Bridgewater v. Hotz
| Decision Date | 30 March 1972 |
| Docket Number | 44897,Nos. 44891,44908 and 44929,s. 44891 |
| Citation | 51 Ill.2d 103,281 N.E.2d 317 |
| Parties | Wayne BRIDGEWATER, Appellee, v. Eulalia HOTZ, Appellant. Herbert L. 'Hub' STERN et al., Appellants, v. Grace Mary STERN, Appellee. Elmo McCLAIN, Appellant, v. Lois MILLER, Appellee. PEOPLE ex rel. Richard M. COLEMAN, Petitioner, v. Ray W. MacDONALD, County Clerk, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
William Brandt, Madison and David A. Epstein, Springfield, for appellee.
We have consolidated for opinion appeals from judgments of the circuit courts of Madison (Docket No. 44891), Lake (Docket No. 44897), and Adams (Docket No. 44908) counties, and an original action for Mandamus (Docket No. 44929). The Following timely notices of appeal to the appellate court for the appropriate districts we allowed motions filed in accordance with our Rule 302(b) ( Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 110A, par. 302(b)), fixed an expedited schedule for filing briefs, consolidated the cases for oral argument and following oral argument announced our decision. Subsequent to announcement of that decision we allowed a motion for leave to file an original action seeking the issuance of a writ of Mandamus ordering the circuit court of Du Page County to expunge a decree substantially similar to the decree of the circuit court of Madison County and ordering the county clerk of Du Page County to hold the primary and election for nomination and election of members of the county board in accordance with the statutes. Because of the brief period of time remaining until February 8, 1972, we ordered an expedited briefing schedule, and following oral argument awarded the writ.
circuit court of Madison County held section 2--26.01 of the Election Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1969, ch. 46, par. 2--26.01) invalid, enjoined the county clerk of Madison County from conducting the primary for the nomination of candidates for the offices of members of the county board on February 8, 1972, as provided in section 7--5, and from conducting the election for said offices on April 4, 1972, as provided in section 2--26.01 of the Election Code, ordered the county clerk to conduct the primary on March 21, 1972, the same date fixed for the primary for the nomination of candidates for offices to be voted upon in the general election, and further ordered that the election of members of the county board be conducted at the same time as the general election to be held in November 7, 1972. In actions seeking substantially similar judgments the circuit courts of Lake and Adams Counties denied the relief sought and dismissed the suits.
Several statutes are pertinent to this litigation. Section 2 of 'An Act relating to the composition and election of county boards in certain counties' (Ill.Rev.Stat.1969, ch. 34, par. 831 et seq.), hereafter called the County Board Act, provides, in part, that in counties having a population of 3,000,00 or less and the township form of government there shall be a county board of not less than 5 nor more than 29 members, who may be elected at large or by county board districts with an equal number of inhabitants. Section 2--26.01 of the Election Code provides that county board members provided for in the County Board Act shall be elected on the first Tuesday in April 1972 (April 4) and one half of the members shall be elected every two years thereafter. To the extent here relevant, section 7--5 of the Election Code provides that a primary for the nomination of officers to be voted for on the first Tuesday in April in any year shall be held on the second Tuesday in February of such year, and that 'A primary shall be held on the third Tuesday in March in every year in which officers are to be voted for on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November of such year, for the nomination of candidates for such offices as are to be voted for at such November election.' Section 7--1.01 of the Election Code provides that in any county that has been divided into county board districts in accordance with the County Board Act, the county with the County Board Act, the county board may, by resolution, provide that established political parties may nominate candidates for the office of member of the county board by caucus.
