O'Brien v. City of Saginaw
| Decision Date | 26 August 2011 |
| Docket Number | Case Number 10-12700-BC |
| Parties | RONALD O'BRIEN, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF SAGINAW and LARRY CAMEL, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
Honorable Thomas L. Ludington
Plaintiff Ronald O'Brien contracted with Defendant City of Saginaw in January 2009 to serve as an independent site coordinator for the Saginaw East Side Weed and Seed Program. The Weed and Seed program "is a national community-based strategy to 'weed out' violent crime, drug abuse and gang activity in designated neighborhoods while planting the seed of knowledge in the community." Compl. ¶ 9, ECF No. 1. The contract was for a one-year term, from January 6, 2009, through January 5, 2010, terminable by either party "at any time with or without cause by providing a 15-day notice in writing." Pl.'s Opp'n Summ. J. Ex. 4 § I, ECF No. 24-5; Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Ex. A § I, ECF No. 21-2. The contract also stated that Plaintiff agreed "not to commence any action or suit relating to the Agreement more than six months after the date of termination of the Agreement." Pl.'s Ex. 4 § VII; Defs.' Ex. A § VII.
As the contract neared its conclusion in December 2009, the Saginaw Weed and Seed Steering Committee agreed to extend the contract on a month-to-month basis until the Saginaw Weed and Seed Executive Committee completed its evaluation of Plaintiff's performance. OnJanuary 13, 2010, a Saginaw Weed and Seed Committee meeting was held. The Executive Committee had completed its evaluation. It recommended that Plaintiff's contract not be renewed. A discussion then ensued, during which Defendant Larry Camel stated that Plaintiff is "a racist and hat[es] children." Compl. ¶ 18. The Steering Committee put the issue of whether to renew Plaintiff's contract to a vote. Seven to four, the Steering Committee declined to renew Plaintiff's contract. Plaintiff contends that the decision was influenced by Camel's statement. Camel and the City (collectively, "Defendants") dispute this. They offer affidavits of six committee members who voted against Plaintiff, each of whom made averments such as: "statements made at the meeting by . . . Camel describing [Plaintiff] as a racist who hated or did not like children (or words to that effect) did not influence my decision regarding the renewal of [Plaintiff's] contract." Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Ex. G ¶ 6; see also Defs.' Exs. EE ¶ 5, FF ¶ 3, GG ¶ 4, HH ¶ 3, II ¶ 3. After the meeting, Plaintiff was given fifteen days notice in writing that his contract was terminated.
On July 1, 2010, Plaintiff wrote to the City requesting a "name-clearing hearing." The following day, he spoke with a City representative. Noting that the contract's six month limitation of actions clause would elapse on July 13, 2010, Plaintiff requested that either the hearing be held on or before July 13, or that the City agree to toll the limitation of actions clause. The City responded that it was willing to hold a name-clearing hearing, but that it was unable to arrange the hearing by July 13, and that it was unwilling to toll the limitation of actions clause. Plaintiff then filed a three-count complaint against Defendants on July 7, 2010, alleging that they had violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by infringing his rights to due process and equal protection, and that they had violated Michigan common law by defaming him.
In August, the City wrote to Plaintiff regarding the name-clearing hearing. The City offered a hearing "during which [Plaintiff], his attorney and/or persons who would like to speak on his behalf may respond to any statements made at the January 13, 2010 meeting." Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Ex. V. Over the next several weeks, the parties corresponded regarding the format of the hearing, its location, and how it would be publicized. On September 30, 2010, Plaintiff wrote to the City that he would "agree to the name[-]clearing hearing in the manner and form presented [by the City] if notice is published in The Saginaw News" Defs.' Ex. U. The City agreed in writing by letter dated October 8. Defs.' Ex. V. On November 4, Plaintiff rescinded his request for a name-clearing hearing, writing: "Upon further reflection, [I] have determined that the manner in which you proposed that the name-clearing hearing proceed will cause [me] further humiliation." Defs.' Ex. X. Instead, Plaintiff proposed, the parties should "proceed with discovery on other matters and delay the name[-]clearing hearing until such time we determine that this case cannot be amicably resolved." Id.
On September 21, 2010, Defendants filed a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings, contending that the defamation claims against both Defendants should be dismissed. ECF No. 11. The Court granted Defendants' motion in part and denied it in part, dismissing the defamation claim against the City with prejudice, but permitting the defamation claim against Camel to go forward. O'Brien v. City of Saginaw, No. 10-12700-BC, 2011 WL 8143, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 3, 2011).
On May 26, 2011, Defendants filed the instant motion for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed for the following reasons: (1) his due process claim should be dismissed as he cannot establish that was deprived of a liberty interest in his good name or a property interest in the at-will contract; (2) his equal protection claim should bedismissed as he is a public employee and thus he cannot establish a "class of one" violation; and (3) his defamation claim should be dismissed as he cannot establish damages. For the reasons discussed below, Defendants' motion will be granted.
A motion for summary judgment should be granted if the "movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party has the initial burden of informing the Court of the basis for its motion, and identifying where to look in the record for relevant facts "which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The burden then shifts to the opposing party who must "set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (citation omitted). If the opposing party does not raise genuine issues of fact and the record indicates the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the court shall grant summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.
The Court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party and determine "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52. The party opposing the motion may not "rely on the hope that the trier of fact will disbelieve the movant's denial of a disputed fact" but must make an affirmative showing with proper evidence in order to defeat the motion. Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479 (6th Cir. 1989). A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must designate specific facts in affidavits, depositions, or other factual material showing "evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
"[R]eputation, good name, honor, and integrity are among the liberty interests protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment." Quinn v. Shirey, 293 F.3d 315, 319 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Chilingirian v. Boris, 882 F.2d 200, 205 (6th Cir. 1989)); see also Burkhart v. Randles, 764 F.2d 1196, 1201 (6th Cir. 1985) (). To demonstrate a deprivation of this interest, a plaintiff must establish five elements:
First, the stigmatizing statements must be made in conjunction with the plaintiff's termination from employment. Second, a plaintiff is not deprived of his liberty interest when the employer has alleged merely improper or inadequate performance, incompetence, neglect of duty or malfeasance. . . . Rather, to implicate the Due Process Clause, the employer must have made a statement in the course of the employee's discharge that might seriously damage his standing and associations in his community or that might impose on him a stigma or other disability that would foreclose his freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities. . . . Third, the stigmatizing statements or charges must be made public. Fourth, the plaintiff must claim that the charges made against him were false. Lastly, the public dissemination must have been voluntary.
Ludwig v. Bd. of Trs. of Ferris State Univ., 123 F.3d 404, 410 (6th Cir. 1997); see also Brown v. City of Niota, 214 F.3d 718, 723 (6th Cir. 2000) ().
Deprivation of this liberty interest triggers the plaintiff's right to "notice and an opportunity to be heard to refute any charges." Chilingirian v. Boris, 882 F.2d 200, 205-06 (6th Cir. 1989) (citing Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972)). Cf. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971) (). That is, once a plaintiff establishes the five elements of a libertyinterest claim under Ludwig, "he is entitled to a name[-]clearing hearing if he requests one." Quinn, 293 F.3d at 320 (quoting Brown, 214 F.3d at 723).
Critically, however, a due process violation occurs only when...
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