Bridges v. McKenna

• Decision Date: 15 July 1859
• Parties: JOHN C. BRIDGES and HIRAM WOODS v. CATHARINE McKENNA, by Prochein Ami.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

14 Md. 258

JOHN C. BRIDGES and HIRAM WOODS v. CATHARINE McKENNA, by Prochein Ami.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

July 15, 1859

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.

The bill in this case, filed on the 28th of September 1855, by Catharine McKenna, a feme covert, in her own name alleges that she has been for several months, with her own capital and by the credit and kindness of her own friends, in her own name, and as a feme sole, carrying on a grocery business in a store at the corner of North and Baltimore streets, in the City of Baltimore; that by virtue of a fieri facias, issued upon a judgment for $613.83, against Peter McKenna, her husband, at the suit of Bridges & Woods, the appellants, the goods, chattels, stock in trade and other matters, whereof a schedule is filed contained in said grocery store, were taken and carried away by the sheriff of Baltimore City; that the store was thereupon closed, the business of the complainant suspended and she deprived of the means of support; that her said husband had no interest in said stock of goods, and that the action of the sheriff is attended with great loss to her and, unless at once relieved, her damages will be irreparable. The bill then prays for an injunction restraining Woods & Bridges, and the sheriff and his deputies, from any further action in the execution of this fieri facias, and from interfering with her in regaining possession of said goods and chattels, and from concealing the same from her, and for general relief.

The injunction was granted as prayed, and the appellants, in their answer, admit the issuing of the fieri facias and the taking of the goods as charged in the bill, but deny that the same are the property of the complainant, and insist that they were the property of Peter McKenna, the complainant's husband. They deny that the complainant has been acting as a feme sole, and that the goods were bought with her means or capital, or by the aid of her friends, but allege that the whole arrangement was a scheme resorted to by the husband to avoid payment of his debts. They insist that the injunction issued improvidently, that the complainant had full redress at law, and that being a married woman, she could not file a bill in her own name.

On filing their answer, the defendants moved to dissolve the injunction, and, under an order, testimony relating chiefly to the title of the husband and wife, respectively, to the property, was taken, which need not be stated. The case was then heard on the motion to dissolve, and the court, (Krebs, J.) on the 15th of July 1856, passed an order sustaining the objection to the bill, that it was brought by a married woman as complainant in her own name, but deciding that under the Act of Assembly relative to amendments in equity proceedings, this defect could be remedied by amendment, and when this was done, a final decree would be passed in the case. The complainant, thereupon, with leave granted on petition, introduced Owen McKenna as her next friend to appear for her in the cause, and afterwards, on the 29th of November 1856, the court passed a decree making the injunction perpetual. From this decree the defendants, Bridges & Wood, appealed.

The cause was argued before LE GRAND, C. J., TUCK and BARTOL, JJ. Orville Horwitz for the appellants.

