O'Brien v. City of Syracuse

Citation445 N.Y.S.2d 687,54 N.Y.2d 353,429 N.E.2d 1158
Parties, 429 N.E.2d 1158 Howard J. O'BRIEN, Jr., as Executor of Howard J. O'Brien, Deceased, et al., Appellants, v. CITY OF SYRACUSE et al., Respondents.
Decision Date19 November 1981
CourtNew York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Michael P. Oot, Syracuse, for appellant.

David M. Garber, Corp. Counsel, Syracuse (James L. Gelormini, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Syracuse, of counsel), for respondents.

OPINION OF THE COURT

COOKE, Chief Judge.

A property owner who unsuccessfully asserts against a governmental entity a claim for de facto appropriation may not later bring another action for trespass in an attempt to recover damages for the same acts as those on which the first lawsuit was grounded. The order of the Appellate Division, 79 A.D.2d 874, 434 N.Y.S.2d 547, should be affirmed.

Plaintiffs owned property in an area of Syracuse subject to urban rehabilitation. In 1973, plaintiffs commenced an article 78 proceeding against the same parties as are defendants in the present litigation. In this earlier suit, plaintiffs alleged that defendants had committed a number of acts that so seriously interfered with plaintiffs' property rights as to amount to a de facto appropriation by the city. In a nonjury trial, the 1973 suit was dismissed for failure to establish a de facto taking. The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, affirmed (Matter of O'Brien v. City of Syra 54 A.D.2d 186, 388 N.Y.S.2d 866, mot. for lv. to app. den. 40 N.Y.2d 809, 392 N.Y.S.2d 1027, 360 N.E.2d 1109, app. dsmd. 41 N.Y.2d 1008, 395 N.Y.S.2d 1028, 363 N.E.2d 1195, cert. den. 434 U.S. 807, 98 S.Ct. 37, 54 L.Ed.2d 65).

In March, 1978, plaintiffs filed a new complaint, essentially restating the allegations of their previous petition, but with the added averment that the city had taken the property by tax deed on June 1, 1977. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata, which motion was granted with leave to amend. Plaintiffs then filed an amended complaint reiterating the original complaint's allegations and adding general statements that defendants "wrongfully, unlawfully and willfully" trespassed upon the property at various times during the period 1967 to 1978, and that the property was damaged during these numerous intrusions. Defendants again moved to dismiss on the grounds of res judicata, Statute of Limitations, and failure to serve timely a notice of claim.

Supreme Court denied the motion on all three points. As to the issue of res judicata, the Trial Judge concluded that no bar existed because there were involved materially different elements of proof for the two theories of recovery, citing Smith v. Kirkpatrick, 305 N.Y. 66, 111 N.E.2d 209. Specifically, the Judge indicated that an action for de facto appropriation required proof that the city owned the property, while an action for trespass required the plaintiffs to prove title in themselves. As to the two other grounds, the Judge calculated the time from June 1, 1977, when the tax deed was executed, and ruled that the action was not time-barred.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, reversed on the reasoning that the entire action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. That court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint. The order should be affirmed, but on a different basis than that employed by the Appellate Division in viewing the general allegations of trespass in the instant action.

In analyzing the complaint, plaintiffs' allegations fall into two categories: (1) those concerning activities underlying the 1973 litigation; and (2) those asserting trespass generally. Only the claims encompassed by the first category are definitely barred by res judicata.

This State has adopted the transactional analysis approach in deciding res judicata issues (Matter of Reilly v. Reid, 45 N.Y.2d 24, 407 N.Y.S.2d 645, 379 N.E.2d 172). Under this address, once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy (id., at pp. 29-30, 407 N.Y.S.2d 645, 379 N.E.2d 172). Here, all of defendants' conduct falling in the first category was also raised during the 1973 suit as the basis for that litigation. That proceeding having been brought to a final conclusion, no other claim may be predicated upon the same incidents.

Plaintiffs, relying on Smith v. Kirkpatrick, 305 N.Y. 66, 111 N.E.2d 209 supra, urge that de facto appropriation and trespass are actions having different theoretical bases and requiring different evidentiary proof. This contention, however, erroneously characterizes the bases of the two causes. De facto appropriation does not involve a proof of title in the governmental defendant. Rather, de facto appropriation, in the context of physical invasion, is based on showing that the government has intruded onto the citizen's property and interfered with the owner's property rights to such a degree that the conduct amounts to a constitutional taking requiring the government to purchase the property from the owner; only at that point does title actually transfer. ...

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