Bridges v. Park Place Entertainment, 2002-CA-02145-SCT.

• Decision Date: 04 December 2003
• Docket Number: No. 2002-CA-02145-SCT.,2002-CA-02145-SCT.
• Citation: 860 So.2d 811
• Parties: William BRIDGES, by and Through his Conservator, Sharon BRIDGES, and Sharon Bridges, Individually v. PARK PLACE ENTERTAINMENT a/k/a Park Place Entertainment, Inc. a/k/a and/or d/b/a the Grand Casino, John Doe and/or Jane Doe.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

860 So.2d 811

William BRIDGES, by and Through his Conservator, Sharon BRIDGES, and Sharon Bridges, Individually v. PARK PLACE ENTERTAINMENT a/k/a Park Place Entertainment, Inc. a/k/a and/or d/b/a the Grand Casino, John Doe and/or Jane Doe.

No. 2002-CA-02145-SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

December 4, 2003.

Daniel A. Seward, attorney for appellants.

Tim Wade Hellen, D. Pace Branan, Southaven, attorneys for appellee.

CARLSON, Justice, for the Court.

¶ 1. Aggrieved by the circuit court's judgment granting dismissal pursuant to Miss. R. Civ. P. 12(c), William and Sharon Bridges have appealed to this Court on the issue of whether a first-party tort lawsuit may be brought against the business which furnished intoxicating beverages to an adult plaintiff who voluntarily became intoxicated and was then injured by a thirdparty. Finding that the circuit court was correct in granting the Grand Casino's motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissing the suit, we affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court of Tunica County.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL COURT

¶ 2. We state the facts as gleaned from the trial court pleadings before us. William Bridges and his wife, Sharon, were patrons of the Grand Casino¹ on March 8, 1999, in Tunica County, Mississippi. During his stay at the Casino, William gambled and was served alcoholic beverages by the Casino staff. William eventually left the Casino, with the assistance of his wife, and was placed into their car. Sharon drove away on U.S. Highway 61. During their drive home, William attempted to get out of their car; therefore, Sharon pulled over on the shoulder of the highway. William then exited the vehicle, walked onto Highway 61, and was struck by a car. As a result of the accident, William suffered a broken neck, broken ribs, fractured scapula, fibula and ankle, pneumonia and brain damage. William was declared incompetent, and Sharon was appointed his conservator. ¶ 3. On March 8, 2002, the Bridgeses (plaintiffs) filed a complaint against the Grand Casino alleging that while William was gambling, the Casino and its staff continuously served him alcoholic and/or intoxicating beverages and that William's subsequent injuries were a direct and proximate result of the Casino continuously serving William alcohol after he was visibly intoxicated.

¶ 4. On October 4, 2002, the Casino filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Miss. R. Civ. P. 12(c)² on the ground that the complaint failed to state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted because Mississippi did not recognize a common law right of action for damages against a person who furnishes alcoholic beverages. On December 9, 2002, the trial judge granted the Casino's motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed the suit pursuant to Miss. R. Civ. P. 12(c). In his order of dismissal, the trial judge, finding that Cuevas v. Royal D'Iberville Hotel, 498 So.2d 346 (Miss. 1986), was directly on point, held that the "[L]egislature did not intend to impose liability on servers of alcoholic beverages when adult consumers voluntarily consume intoxicating beverages and injure themselves" (citing Cuevas, 498 So.2d at 348-49). On December 26, 2002, the plaintiffs timely filed their appeal.

DISCUSSION

¶ 5. This Court applies a de novo standard when reviewing the granting of a Miss. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) or 12(c) motion. Arnona v. Smith, 749 So.2d 63, 65-66 (Miss.1999). As such, we sit in the same position as did the trial court. The scope of review of a motion to dismiss is that the allegations in the complaint must be taken as true, and the motion should not be granted unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff will be unable to prove any set of facts in support of her claim. Brewer v. Burdette, 768 So.2d 920, 922 (Miss.2000). See also Overstreet v. Merlos, 570 So.2d 1196, 1197 (Miss.1990); Grantham v. Miss. Dep't of Corrections, 522 So.2d 219, 220 (Miss.1988).

¶ 6. The two statutes at issue in this suit are Miss.Code Ann. §§ 67-1-83 (Rev.2001) and 67-3-73 (Rev.2001). Miss.Code Ann. § 67-1-83(1) states:

(1) It shall be unlawful for any permittee or other person to sell or furnish any alcoholic beverage to any person who is known to be insane or mentally defective, or to any person who is visibly intoxicated, or to any person who is known to habitually drink alcoholic beverages to excess, or to any person who is known to be an habitual user of narcotics or other habit-forming drugs ...

