Bridges v. Baca
| Decision Date | 07 December 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:15-cv-00121-MMD-VPC |
| Parties | RANDY MAURICE BRIDGES, Petitioner, v. ISIDRO BACA, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nevada |
In this habeas corpus action, brought by Nevada prisoner Randy Maurice Bridges, the respondents have filed a motion to dismiss. (Dkt. no. 10.) The Court will grant that motion, and dismiss this action, on the ground that Bridges' claims are barred by the procedural default doctrine.
On September 2, 1988, Bridges was charged with sexual assault, first degree kidnapping, unlawful giving away of a controlled substance, and possession of a controlled substance. See Information, Exh. 1.1 The charges related to events that occurred on August 6, 1988, which, the jury apparently found, involved Bridges kidnapping and sexually assaulting a 15-year-old girl who was in Reno from California visiting relatives.2
At the conclusion of a jury trial, on March 15, 1989, the jury found Bridges guilty of sexual assault, second degree kidnapping, unlawful giving away of a controlled substance, and possession of a controlled substance. See Verdicts, Exh. 2.
Bridges, who was released on bond pending sentencing, failed to appear for his sentencing on May 3, 1989, and, on May 12, 1989, a bench warrant was issued for his arrest. See Bench Warrant, Exh. 3. With respect to his failure to appear for his sentencing, Bridges stated the following in his supplemental state habeas petition:
Mr. Bridges left the jurisdiction and went to St. Martin, an island in the Caribbean, prior to the sentencing for a number of years. The reason Mr. Bridges left the jurisdiction was that he believed that his counsel had done very little to get him a fair trial and that he was not guilty of the charges. Mr. Bridges believed he had been "railroaded."
Supplemental Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Exh. 14 at 6, ¶ 20. Bridges returned to the United States and was apprehended in 2010. See id. at 5-6, ¶¶ 19-21.
Bridges' sentencing was then finally held on July 30, 2010. See Minutes, Exh. 7. Bridges was sentenced as follows:
| Count I |
| sexual assault |
| life in prison, with the possibility |
| of parole after 5 years |
| Count II |
| kidnapping |
| 15 years in prison, concurrent |
| with the sentence on Count I |
| Count III |
| unlawful giving away |
| of controlled substance |
| 20 years in prison, concurrent |
| with the sentence on Count II |
| Count IV |
| possession of |
| controlled substance |
| 6 years in prison, concurrent |
| with the sentence on Count III |
Id. Judgment was entered on August 2, 2010. See Judgment of Conviction, Exh. 8.
Bridges appealed. See Notice of Appeal, Exh. 9; Appellant's Opening Brief, Exh. 10. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed on July 14, 2011. See Order of Affirmance, Exh. 11.
On May 9, 2012, Bridges filed, in the state district court, a pro se post-conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus. See Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction), Exh. 12. On May 11, 2012, the state district court appointed counsel to represent Bridges. See Order Granting Motion for Appointment of Counsel, Exh. 13. OnNovember 6, 2012, with counsel, Bridges filed a supplemental petition. See Supplemental Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Exh. 14. The State filed a motion to dismiss, and on July 19, 2013, the court held an evidentiary hearing regarding procedural defenses asserted by the State. See Motion to Dismiss, Exh. 15; Order filed March 11, 2013, Exh. 16; Minutes, Exh. 17; Transcript of Proceedings, July 19, 2013, Exh. 18. On August 1, 2013, the state district court dismissed Bridges' petition as barred under the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, and, alternatively, ruled that Bridges' claims lacked merit. See Order entered August 1, 2013, Exh. 19. Bridges appealed. See Notice of Appeal, Exh. 20; Appellant's Opening Brief, Exh. 22. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed on October 15, 2014, ruling that the district court erred in reaching the merits of certain of Bridges' claims, but also ruling that the district court properly dismissed the case pursuant to the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. See Order of Affirmance, Exh. 23.
