Bridges v. Colvin

• Decision Date: 30 September 2015
• Docket Number: No. 5:12-cv-02316,5:12-cv-02316
• Parties: Charles Bridges, Plaintiff, v. Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner of Social Security Administration, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

136 F.Supp.3d 620

Charles Bridges, Plaintiff,

v.Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner of Social Security Administration, et al., Defendants.

No. 5:12-cv-02316

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed September 30, 2015

Alphonso Arnold, Jr., Harrisburg, PA, for Plaintiff.

Susan Dein Bricklin, Veronica Jane Finkelstein, U.S. Attorney's Office, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration and/or Reargument, ECF No. 63—Denied

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Count II, ECF No. 65—Granted

Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Third Amended Complaint, ECF No. 67—Denied

Joseph F. Leeson, Jr., United States District Judge

I. Introduction

Presently before the Court are the following three motions: (i) Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration and/or Reargument of the Order of the Court dated March 28, 2014, in which the Court granted, in part, the motion of Defendants to dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, (ii) Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Count II of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, the sole claim presently remaining in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint following the Court's aforementioned March 28, 2014 Order, and (iii) Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File a Third¹ Amended Complaint. For the following reasons, the Court denies Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration, grants Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Count II of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, and denies Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to amend his complaint.

II. Factual Background²

Plaintiff is an administrative law judge ("ALJ") employed by the United States Social Security Administration and was formerly the Hearing Office Chief Administrative Law Judge ("HOCALJ") at the Administration's Harrisburg, Pennsylvania office. Am. Compl. ¶ 20, ECF No. 30. Applicants for Social Security benefits are entitled to appeal unfavorable decisions on their claims, and Social Security Administration ALJs, such as Plaintiff, preside over these appeals. Id. ¶¶ 29, 42. The HOCALJ of a regional Social Security Administration office acts in a managerial capacity for the office, id. ¶ 32, with "[o]ne of the essential duties of the HOCALJ" being "to assign and reassign appeals cases to subordinate ALJs within the hearing office," id. ¶ 43.

Plaintiff alleges that the Social Security Administration and certain individuals employed by the Administration discriminated against him on the basis of his status as an African-American in violation of Title VII, violated his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment, and engaged in tortious conduct under Pennsylvania law. Plaintiff's claims arise out of a decision by Defendant Jasper Bede, the Regional Chief ALJ and Plaintiff's immediate supervisor during Plaintiff's tenure as HOCALJ, to remove Plaintiff from his position as HOCALJ of the Harrisburg office. See id. ¶¶ 22-23, 74-75. Plaintiff claims that Defendant Bede conspired with Defendants Janet Landesburg and Reana Sweeney, two ALJs who were subordinate to Plaintiff in the Harrisburg office, to remove Plaintiff from his position on the basis of "racial animus, jealousy and malice against Plaintiff." Id. ¶¶ 24-25, 44.

According to Plaintiff, Defendant Bede's explanation for removing Plaintiff from his position was that Plaintiff had improperly reassigned a pending appeal from Defendant Landesberg to another ALJ—a decision that led Defendant Landesberg to file a grievance against Plaintiff. Id. at ¶¶ 65-75. Plaintiff, however, claims that his decision to reassign the appeal from Defendant Landesberg comported with the Social Security Administration's case management procedures, which suggests that Defendant Bede's explanation for removing Plaintiff from his HOCALJ role was merely a pretext. Id. Plaintiff contends that, in fact, Defendants Landesburg and Sweeney, who are white, had urged Defendant Bede to remove Plaintiff from his position, and Defendant Bede "acceded to the demands of [the] two white females." Id. at 64, 78.

