Bridges v. Groendyke Transport, Inc.
| Decision Date | 27 May 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. 75-2565,75-2565 |
| Citation | 553 F.2d 877 |
| Parties | Willace BRIDGES and wife, Ruby Bridges, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. GROENDYKE TRANSPORT, INC. and Frank Gorsuch, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Hugh R. Kelly, Houston, Tex., for defendants-appellants.
Robert H. Roch, Craig Lewis, Houston, Tex., for plaintiffs-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.
Before WISDOM, GEE and FAY, Circuit Judges.
This appeal arises out of an automobile-truck collision wherein the plaintiffs-appellees, Willace and Ruby Bridges, sustained personal injuries. The defendants-appellants are Frank Gorsuch, the driver of the truck, and Groendyke Transport, Inc., employer of Gorsuch and the owner of the truck. The trial court, after hearing all the evidence, directed a verdict holding the defendants liable to the Bridges as a matter of law. Based upon the jury verdict in answer to the damage issues, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of Ruby Bridges in the amount of $36,290.50, and a judgment in favor of Willace Bridges in the amount of $56,165.00. On appeal, the defendants are alleging that the trial judge erred in directing a verdict as to liability, and that the award to plaintiff Willace Bridges was excessive, and, therefore, the trial judge abused his discretion in denying the defendants' motion for a new trial. We disagree and affirm.
The first issue raised by the defendants on appeal is whether the trial court erred in directing a verdict on liability against the defendant. In determining whether a verdict should have been directed, the appellate court applies the same standard as did the trial court in passing on the motion originally. Whether a verdict should be directed is a question of law, United States v. Bucon Construction Company, 430 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. 1970), and, therefore, litigants are entitled to a full review by the appellate court without special deference to the views of the trial court. 9 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2536.
In Boeing Company v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1969), this court set forth the standards to be followed in deciding motions for directed verdicts. We explained that the trial judge should consider all the evidence not just that evidence which supports the non-mover's case. This evidence, however, should be considered in the light most favorable to the party opposed to the motion. If the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of one party that the Court believes that reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary verdict, granting of the motion is proper. A mere scintilla of evidence is insufficient to present a question for the jury. The motion for directed verdict should not be decided by which side has the better of the case, nor should it be granted only when there is a complete absence of probative facts to support a jury verdict. There must be a conflict in substantial evidence to create a jury question.
The key question in applying the reasonable man standard for determining whether there is an issue for the jury is the freedom that the jury will be permitted in drawing inferences from the evidence. There would be little problem in determining the sufficiency of the evidence to make a jury issue if there were any sure way to distinguish between the legitimate inference, to which the party is entitled, and the unreasonable inference, to which he is not. It is suggested that the range of reasonable inference is dependent upon the unique circumstance of each particular case. No self applying rule can be offered for determining what inferences are reasonable. It is uncontested, however, that an inference would be unreasonable if it would allow a jury to rest its verdict on mere speculation and conjecture.
In the present case, any inference that a jury might have made which would have freed the defendants from negligence would have been unreasonable. The defendant Gorsuch's own testimony established negligence, and the trial judge did not err in so finding.
Mr. Gorsuch testified that at the time of the accident he was driving a fourteen thousand pound tractor which was pulling a thirteen thousand five hundred pound petroleum tank trailer. He testified that he had been driving for some nineteen miles in what he termed as "patchy" fog before he reached the intersection of US 259 and 224. The defendant stated that at the intersection the fog became very heavy (App 69) and that it was "just like running onto a blank wall." (App 71). He further stated that because of the fog he was unable to see a man in the roadway approximately one-half mile from the intersection until the man was only twenty feet in front of his truck. (App 71). The man who was in the roadway was attempting to flag down traffic because of an accident further up the highway. In order to avoid hitting this man, Gorsuch swerved his truck to the left, applied full and continuous braking power, laid down skid marks for sixty-five feet, hit the guard rail on the left hand side of the road, ricocheted off the guard rail and went another one hundred feet before striking the plaintiff's car and the car parked behind it. After hitting these cars, the truck then struck the guard rail on the right hand side of the road and came to a stop.
Despite the weather conditions, the defendant admitted that he had been continually accelerating his truck from the intersection of US 259 and 224 until the location of the accident a distance of at least a half mile. Mr. Gorsuch testified that he was in fifth gear at the point of the accident, traveling approximately thirty miles per hour, and that he had not attempted to slow down until he saw the flagman. At the speed he was traveling, Mr. Gorsuch did not have time to bring his truck to a safe stop and still avoid hitting the flagman. The police officer who investigated the accident testified at trial that because of the poor visibility any speed over fifteen to twenty miles per hour would be overdriving one's visability under the conditions existing at the scene of the accident. (App 8). The officer's testimony is not inconsistent with the defendant's own description of the weather conditions and the fact that the flagman did not become visible until he was only twenty feet away from the truck. It is inconceivable that Mr. Gorsuch could possibly bring his twenty-seven thousand pound vehicle traveling at a speed of thirty miles per hour to a stop in this short of a distance.
Applying the standards we have previously set forth, we feel that a reasonable man could not find the defendant to be free of negligence. We hold, therefore, that the trial court did not err in directing a verdict on liability against the defendants.
The second error raised by the defendants is whether the trial judge abused his discretion in denying the defendants' motion for a new trial based on the grounds that the damage award to the plaintiff Willace Bridges was excessive. We hold that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion.
This Court has reviewed verdicts challenged as excessive for many years. While the Supreme Court has not spoken conclusively on the propriety of this review, that Court has turned down several opportunities to determine...
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