While the appeal from the dismissal of Bridges' state habeas petition was pending, Bridges filed a pro se petition for writ of mandamus in the Nevada Supreme Court; the Nevada Supreme Court denied that petition on November 14, 2013. See Order Denying Petition, Exh. 21.
This Court received Bridges' pro se federal habeas corpus petition, initiating this case, on February 26, 2015. See Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Dkt. no. 6.)
Respondents filed their motion to dismiss on August 27, 2015 (dkt. no. 10), asserting: that all the claims in Bridges' petition are procedurally defaulted as a result of the state courts' application of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine; that all the claims in Bridges' petition are barred by the federal fugitive disentitlement doctrine; and that all the claims in Bridges' petition are barred by the federal laches doctrine. See Motion to Dismiss (dkt. no. 10 at 6-13). Bridges filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss on September 30, 2015. (Dkt. no. 14.) Respondents filed a reply in support of the motion to dismiss on October 20, 2015. (Dkt. no. 15.)
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In Coleman v. Thompson, the Supreme Court held that a state prisoner who fails to comply with the state's procedural requirements in presenting his claims is barred from obtaining a writ of habeas corpus in federal court by the adequate and independent state ground doctrine. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731-32 (1991) (). Where such a procedural default constitutes an adequate and independent state ground for denial of habeas corpus, the default may be excused only if "a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent," or if the prisoner demonstrates cause for the default and prejudice resulting from it. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986).
To demonstrate cause for a procedural default, the petitioner must "show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded" his efforts to comply with the state procedural rule. Murray, 477 U.S. at 488. For cause to exist, the external impediment must have prevented the petitioner from raising the claim. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 497 (1991). With respect to the prejudice prong, the petitioner bears "the burden of showing not merely that the errors [complained of] constituted a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire [proceeding] with errors of constitutional dimension." White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1989), citing United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982).
In their motion to dismiss, respondents assert that all Bridges' claims are procedurally defaulted, as a result of the state courts' application of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine.
The claims that Bridges asserts in his habeas petition in this case are the same claims that he asserted in his supplemental habeas petition in state court. ComparePetition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (dkt. no. 6) with Supplemental Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Exh. 14. The state district court dismissed Bridges' petition as barred under the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, and, alternatively, ruled that Bridges' claims lacked merit. See Order entered August 1, 2013, Exh. 19. On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the case pursuant to the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. See Order of Affirmance, Exh. 23.
A state procedural bar is independent unless it appears "to rest primarily on federal law or appears to be interwoven with federal law." Coleman, 501 U.S. at 734; see also Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1152 (9th Cir. 2000). The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Bridges' claims solely on the ground of the state-law fugitive disentitlement doctrine. That ruling was independent of the merits of Bridges' federal constitutional claims.
A state procedural rule is "adequate" if it is "clear, consistently applied, and well established at the time of the petitioner's purported default." Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Bean), 96 F.3d 1126, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 424 (1991) ; Lambright v. Stewart, 241 F.3d 1201, 1203 (9th Cir.2001).
In Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 585 86 (9th Cir. 2003), the court of appeals announced a burden shifting test for analyzing adequacy. Under Bennett, the State carries the initial burden of pleading "the existence of an independent and adequate state procedural ground as an affirmative defense." Id. at 586. The burden then shifts to the petitioner "to place that defense in issue," which the petitioner may do "by asserting specific factual allegations that demonstrate the inadequacy of the state procedure, including citation to authority demonstrating inconsistent application of the rule." Id. If the petitioner meets this burden, "the ultimate burden" of proving the adequacy of the procedural rule rests with the State, which must demonstrate "that the state proceduralrule has been regularly and consistently applied in habeas actions." Id.; see also King v. Lamarque, 464 F.3d 963, 966-67 (9th Cir. 2006).
In this case, the respondents meet their initial burden under Bennett by asserting that the Nevada Supreme Court's application of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine constituted an independent and adequate state...
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