Bridges v. United States
Decision Date | 15 June 1953 |
Docket Number | No. 548,548 |
Citation | 97 L.Ed. 1557,73 S.Ct. 1055,346 U.S. 209 |
Parties | BRIDGES et al. v. UNITED STATES |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
[Syllabus from pages 209-210 intentionally omitted] Mr. Telford Taylor, Washington, D.C., for petitioners.
Mr. John F. Davis, Washington, D.C., for respondent.
In this proceeding we are limited to the consideration of the following questions: (1) is it barred by the statute of limitations and, if not, (2) is it barred by the principles of res judicata, or estoppel, or the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment? For the reasons hereafter stated we hold that it is barred by the statute of limitations. We do not reach or discuss the second question.
The issues raised by the first question are:
1. Whether the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act1 has suspended the running of the general three-year statute of limitations2 in relation to the offenses charged in—
Count I, under the general conspiracy statute;3
2. Whether the saving clause in § 21 of the Act of June 25, 1948, which enacted the present Criminal Code into law,6 continued in effect the special five-year statute of limitations of § 346(g) of the Nationality Act of 19407 in relation to violations of § 346(a) of that Act.
For the reasons set forth, we reach a negative conclusion on each of the above issues.
Petitioner Harry Bridges entered the United States in 1920 as an immigrant seaman from Austalia. Subsequently, he defeated two attempts of the United States to deport him because of his alleged Communist Party membership or affiliation. The second such attempt culminated June 18, 1945, in Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 65 S.Ct. 1443, 89 L.Ed. 2103.
June 23, 1945, he applied, in the San Francisco office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, for a Certificate of Arrival and a Preliminary Form for Petition for Naturalization. August 8, he appeared, with petitioners Schmidt and Robertson, before an examiner for a preliminary examination. Each of the three testified that Bridges was not a member of the Communist Party.
September 17, 1945, Bridges appeared in the Superior Court in San Francisco for the naturalization hearing. Schmidt and Robertson testified that they had known Bridges for five years or longer, that he was a resident of the United States during that time and that they vouched for his loyalty to the United States. Bridges gave the following answers under oath:
He was then admitted to citizenship.
May 25, 1949, more than three years later, a grand jury in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California returned the present indictment in three counts.
Count I charges the three petitioners with a conspiracy to defraud the United States by impairing, obstructing and defeating the proper administration of its naturalization laws by having Bridges fraudulently petition for and obtain naturalization by falsely and fraudulently stating to the naturalization court that he had never belonged to the Communist Party in the United States, and that such statement was known at all times by each of the petitioners to be false and fraudulent. The appearance and testimony of the petitioners in the naturalization proceeding were alleged as the overt acts in the conspiracy.
That count is laid under the following general conspiracy statute:
'If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such parties do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each of the parties to such conspiracy shall be fined not more than ten thousand dollars, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.' § 37 of the old Criminal Code, 35 Stat. 1096, 18 U.S.C. § 88, now 18 U.S.C. (Supp. V) § 371, 18 U.S.C.A. § 371.
Count II charges Bridges with wilfully and knowingly making a false statement under oath in the naturalization proceeding when he testified that he was not and had not been a member of the Communist Party. Count II is laid under § 346(a)(1) of the Nationality Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 1163, 8 U.S.C. § 746(a)(1), which makes it a felony for any person—
'Knowingly to make a false statement under oath, either orally or in writing, in any case, proceeding, or matter relating to, or under, or by virtue of any law of the United States relating to naturalization or citizenship.'8 Count III charges Schmidt and Robertson with wilfully and knowingly aiding Bridges, who was not entitled thereto, to obtain a Certificate of Naturalization which was to be procured by false and fraudulent statements. It avers that they knew that Bridges was a member of the Communist Party and that he had made false and fraudulent representations in the naturalization proceeding. Count III is laid under § 346(a)(5) of the Nationality Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 1164, 8 U.S.C. § 746(a)(5), which makes it a felony—
'To encourage, aid, advise, or assist any person not entitled thereto to obtain, accept, or receive any certificate of arrival, declaration of intention, certificate of naturalization, or certificate of citizenship, or other documentary evidence of naturalization or of citizenship—
9
Petitioners each moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground, inter alia, that each count was barred by the statute of limitations. The motions were denied. D.C., 86 F.Supp. 922. The trial resulted in a jury verdict of guilty on each count. Bridges received concurrent sentences of imprisonment for two years on Count I and five years on Count II. The other petitioners each received concurrent sentences of imprisonment for two years on each of Counts I and III. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 9 Cir., 199 F.2d 811. Rehearing en banc was denied. 9 Cir., 201 F.2d 254. Because of an indicated conflict between that decision and part of the decision in Marzani v. United States, 83 U.S.App.D.C. 78, 168 F.2d 133, affirmed by an equally divided Court, 335 U.S. 895, 69 S.Ct. 299, 93 L.Ed. 431, 336 U.S. 922, 69 S.Ct. 513, 93 L.Ed. 1075, as well as its conflict in part with United States v. Obermeier, 2 Cir., 186 F.2d 243, and because of the importance of the issues, we granted certiorari, 345 U.S. 904, 73 S.Ct. 648.10
The acts charged occurred in 1945. Accordingly, unless the general three-year statute of limitations is suspended or superseded, the indictment, found in 1949, was out of time and must be dismissed.11
A. The suspension prescribed by the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act applies to offenses involving the defrauding of the United States or any agency thereof, whether by conspiracy or not, and in any manner, but only where the fraud is of a pecuniary nature or at least of a nature concerning property.
The Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act creates an exception to a longstanding congressional 'policy of re- pose' that is fundamental to our society and our criminal law. From 1790 to 1876, the general limitation applicable to noncapital offenses was two years and since then it has been three years.12 In relation to a comparable exception stated in § 1110(a) as the limitation applicable under the Revenue Act of 1926,13 Mr. Justice Roberts, speaking for the Court, said:
14 United States v. Scharton, 285 U.S. 518, 521—522, 52 S.Ct. 416, 417, 76 L.Ed. 917.
The legislative history of this exception emphasizes the propriety of its conservative interpretation. It indicates a purpose to suspend the general statute of limitations only as to war frauds of a pecuniary nature or of a nature concerning property. It nowhere suggests a purpose to swallow up the three-year limitation to the extent necessary to reach the offenses before us.
The present Suspension Act had its origin in the Act of August 24, 1942.15 See United States v. Smith, 342 U.S. 225, 226 227, 72 S.Ct. 260, 261, 96 L.Ed. 252. That Act was a wartime measure reviving for World War II substantially the same exception to the general statute of limitations which, from 1921 to 1927, had been directed at the war frauds of World War I.16 The Committee Reports show that in 1921 Congress aimed the proviso at the pecuniary frauds growing out of war contracts.17 Congress was concerned with the exceptional opportunities to defraud the United States that were inherent in its gigantic and hastily organized procurement program. It sought to help safeguard the treasury from such frauds by increasing the time allowed for their discovery and prosecution. In 1942, the reports and proceedings demonstrate a like purpose, coupled with a design to readopt the World War I policy.18
This interpretation of the scope of the 1942 provision was expressly approved in Marzani v. United States, 83 U.S.App.D.C. 78 82, 168 F.2d 133—137. As to nine counts based upon the amended False Claims Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 287, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the 1942 Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act did not suspend the three-year statute of limitations. Those counts charged that false statements had been made to...
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