O'Brien v. People ex rel. Kellogg Switchboard & Supply Co.

Decision Date05 October 1905
Citation75 N.E. 108,216 Ill. 354
CourtIllinois Supreme Court
PartiesO'BRIEN v. PEOPLE ex rel. KELLOGG SWITCHBOARD & SUPPLY CO. (two cases). QUEENAN v. SAME. FISHER v. SAME. CHRISTENSEN v. SAME. MASHEK v. SAME.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Error to Appellate Court, First District.

Proceedings for contempt by the people, on the relation of the Kellogg Switchboard & Supply Company, against John O'Brien, Thomas Queenan, Lee S. Fisher, Jacob Christensen, and Albert Mashek. From judgments sentencing defendants, to various penalties, affirmed by the Appellate Court (114 Ill. App. 40), they bring error. Affirmed.

Scott, J., dissenting.

Darrow & Masters, for plaintiffs in error.

Tenney, Coffeen, Harding & Wilkerson and Allen & Wesemann (Horace Kent Tenney and James H. Wilkerson, of counsel), for defendants in error.

These several cases come to this court on writ of error to the Appellate Court for the First District. On May 25, 1903, the Kellogg Switchboard & Supply Company, a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Illinois, and engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling telephones, switchboards, and electrical supplies, with its principal office in Chicago, filed its bill for an injunction in the superior court of Cook county against certain parties named therein as defendants. The bill alleged that complainant employed from 500 to 800 men and girls in its factory, and had invested about $500,000 in machinery, patents, equipments, etc.; that it had in its employ a large number of mechanics who were members of various labor unions with local lodges in Chicago, and it also had a large number of skilled mechanics who were not associated or affiliated with any union; that a large majority of its employés were well satisfied with their wages and salaries paid, the hours of service, and the general conditions of their employment, yet notwithstanding such facts the defendants wrongfully and maliciously called a strike, and forced all of its employés who were members of the union to cease work; that on May 7, 1903, James J. Lamb, business agent of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Lee S. Fisher, business agent of the International Association of Machinists, R. G. Crane, business agent of the Brassworkers' Union, and J. E. Johnson, business agent of the Brass Moulders' Local, called upon the complainant concerning proposed articles of agreement governing the method in which complainant's factory should be operated, and insisted that said articles should be signed; that the terms of the proposed articles were arbitrary, unreasonable, and of such a nature as to deprive complainant of the free and unrestricted supervision and conduct of its business and force it to discharge nonunion men and girls in its employ; that complainant refused to sign said articles, and on May 7, 1903, a strike was called by said business agents, and the employés, upon leaving complainant's factory, gathered about the streets and alleys around said factory and began to intimidate the employés of said company who insisted upon remaining at work, and instituted and inaugurated what is commonly known as a system of ‘picketing,’ and began a systematic course of intimidation, and by threats and personal violence sought to prevent persons from working in said factory. The bill further alleged that these acts of violence and intimidation had continued from the date of said strike until the time of the filing of the bill, and that prior thereto the complainant had entered into numerous contracts for the furnishing of the products of its factory, and by these acts of intimidation it had been prevented from operating its factory so as to fulfill its contracts, and as a result had sustained great and irreparable damage, loss, and injury, against which it had no relief or remedy except in a court of chancery; that the persons who were made parties defendant to the bill, and others, had entered into a conspiracy to prevent complainant from carrying on its business; and prayed for an injunction restraining said defendants from doing certain things mentioned in said bill.

