Bridgestone Americas Holding v. Mayberry
| Decision Date | 31 August 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 48A02-0504-CV-368.,48A02-0504-CV-368. |
| Parties | BRIDGESTONE AMERICAS HOLDING, INC., Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Bridgestone/Firestone North American Tire, LLC and Bridgestone/Firestone Manufacturing Operations Division, Appellants-Defendants, v. Violet MAYBERRY, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Harmony B. Wigley, and Audrey E. Wigley, as Mother of Harmony B. Wigley, deceased, Appellees-Plaintiffs. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Mark J.R. Merkle, Marc T. Quigley, Krieg DeVault LLP, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellants.
Jon Laramore, D. Lucetta Pope, Baker & Daniels LLP, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae.
Peter Campbell King, Donna L. Marsh, Cline, King & King, P.C., Columbus, IN, Attorneys for Appellees.
Bridgestone Americas Holding Inc., Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Bridgestone/Firestone North American Tire, LLC, and Bridgestone/Firestone Manufacturing Operations Division (collectively "Bridgestone") bring this interlocutory appeal to challenge the trial court's order compelling discovery of Bridgestone's highly proprietary skim stock formula.1 Bridgestone presents three issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as whether the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered Bridgestone to disclose its skim stock formula.
We affirm.
On August 7, 2001, Harmony B. Wigley ("Harmony") died in an automobile accident when she lost control of her vehicle on Interstate 69 in Madison County. Following her death, Harmony's sister and mother, Violet Mayberry and Audrey Wigley, respectively, filed a complaint for damages against Bridgestone alleging that the accident occurred because one of the tires on Harmony's vehicle experienced a tread separation. During the course of discovery, Mayberry requested that Bridgestone produce certain documents, namely, its skim stock formula for the rubber coating compound used to cover the steel belts of the tire at issue. In response to Mayberry's discovery request, Bridgestone filed a motion for a protective order claiming that its "skim stock" formula is entitled to protection as a trade secret. Following a hearing, the trial court issued an order compelling discovery of Bridgestone's formula. The trial court's order consists, in relevant part, of the following:
[T]he Defendant has argued that the "[skim stock]" information is a confidential or secret formula, which the Defendant protects from its competitors. Plaintiff has argued that such information is necessary in the effective preparation and presentation of its case. The Court finds that after considering all of the evidence and arguments of counsel, that the Defendant has failed to establish why [its skim stock formula] should not be made available as part of the discovery process.
In light of the fact that the Court has denied the request for a sharing protective order and the Court's intent to severely restrict the present order, said information is not to be shared with any person not directly an employee, litigant or expert employed by the parties. Furthermore, no expert consulted by or employed by Plaintiff shall be permitted to retain, disseminate or otherwise utilize such discovery material on behalf of any other person, entity or group other than Plaintiff. Any violation will be treated as a serious matter subjecting that person to potential severe punishment for contempt of court.
Thereafter, Bridgestone sought certification of that interlocutory order, and the trial court certified the order and entered a stay. On April 29, 2005, Bridgestone filed a Petition for Acceptance of Interlocutory Appeal with this court, and on July 15, 2005, the motions panel denied that motion.2
Then, on August 12, 2005, Bridgestone petitioned this court for rehearing. In its order granting Bridgestone's petition for rehearing, a second motions panel noted that Indiana Appellate Rule 54 does not allow a party to seek rehearing from a decision denying a motion to accept jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal. Still, the second motions panel concluded that "this Court has inherent authority to reconsider any decision while an appeal remains in fieri." Appellee's App. at 119. The second motions panel reconsidered and granted Bridgestone's motion for acceptance of interlocutory appeal.
First, we address Mayberry's contention that we do not have jurisdiction to consider this appeal. Specifically, she claims that because the first motions panel refused to accept jurisdiction of Bridgestone's discretionary interlocutory appeal, the second motions panel did not have jurisdiction to reconsider and grant Bridgestone's petition for rehearing. We cannot agree.