By reason of the provisions of section 4--6 of the Election Code there can be no period preceding the primaries to be held on February 8 and March 21, 1972, during the 28-day period preceding the election to be held on April 4, 1972, and during the two-day period following each of the primaries and the election. Section 4--6 also provides 'that if by reason of the proximity of any such elections to one another the effect of this provision would be to close registrations for all or any part of the 10 days immediately prior to such 28 day period, the county clerk shall accept, solely for use in the subsequently and not in any Plaintiffs contend that the statutory provisions for the February primary and the April election applicable to counties within the class created by section 832 of the County Board Act are in violation of sections 3 and 4 of Article III and section 13 of article IV of the constitution of 1970, S.H.A. which provide:
intervening election, registrations and transfers of registration within the period from the 28th to the 38th days, both inclusive, prior to such subsequent election * * *.' As the result of this provision, during the period commencing on February 26, 1972, and ending March 6, 1972, voters may register for the election to be held on April 4, 1972.
§ 3. Elections
All elections shall be free and equal.
The General Assembly by law shall define permanent residence for voting purposes, insure secrecy of voting and the integrity of the election process, and facilitate registration and voting by all qualified persons. Laws governing voter registration and conduct of elections shall be general and uniform.
The General Assembly shall pass no special or local law when a general law is or can be made applicable. Whether a general law is or can be made applicable shall be a matter for judicial determination.'
They argue that the effect of the statutes is to create two classes of counties--one class comprised of counties with populations of less than 3,000,00 and the township form of government and the other comprised of Cook County and the counties under commission form of government. They contend that the statutes provide less opportunity for voter registration in the former class than in the latter in that they effect a closing of the registration books for periods of 28 days before the February primary, 18 days before the April election and 2 days after each of these elections in counties of one class while in counties of the other class voter registration is permitted to continue. They point out that in 1972 the period of permissible voter registration will be 50 days less in the first class of counties than in the second. They argue that there are legislative and congressional districts comprised in part of territory lying within both classes of counties, thus effecting discrimination and inequality of opportunity to register between the voters within those districts.
Citing the debates of the Constitutional Convention, plaintiffs contend that the provision in section 4 of article III that laws governing voter registration and conduct of elections be general and uniform is 'a new, unprecedented constitutional standard for Illinois election laws, distinct from the continued standard of prohibiting local or special laws.' They argue that the presence in the constitution of two separate provisions, each phrased differently, one specifically (article III, section 4) and the other generally (article IV, section 13) applicable to election laws, requires us to hold that they are different standards and that to hold them equivalent would 'render the uniformity clause nugatory, or at best redundant.' From this, they argue, it follows that the requirement that such laws be 'general and uniform' imposes a more stringent standard than does the proscription of 'local or special laws' and the test of reasonableness and validity of classifications is a much stricter one. They argue further that the test of 'general and uniform' requires that the reasonableness and validity of a classification requires 'affirmative justification by a valid purpose' rather than merely 'rational relation to a valid purpose while the local or special laws standard, by contrast, allows a classification to stand if a rational justification is logically possible.'
Defendants contend that the regulation of registration of voters and of the holding of primaries and elections is within the power of the General Assembly and the enactment of the legislation of which plaintiffs complain is within the constitutional limitations imposed upon that power.
Sound rules of construction require that in those instances in which this court, prior to the adoption of the constitution of 1970, has defined a term found therein, that it be given the same definition, unless it is clearly apparent that some other meaning was intended. (Hamer v. Board of Education (1971), 47 Ill.2d 480, 265 N.E.2d 616; American Aberdeen-Angus Breeders' Association v. Fullerton (1927), 325 Ill. 323, 156 N.E. 314.) Our earlier decisions hold that: 'Laws are general and uniform when alike in their operation upon all persons in like situation.' (City of Mt. Olive v. Braje (1937), 366 Ill. 132, 135, 7 N.E.2d 851, 853; Bowers v. Glos (1931), 346 Ill. 623, 179 N.E. 80.) In Mathews v. City of Chicago (1930), 342 Ill. 120, 128, 174 N.E. 35, and in Latham v. Board of Education (1964), 31 Ill.2d 178, 183, 201 N.E.2d 111, 114, this court said: ...
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