his absence, she performed his job in addition to hers. Ruth Gray ("Gray") was the Director of the Community Center at the time. When Starkey returned in May 2013, he was given other responsibilities outside the senior department and Plaintiff was told to report to Gray. In September 2013, Plaintiff was told that Starkey's former position of Senior Coordinator was being eliminated and alleges that she was required to perform "all the senior department duties alone." (Id. at 1). Plaintiff claims that she "was performing the exact same job as my former supervisor whom just happened to be a Caucasian male." (Id. at 3, ¶ 1; at 5, ¶ 15).
Plaintiff alleges violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Equal Pay Act, American with Disabilities Act, and Family and Medical Leave Act in connection with her employment by the City. Plaintiff's claims revolve around Gray, and states that she suffers from manic depression and "had to seek mental and physical treatment due to unfair treatment from Ruth Gray." (Id. at 1).
Plaintiff filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). She does not attach the charge to the Complaint,1 but does attach the City's response, which is dated July 28, 2014. (Doc. #: 1-2). According to the City's response, Plaintiff's EEOC charge alleged race (African-American) and gender discrimination under Title VII, disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act, and denial of equal pay. In her charge, Plaintiff claimed that she assumed Starkey's duties but Mayor Fletcher Burger ("Mayor") and Gray denied her a pay increase and told her that she must perform the duties requested by Gray, that Gray refused to purchase required work supplies, that she is required to use her lunch break for medical appointments for her approved FMLA leave, and that during performance reviews Gray discussed Plaintiff's medications and the medical condition of her husband. (See id. at 1).
It is unclear from the Complaint or documents attached thereto what transpired with respect to Plaintiff's EEOC charge after the City's response. Ultimately, Plaintiff withdrew her EEOC charge and the EEOC issued a right to sue letter, both occurring on July 24, 2018. (See Doc. #: 1-4).
Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standards than pleadings drafted by lawyers, and must be liberally construed. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). That said, federal district courts are expressly required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) to screen all in forma pauperis actions and to dismiss before service any such action that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. The standard for dismissal articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) with respect to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) also governs dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). Therefore, in order to survive scrutiny under § 1915(e)(2)(B), a pro se complaint "'must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.'" Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
Under Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002), a plaintiff need not plead the elements of a prima facie case of employment discrimination to survive a motion to dismiss, or in this case, a § 1915 screening. That said, Swierkiewicz did not change the law of pleading, and "offers no gateway for a plaintiff to side-step the 'plausibility' standard laid out in Twombly and Iqbal." Smith v. Wrigley Mfg. Co., LLC, 749 F. App'x 446, 448-49 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing Keys v. Humana, Inc., 684 F.3d 605, 609-10 (6th Cir. 2010)). Plaintiff must, therefore, advance facts which, taken as true, plausibly allege that the City is liable for the claimed conduct. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 ().
Plaintiff claims that the City violated the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). Plaintiff does not state under which Title of the ADA she brings this action. Because her claims are related to her employment with the City, the Court infers that she brings this action under Title I.
Under Title I of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), employers are prohibited from "discriminating against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." Discrimination under the ADA includes taking an adverse action against an otherwise qualified individual "on the basis of disability," and failing to make a reasonable accommodation for an employee with a known disability. See Johnson v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 922 F. Supp. 2d 658, 666 (S.D. Ohio 2013) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a), 12112(b)(5)(A)). Under the ADA, "disability" means "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities" of an individual. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A).
As an initial matter, Plaintiff denies that she has a disability, but does allege that she has several health issues, including job stress, a car accident in 2013, and serving as a care giver for her disabled husband. (Doc. #: 1-1 at 5, ¶ 10). Plaintiff alleges that she documented all doctor appointments for her husband and herself, but does not allege that she provided the City with any medical documentation of a disability under the ADA. (See id. at 5, ¶ 11). Nor does Plaintiff allege that she was discriminated against or denied accommodation with respect her alleged job stress or health issues resulting from the 2013 car accident. In the absence of a disability as defined by the ADA, or discrimination or failure to accommodate on the basis of a perceived disability, Plaintiff fails to state a plausible ADA claim.
Plaintiff also states that she had carpel tunnel and back issues in 2008 through 2010. To the extent that Plaintiff's carpel tunnel and back issues constituted a disability, or that the City regarded her as disabled, Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege that the City violated the ADA by failing provide a reasonable accommodation or otherwise discriminating against her. Indeed, Plaintiff requested certain work equipment in connection with her carpel tunnel and back issues, such as a wrist mouse pad, keyboard, and chair,2 which she states were provided. (Id. at 3, ¶ 2).
Moreover, there are no allegations in the Complaint from which the Court can infer that Plaintiff administratively exhausted any ADA claim she may have had. A plaintiff seeking to bring an employment discrimination claim under the ADA must first exhaust administrative remedies and, in order to do so, must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 180 or 300 days, depending upon the agency with whom Plaintiff filed her charge. Hoover v. Timken Co., 30 F. App'x 511, 513 (6th Cir. 2002) () (statutory and case citations omitted). "[F]ailure to properly exhaust is an appropriate bases for dismissal of an ADA action." Jones v. Nat. Essentials, Inc., 740 F. App'x 489, 492-93 (6th Cir. 2018) (citations omitted).
Plaintiff does not allege that she administratively exhausted any ADA claim she may have had in 2008 and 2010 with respect to her carpel tunnel and back issues, and the time to do so has expired. With respect to any alleged ADA violations by the City that were timely brought in the 2014 EEOC charge, Plaintiff withdrew that charge before the EEOC reached a determination. (See Doc. #: 1-4 at 2). "Numerous courts have held that a claimant who abandons or withdraws his or her claim before the EEOC has reached a determination cannot be deemed to have exhausted his administrative remedies." Sain v. Am. Red Cross, 233 F. Supp. 2d 923, 931 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (collecting cases); Williams v. United States Postal Serv., No. 1:08-CV-892-TSH, 2010 WL 11538139, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 8, 2010) (same) (collecting cases). Therefore, any ADA claims that were timely filed by Plaintiff in the 2014 EEOC charge, those claims are dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies...
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