"It is the duty of this Court to determine whether we have jurisdiction before proceeding to determine the rights of the parties on the merits." Allstate Ins. Co. v. Scroghan, 801 N.E.2d 191, 193 (Ind. Ct.App.2004), trans. denied. Further, a court always has jurisdiction to consider its own jurisdiction. Schoffstall v. Failey, 180 Ind.App. 528, 530, 389 N.E.2d 361, 363 (Ind.Ct.App.1979) (citation omitted). Indeed, it is not uncommon for our appellate courts to raise the question of jurisdiction in a particular case. See e.g., Young v. Estate of Sweeney, 808 N.E.2d 1217, 1219-20 (Ind.Ct.App.2004) ().
Our Rules of Appellate Procedure provide that we have jurisdiction over interlocutory orders only under the conditions described in Appellate Rule 14. Id. at 1219. Under Rule 14, there are three ways we may obtain jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal: (1) Rule 14(A) allows interlocutory orders as of right; (2) Rule 14(B) permits discretionary appeals "if the trial court certifies its order and the Court of Appeals accepts jurisdiction over the appeal"; and (3) Rule 14(C) authorizes other interlocutory appeals only as provided by statute. Scroghan, 801 N.E.2d at 193. Because Rule 14(A) and (C) do not apply to the present case, our jurisdiction over this appeal is discretionary and must derive from Rule 14(B).
Here, the trial court certified its order, but the first motions panel denied Bridgestone's request to accept jurisdiction of the appeal. Bridgestone filed a petition for rehearing. A second motions panel then granted Bridgestone's petition and accepted jurisdiction of the interlocutory appeal under Appellate Rule 14(B). The second motions panel concluded that, "this Court has inherent authority to reconsider any decision while an appeal remains in fieri." Appellee's App. at 119. But Mayberry claims that when the first motions panel refused to accept jurisdiction over Bridgestone's interlocutory appeal, the second motions panel was without jurisdiction to grant Bridgestone's petition for rehearing. Thus, according to Mayberry, we are without jurisdiction to consider the merits of the present appeal.
Again, Appellate Rule 14(B) states: "[a]n appeal may be taken from . . . interlocutory orders if the trial court certifies its order and the Court of Appeals accepts jurisdiction over the appeal." The rule clearly states that the only prerequisite for this Court to accept a discretionary interlocutory appeal is certification of the order by the trial court. Here, the trial court certified its order compelling discovery, and Bridgestone filed a motion with this Court to accept jurisdiction of the appeal. While the first motions panel declined to accept jurisdiction, the second motions panel exercised its inherent authority to reconsider the ruling of the first motions panel. It then granted Bridgestone's motion and accepted jurisdiction. Therefore, the two requirements of Rule 14(B) were satisfied.
We considered the same issue in Lohm v. State, 177 Ind.App. 488, 489, 380 N.E.2d 561, 562 (Ind.Ct.App.1978).3 There, too, we first refused to accept jurisdiction and then granted appellant's petition for rehearing and accepted jurisdiction of the discretionary interlocutory appeal. But Mayberry relies on Oxford Fin. Group, Ltd. v. Evans, 795 N.E.2d 1135, 1141 (Ind. Ct.App.2003), for the proposition that this court will not reconsider a ruling by the motions panel in the absence of clear authority establishing that it erred as a matter of law. Mayberry's reliance on Oxford Fin. is misplaced.
Oxford Fin. can be readily distinguished. First, the question in Oxford Fin. was whether the panel of judges assigned to decide an appeal can review a previous ruling made by the motions panel, and it was in that procedural context that Oxford Fin. enunciated the "erred as a matter of law" standard. Here, the issue is whether a motions panel can revisit a ruling by a previous motions panel while the matter remains in fieri.4
Second, and more importantly, in this context the Oxford Fin. "error as a matter of law" standard for reconsideration of a previous ruling simply does not apply. When the trial court has properly certified an interlocutory order, and the motion is otherwise submitted according to the Appellate Rules, our decision whether or not to accept a discretionary interlocutory appeal is entirely discretionary. Thus, in its petition for rehearing, Bridgestone was not required to show and, indeed, could not show, that the first motions panel had erred.
Still, Mayberry alleges that Indiana Appellate Rule 54(A) does not allow a party to petition for rehearing from a refusal to accept jurisdiction of a discretionary interlocutory appeal. The rule does, however, permit a petition for rehearing from "an order dismissing an appeal." App. R. 54(A)(3). Here, the first motions panel's refusal to accept jurisdiction of Bridgestone's discretionary interlocutory appeal is the functional equivalent of an order dismissing an appeal. That is,...
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