O'Brien v. Chi., St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co.
| Decision Date | 04 April 1899 |
| Citation | 102 Wis. 628,78 N.W. 1084 |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
| Parties | O'BRIEN ET AL. v. CHICAGO, ST. P., M. & O. RY. CO. |
1. The rule that disputed questions of fact on evidence are to be answered by the jury applies only where the evidence is such that there is room for different reasonable inferences therefrom. If the truth of propositions of fact upon which the right of recovery depends be not within the range of reasonable probabilities, no question in regard to them need be sent to a jury though there is evidence as to their truth.
2. To entitle plaintiff to have his alleged cause of action submitted to a jury for decision, he must produce evidence from which sensible men of unbiased minds can reasonably decide the issues in his favor.
3. The rule that, in determining whether a nonsuit should be granted or a verdict directed, the evidence of plaintiff only should be considered, contemplates the consideration of such evidence in the light of matters of common knowledge and facts established beyond reasonable controversy in the case, whether by evidence of plaintiff or defendant or both.
4. If the evidence of the plaintiff, taking the most favorable view of it in his behalf that it will reasonably bear, including all reasonable inferences therefrom and assuming that it establishes all that it tends to establish when viewed in the light of conceded or undisputed facts, will not support a verdict in his favor, the verdict, on request being made therefor, should be directed against him.
Appeal from circuit court, St. Croix county; E. W. Helms, Judge.
The case was an action by James S. O'Brien and another against the Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Railway Company for the recovery of damages for breach of a contract to convey land on facts alleged in substance as follows: May 1, 1893, defendant contracted in writing to sell and convey to D. M. Sabin and Walker, Judd & Veazie, lands described in Schedules A and B attached to the complaint, those in A to be conveyed when paid for and those in B when defendant should acquire title thereto, the consideration being two dollars per thousand feet on the standing pine on the lands according to estimates furnished the purchasers by defendant. July 20, 1883, the purchasers paid the full amount of the purchase price, part in cash and part in notes, each note being for one-twentieth of the deferred amount, one to mature every six months and the last on February 1, 1893. Before the commencement of this action plaintiffs became owners of the conveyed lands and all rights under the aforesaid contract. After they became such owners, they made all the deferred payments as they fell due, till all were paid. The total amount paid for the land in Schedule B was $16,000. Such lands were never conveyed as per contract, but for a valuable consideration were released by defendant to the United States, thereby disabling it from complying with the requirements of such contract. Defendant had a good title to the Schedule B lands and its conveying the same in breach of the contract entitled plaintiffs to damages in the sum of $48,000, that being the value of the lands in excess of the contract price. Judgment was demanded for $64,000 and interest on the $16,000 alleged to have been paid for the Schedule B lands, to wit: On $2,500 from February 1, 1892, on $6,700 from August 1, 1892, and on $6,700 from February 1, 1893. Defendant answered that before the alleged making of a land contract with Sabin and Walker, Judd & Veazie, it agreed to sell the lands mentioned in the complaint, under certain conditions, to one Humbird, who thereafter assigned his contract to Sabin and Walker, Judd & Veazie, and that in part performance of such contract it conveyed the Schedule A lands and before the action was commenced received full payment therefor. The answer admitted that the Schedule B lands had not been conveyed under the Humbird contract, and took issue with all the allegations of the complaint as to plaintiffs being entitled to the Schedule B lands or damages for nonconveyance of the same, or the recovery of money paid therefor, or that any money had been so paid. The court decided that there was no satisfactory evidence that defendant ever made a contract to cover the Schedule B lands, other than the one with Humbird, or that any money had been paid to defendant on such contract or otherwise for such lands, and therefore directed a verdict for defendant, on which judgment was entered and from which this appeal was taken, as before stated. Affirmed.S. J. Bradford and Clapp & Macartney, for appellants.
Thomas Wilson and L. K. Luse, for respondent.
MARSHALL, J. (after stating the facts as above).
The main question here is, was there evidence from which the jury could reasonably have found facts requisite to a recovery by plaintiffs on the cause of action set forth in the complaint? It is often said in jury cases that if there is any evidence to establish the existence of a disputed fact, and a conflict in that regard, the question respecting it is for the jury. That rule should be construed as calling for evidence worthy of belief in regard to the subject. If the truth of the proposition be not within the range of probabilities, in the light of reason and common sense, in view of facts of common knowledge or facts established in the case beyond reasonable controversy, then evidence of the existence of the fact involved does not prove such existence, or tend to prove it. It is not evidence tending to establish the allegation of fact, because there can be no tendency that way so long as all reasonable probabilities are opposed to it. It is often said that if different, unbiased minds may draw different inferences from the evidence, it is for the jury to draw the proper inference. Just so,--but only within the range of reasonable probabilities. Evidence, or an inference therefrom, showing a bare possibility of the existence of a fact in issue, will not do. Verdicts can be based only on reasonable probabilities. Mere possibility cannot establish probability. Gibbons v. Railroad Co., 58 Wis. 335, 17 N. W. 132;Finkelston v. Railway Co., 94 Wis. 270, 68 N. W. 1005. If evidence be not sufficiently persuasive to an unbiased mind, as to the existence of a fact, giving full effect to the most favorable inferences in that regard that can be reasonably drawn therefrom, to remove the question of its existence beyond the...
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