Plaintiff's Amended Complaint contains the following eight claims: (1) violations of Title VII's prohibition on discrimination on the basis of race in employment and Title VII's prohibition on the creation of a hostile work environment, which Plaintiff asserted against the Social Security Administration and the individual Defendants, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 4-8, 62-78; (2) violation of Plaintiff's procedural due process rights under the Fifth Amendment as a result of his removal from his position as HOCALJ without an opportunity for a hearing, which Plaintiff asserts against the Social Security Administration and the individual Defendants, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 79-82; (3) violation of Title VII's anti-retaliation provision, arising out of allegations that Defendant Bede failed to provide Plaintiff with a meaningful opportunity to bid on open HOCALJ positions after Plaintiff was removed from his position as HOCALJ of the Harrisburg office, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 83-85; (4) defamation under Pennsylvania law, arising out of allegations that the individual Defendants made "statements and innuendo that Plaintiff does not apply the Social Security laws and regulations properly, or is, somehow unethical, biased or dishonest in his application of the Social Security law," Am. Compl. ¶¶ 86-92; (5) tortious interference with contractual relations under Pennsylvania law, arising out of allegations that the individual Defendants intentionally interfered with the collective bargaining agreement that governs the relationship between HOCALJs and subordinate ALJs, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 93-94; (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress under Pennsylvania law, which Plaintiff asserted against the individual Defendants, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 95-97; (7) "wrongful discharge in violation of public policy" under Pennsylvania law, which Plaintiff asserted against the individual Defendants, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 98-99; and (8) intrusion upon seclusion under Pennsylvania law, arising out of allegations that the individual Defendants improperly disclosed the terms of a prior settlement Plaintiff reached with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), Am. Compl. ¶¶ 100-01.

III. Procedural History

On February 21, 2014, Plaintiff moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunctive relief based on allegations that Defendant Bede had suspended Plaintiff from his duties as an ALJ for a ten-day period following a "focused review" of ninety cases that Plaintiff had adjudicated. See Mem. Supp. Pl.'s Mot. TRO and Prelim. Inj. 7-8, ECF No. 44-3. Plaintiff claimed that he was to undergo training during this period of suspension. Id. After Plaintiff and his attorney failed to appear at a hearing on Plaintiff's Motion, the Court denied Plaintiff's Motion. See Order, Feb. 24, 2014, ECF No. 49. Plaintiff then appealed the denial of his Motion to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. See Notice of Appeal, Mar. 6, 2014, ECF No. 57. The Third Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot because Plaintiff had completed the training and been reinstated to his position by the time the court considered his appeal.³ See Bridges v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. , 607 Fed.Appx. 168, 170–71 (3d Cir.2015).⁴

On March 28, 2014, this Court granted, in part, the motion of Defendants to dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, dismissing seven of Plaintiff's eight claims. First, the Court dismissed each of Plaintiff's claims of discrimination that he brought against the individual Defendants, which had alleged violations of his constitutional rights and his rights under Title VII. The Court explained that Title VII provides the exclusive remedy for a federal employee to seek redress for racially motivated employment discrimination, and a Title VII claim can only be asserted against the head of a federal agency, not individual federal employees. See Bridges v. Astrue , No. 12–cv–02316, 2014 WL 1281158, at *12 (E.D.Pa. Mar. 28, 2014). Second, the Court dismissed each of Plaintiff's claims against the individual Defendants sounding in state tort law. The individual Defendants had argued that the Federal Tort Claims Act precludes Plaintiff from asserting tort claims against individual federal employees, and after Plaintiff failed to respond to this aspect of Defendants' motion, the Court granted this aspect of Defendants' motion as uncontested. See id. at *14–15. Third, the Court dismissed each of Plaintiff's Title VII claims against the Social Security Administration. Plaintiff had claimed that the Social Security Administration violated Title VII's prohibition on making employment decisions on the basis of race, creating a hostile work environment, and retaliating against an employee who engages in conduct protected by the statute. With respect to Plaintiff's hostile work environment claim, Defendants had argued that Plaintiff's complaint failed to plead facts sufficient to state such a claim, and, after Plaintiff failed to respond to this aspect of Defendants' motion, the Court granted that aspect of Defendants' motion as uncontested. See id. at *15. With respect to Plaintiff's claims of discrimination on the basis of an adverse employment action and retaliation arising out the removal of Plaintiff as HOCALJ, the Court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss those claims because Plaintiff failed to timely exhaust his administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief. The Court explained that before a federal employee may sue for violations of Title VII in federal court, the employee "must initiate contact with an EEO counselor within 45 days of the date of the matter alleged to be discriminatory or, in the case of a personnel action, within 45 days of the effective date of the action." See id. (quoting Winder v. Postmaster Gen. of the United States , 528 Fed.Appx. 253, 255 (3d Cir.2013)). Plaintiff did not argue that he had done so; rather, he contended that his failure to timely meet with an EEO counselor should have been excused under the "discovery rule," which provides that the 45-day exhaustion period may...