As to the jurisdiction of the court: The general proposition must be conceded, that an injunction will not lie to restrain a sale where the goods of A are taken under a fi. fa. against B, at the instance of A. The remedy at law is perfect; replevin will get back the very goods; trespass will make adequate compensation in damages. In order to entitle the court to interfere, there must be some additional equity. Either the property itself must be peculiar in its character, and such as no damages can adequately compensate for its loss, or there must be some strong reasons for the retention of the property in specie. The whole doctrine on the subject is so fully and clearly laid down in Allen v. Freeland, 3 Rand. 170, and Bowyer v. Creigh, Ib. 25. The case of Warnick v. Michael, 11 G. & J. 153, is in strict conformity to the principles above indicated. In that case it was slave property that was about to be sold, and the allegations in the bill were, that the slaves were " favorite servants, " and that the complainant feared that they would be purchased by some southern trader and removed beyond " the jurisdiction." And yet, even in that case, the injunction was dissolved by the Court of Appeals, and the bill dismissed, because a clear and undisputed title, above suspicion or doubt, was not shown. The parties were left to their legal rights. It can scarcely be said, in this case, that the title is, beyond question, free from all suspicion of fraud, or, on the other hand, that the groceries were favorite groceries, and had about them a certain " pretium affectionis, " that rendered them invaluable and above compensation. What then can distinguish this from the ordinary case? One of two reasons, says the appellee: either the fact that the goods taken constituted the whole or a part of a stock of goods, or that the complainant is a married woman. That the place of business, as a store, was not interfered with, is clear. The stock taken was carried away; the furniture and fixtures were left undisturbed. As a store it might have been used and occupied the next day, by the appellee or any one else. There was no interruption of the store as a store. Does the fact that the appellee was a feme covert make any difference in this State? What rights do the Acts of 1842 and 1853 give to married women? The 8th sec. of the Act of 1842, is the only one that can, by possibility, be connected with the present inquiry, and it appears to me that that section was only intended to apply to money or property actually " earned 'DDD' by the wife's " skill, industry or personal labor," to the extent of $1000, and that that skill, & c., must be altogether independent of her husband; that when so earned she should hold it to her separate use. Has that any thing to do with the present case? Is there any thing to show that the complainant has earned one dollar? But this Act, as well as that of 1853, ch. 245, has been construed by this court in Schindel v. Schindel, 12 Md. 108, 294, and, according to that construction, the marital rights are not interfered with, except that the property of the wife is protected from the husband's debts. The right of possession, disposition, & c., remains with the husband as theretofore. Not only so, but the right to recover in trespass, for the property of the wife taken away, is expressly ruled in that case. The subsequent distribution of the amount of the verdict is left for the future action of the court. If, then, it be true, that the husband could sue or recover for the trespass, or could take back the goods themselves by replevin, after sale, how can it be said there is no adequate remedy at law in this State? Or if the husband and wife jointly could recover the goods, or their value in damages, at law, how can it be successfully maintained that they are remediless at law?

Now the doctrine relied on by the other side shows, that even where the property is held in trust, by the intervention of a trustee, an injunction will not be sustained unless the trustee refuses to proceed at law, (25 Ala. 136.) In this State the necessity for the intervention of a trustee is expressly dispensed with by sec. 3, of the Act of 1853, ch. 345, and all remedies at law and in equity, for the protection of her property, secured to her. But it is insisted, that McCann v. Taylor, 10 Md. 418, and Holland v. Balto., 11 Md. 186, sustain this injunction. The first of these cases, however proceeded on very different grounds. The allegations of the bill there charging a fraudulent intent and a desire to cast a shadow on the title to property, and that, too, by a creditor subsequent to the execution of the deed, were said to be sufficient, in the first instance, to warrant the issual of the injunction. In the second case, the principle decided is, that where an attempt is made to sell real property, " under a void proceeding, " the court will interfere. If, in this case, it had been alleged that the judgment of the appellants was void, and that under a proceeding absolutely null an attempt was made to sell her property, there might be some similarity, although a distinction is taken in the books between the remedy by injunction as to the realty and personal property. In regard to the latter, the question of title can at once be disposed of in the action of replevin or trover, or damages obtained for carrying away the goods. In regard to the former, a sale under such a proceeding would cast a cloud over the title that would remain until an ejectment might be brought by the purchaser. Crain v. Barnes, 1 Md.Ch. 151, and Barnes v. Compton, 8 Gill 391, are cases between guardian and ward, and trustee and cestui que trust. There can be no question as to the jurisdiction in those cases. There can be no doubt as to the jurisdiction of a court of chancery between a feme covert and her trustee, but the inquiry here is, as stated in the opinion of the judge in Watkins v. Logan, 3 Monroe 21, how far does the jurisdiction extend, as between a married woman and third parties? Now it seems that there can be no doubt as to the right of the husband, in his own name, or in an action by husband and wife jointly, to recover damages in trespass or trover for injuries to the wife's property. See Allen v. Kingsbury, 16 Pick. 235.

But the decree should be reversed for the additional reason, that the husband of the appellant is not a party to the proceedings either as co-complainant or as defendant. Story's ...