(emphasis added). The provisions of Miss. Code Ann. § 67-3-73 are quoted later in this opinion.

¶ 7. The plaintiffs argue that we should overrule our 1986 decision in Cuevas v. Royal D'Iberville Hotel, 498 So.2d 346 (Miss.1986), wherein this Court affirmed the dismissal of a first party suit against a hotel which allegedly sold alcohol to a visibly intoxicated guest. They contend that because Cuevas was a four to four decision with one justice not participating and because it was decided before the rise of the gaming industry, Cuevas is now ripe for judicial review. They also argue the language "any person who is visibly intoxicated" found in Miss.Code Ann. § 67-1-83 is meant to encompass everyone for public policy considerations.

¶ 8. However, the Casino argues Cuevas is still good law which is in line with the majority of other jurisdictions having held there is no cause of action against a business who sells or furnishes alcohol to adults who voluntarily become intoxicated and then injure themselves as a result of that intoxication. The Casino contends that this Court has held that persons who become voluntarily intoxicated and then injure themselves are not in the protected class listed in § 67-1-83. The Casino also argues this claim falls under § 67-3-73(1), not § 67-3-73(4), which states that consumption, not the sale or furnishing of the beverage, is the proximate cause of any injury inflicted by an intoxicated person on himself or another person. The Casino thus opines that William proximately caused his own injuries.

¶ 9. While we today unhesitatingly revisit our decision in Cuevas, we do so recognizing that notwithstanding the fact that we voted 4-4 to affirm the trial court in Cuevas, that decision is still good law and binding precedent. Harper v. Harper, 491 So.2d 189, 202 (Miss.1986) ("Prior decisions of this Court have said that an affirmance by an equally divided court is binding precedent unless and until the same is overruled. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Harland, 205 Miss. 380, 38 So.2d 771 (1949)"). We are not however without authority to overrule Cuevas should we deem it appropriate.

¶ 10. In Cuevas, the plaintiff, a guest at a hotel, injured herself after she fell over a railing. 498 So.2d at 346-47. Immediately prior to the accident, Cuevas had been drinking alcoholic beverages in the hotel lobby. Id. at 347. Cuevas argued the hotel continued to serve her alcoholic beverages after she had become intoxicated and that her intoxicated condition caused or contributed to her injuries. Id. Therefore, Cuevas argued the hotel was liable pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 67-1-83. The circuit court dismissed Cuevas's complaint. Id. at 347. The question before this Court was "whether or not [the hotel] was liable to [Cuevas] for selling and furnishing her intoxicants in violation of § 67-1-83(1), if the intoxication proximately caused or contributed to [Cuevas's] injury." Id.

¶ 11. This Court reaffirmed its holding in Munford, Inc. v. Peterson, 368 So.2d 213 (Miss.1979), "that the Mississippi law which prohibits the sale of beer or wine to a minor, was adopted for the protection of the general public" and that minors are members of that protected class. Cuevas, 498 So.2d at 348. This Court further stated:

We hold that the public, e.g., a thirdparty class whether minor or adult, is protected under the statute from the negligent acts of an intoxicated person, and has a claim against a person or business furnishing alcoholic beverages in violation of the statute. However, we do not think the legislature intended to impose liability upon a dispenser of intoxicants to an adult individual, such as appellant here, who voluntarily consumes intoxicants and then, by reason of his inebriated condition, injures himself. We further hold that such a person as appellant is excluded from the protected class as articulated in Munford, Inc. v. Peterson.

Cuevas, 498 So.2d at 348-49 (emphasis added). ¶ 12. Subsequent to this Court's decision in Cuevas, the Legislature enacted a law, codified as Miss.Code Ann. § 67-3-73 (Rev.2001), which became effective from and after April 3, 1987, which states in its entirety:

(1) The Mississippi Legislature finds and declares that the consumption of intoxicating beverages, rather than the sale or serving or furnishing of such beverages, is the proximate cause of any injury, including death and property damage, inflicted by an intoxicated person upon himself or upon another person.

(2) Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, no holder of an alcoholic beverage, beer or light wine permit, or any agent or employee of such holder, who lawfully sells or serves intoxicating beverages to a person who may lawfully purchase such intoxicating beverages, shall be liable to such person or to any other person or to the estate, or survivors of either, for any injury suffered off the licensed premises, including wrongful death and property damage, because of the intoxication of the person to whom the intoxicating beverages were sold or served.

(3) Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, no social host who serves or furnishes any intoxicating beverage to a person who may lawfully consume such intoxicating beverage shall be liable to such person or to any other person or to the estate, or survivors of either, for any injury suffered off such social host's premises, including wrongful death and property damage, because of the intoxication of the person to whom the

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