Bridgeport Public Library and Reading Room v. Burroughs Home
Citation | 82 A. 582,85 Conn. 309 |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Decision Date | 07 March 1912 |
Parties | BRIDGEPORT PUBLIC LIBRARY AND READING ROOM v. BURROUGHS HOME et al. |
Case Reserved from Superior Court, Fairfield County; Howard J Curtis, Judge.
Action by the Bridgeport Public Library and Reading Room against the Burroughs Home and others. Case reserved by superior court for the advice of the Supreme Court of Errors. Questions answered as stated.
The Legislature cannot exercise judicial power; the Constitution being a grant and not a limitation of power.
Mrs Catherine E. Pettengill, who died in 1883, by her will gave to the board of directors, and their successors in office forever, of the Bridgeport Public Library and Reading Room a tract of land situated on the corner of Main and John streets in the city of Bridgeport, and having a block of buildings thereon, " to have and to hold the said premises," the language of the will being now recited " with the appurtenances thereof unto the said board of directors and their successors forever, as special trustees for the use and benefit of the said Bridgeport Public Library and Reading Room and according to the terms following, to wit:
The will contained a residuary clause, the effect of which is that the defendant, the Burroughs Home, an incorporated institution, is the beneficiary of any residue.
In 1907 the General Assembly adopted a resolution, being No. 388, and found at page 356 of the Special Laws of that year, which, among other things, purports to empower the directors of the library and reading room to sell the premises so given by Mrs. Pettengill, and to invest the proceeds in a new site and building to be purchased, erected, and used for the uses of the institution. The resolution also purports to authorize the Burroughs Home to release and convey to the directors of the library and reading room all right, title, or interest it may have in the Main street property by force of Mrs. Pettengill's will. It further authorized these directors to make application to the superior court, setting forth the terms of the will, their desire to erect a more commodious building in a more suitable location, to bear the name and inscription the will prescribed for the present building, and the action, if any, taken by the Burroughs Home in making a release or conveyance, and praying for an adjudication upon the facts alleged and proven The course of procedure upon this application was prescribed, and the court directed to take jurisdiction of it, and determine all the questions of law or equity presented. This action was brought under the authority thus given, and advice is asked in answer to the three questions embodied in the resolution.
The Burroughs Home was made a party defendant, and appeared. It filed no pleadings, and is not opposed to the sale of the premises. The heirs of Mrs. Pettengill are unknown. They were made defendants by general description, and they have by publication received as full and adequate notice of the pendency of the action as could be given them. None appeared.
By reason of the changed conditions, due to the growth of the city and other causes, the land and buildings in question have become unsuitable for the purposes of a public library and reading room, and the board of directors desires to sell them, and to use the avails in purchasing a more suitable site, and in erecting thereon a more commodious library and reading room building, to bear the same name and inscription as the present one. The proceeds of a sale would be sufficient to make such purchase and to erect such building.
Thomas M. Cullinan and John S. Pullman, for plaintiff.
Morris B. Beardsley and Samuel F. Beardsley, for defendant The Burroughs Home.
PRENTICE, J. (after stating the facts as above).
The advice of the superior court is asked in answer to three questions. The first and fundamental one is whether or not the trustees have complete title to the premises in question, so that they can sell them and apply the proceeds in a prescribed manner without risk of forfeiture or jeopardizing the trust estate. The question thus presented, if taken with any degree of literalness, is one which seeks information as to the consequences which would attach to a sale and application of proceeds as provided, if made. It does not call for advice as to the adequacy of the authority of the trustees to sell, or as to whether title could be given, if they now undertook to convey. It, and the other two questions, appear to assume that the trustees have all the authority which could be bestowed upon them, and their solicitude apparently arises from a fear that if they make a conveyance of the property which Mrs. Pettengill placed under the trust which they are executing the trust would be defeated, and a forfeiture to her heirs or residuary legatee result. However this may be, no one of the questions propounded directly calls for an adjudication as to the nature and extent of the power of the trustees. Neither does any one of them indirectly call for such adjudication. This latter fact follows from the nature of the trust under which the property is held, and the peculiar incidents of trusts of its class. It is a public charitable trust, and as such is brought within the application of the general principles governing trusts of that nature, and of General Statutes, § 4026.
The existence of this statute, first enacted in 1684, renders it unnecessary to inquire whether or not its provisions of present pertinence add anything to what the general principles of equity would supply, did it not exist. It, at least, removes from the domain of discussion the policy of our law, and contains an unmistakable statutory declaration as to the permanent and abiding character of the devotion to the charitable use which attaches to gifts intended for such use by the donor.
Wherever this policy prevails, whether it be declared in statute or otherwise deduced, it is well settled that the trust will not ordinarily be permitted to fail through any improper action on the part of the trustees in their administration of the trust. There may indeed be express conditions so embodied in the instrument creating the trust as to make manifest the intention of the donor that for the breach of them there shall be a forfeiture and a reversion of the fund. But nothing which even remotely partakes of the character of such conditions enters into Mrs. Pettengill's...
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