The bill was supported by numerous affidavits. A preliminary injunction was issued, which restrained the defendants and their confederates from in any manner interfering with, hindering, obstructing, or stopping any of the business of the said Kellogg Switchboard & Supply Company, or its agents, servants, or employés, in the operation of the business of such complainant; from entering upon the ground or places where the employés of said complainant are at work, for the purpose of interfering with, hindering, or obstructing the business of said complainant in any manner whatsoever; from compelling or attempting to compel, by threats or intimidation, force or violence, any of the employés of said complainant to refuse or fail to do their work or discharge their duties as such employés; from compelling or inducing, or attempting to compel or induce, by threats, intimidation, force, or violence, any of the employés of said complainant to leave the service of said complainant; from preventing or attempting to prevent any person or persons, by threats, intimidation, force, or violence, from freely entering into the service and employ, or continuing in the service and employment of said complainant; from compelling and inducing, or attempting to compel and induce, by threats, intimidation, force, violence, or persuasion, the said complainant, against its will or the will of its officers, to employ or discharge any person or persons whomsoever; from doing any act whatever in furtherance of any conspiracy or combination to restrain or obstruct either said complainant or any of its officers and employés in the free, uninterrupted, and unhindered control and direction of its business and affairs; from ordering, asking, aiding, or abetting, in any manner whatever, any person or persons to commit any or either of the acts aforesaid; from congregating or being upon or about the sidewalks, streets, alleys, or approaches adjoining or adjacent to the premises so occupied by said complainant, for the purpose of intimidating its employés, or coercing said employés, or any of its officers or agents, or preventing them, or any of them, from rendering their services or discharging their duties to said complainant; from inducing or coercing, by threats, intimidation, force, violence, or persuasion, any of the employés of said complainant to leave the service or employment of said complainant; from in any manner interfering with said complainant in carrying on its business in its usual and ordinary way; from in any manner interfering with or molesting any persons who may be employed by, or who may be seeking employment with, said complainant in the operation of its business; from either singly, or in combination with others, collecting in or about the approaches to the factory, building, and place of business of said complainant for the purpose of picketing or patrolling or guarding the streets, avenues, gates, and approaches to the place of business of said complainant, for the purpose of intimidating, threatening, or coercing any of its employés or any person or persons seeking employment with it; from interfering with its employés in going to and from their daily work at its place of business, or whatever the said employés may be employed at in the business of said complainant; from going, either singly or collectively, to the homes of said employés of said complainant, or any or either of them, for the purpose of intimidating, coercing, or persuading any or all of said employés to leave the employment or service of the complainant or from entering the employment or service of the complainant, and from intimidating or threatening in any manner the wives and families of said employés, at their homes or elsewhere, until the further order of this court. From this interlocutory order an appeal was perfected to the Appellate Court for the First District, where the decree of the superior court was affirmed. Christensen v. Kellogg Switchboard and Supply Co., 110 Ill. App. 61.

On June 3, 1903, the complainant filed a petition in the superior court, stating, in substance, that immediately after the issuance of the injunction it caused 500 copies of it to be posted in conspicuous places around its factory buildings, and also caused notices of said injunction to be given as wide a circulation as possible among its employés and exemployés, and on May 26, 1903, caused a printed copy of said injunction writ to be mailed to each defendant, and also caused a copy of said writ to be served by a deputy sheriff upon all of the defendants in the neighborhood of its said factory. The petition further stated that persons named therein since the issuing of said injunction, had been picketing and patrolling complainant's place of business, stopping persons on their way to take employment with complainant, and had been endeavoring, by threats, intimidation, and persuasion, to compel complainant's employés to leave its service, and to prevent persons from seeking employment with complainant, and that the persons named therein had congregated on the streets and approaches to the complainant's factory in order to accomplish these purposes. This petition was verified by certain affidavits filed with it.

On June 5, 1903, the complainant filed a supplemental petition substantially the same as the one of June 3d, naming other persons who had violated said injunction and who had received personal notice of the existence of the same. This supplemental petition was answered by certain of the defendants named therein, who denied the use of threats, intimidation, coercion, or violence towards any persons, or in any manner interfering with the workmen going to or leaving the factory, but admitted that since the entry of the injunction order they had during a part of the day stood at Peoria and Congres...

To continue reading

Request your trial
145 cases
  • State v. Kusel
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • February 27, 1923
    ...the petition and the service of the subpoena. (In Re Plymouth Cordage Co., 135 F. 1000, 1004, 68 C. C. A. 434, 438.)" In the case of O'Brien v. People, supra, the court "The chief argument against the jurisdiction of the court is that the allegations of the bill of complaint are not suffici......
  • State v. District Court of Eighth Jud. Dist.
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • August 11, 1925
    ... ... contempt order; 13 C. J. 80; O'Brien v. People ... (Ill.) 75 N.E. 108; 129 N.W. 400; Croft v ... successor in office; Ex Parte Kellogg (Cal.) 30 P ... 1030; Burnett v. State ... In ... State ex rel. v. Brandhorst, 156 Mo. 457, 56 S.W. 1094, ... ...
  • Malone v. Meres
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • April 30, 1926
    ... ... Pl ... & Pr. 187, 196; 21 C.J. 166; People ex rel. Gaynor v ... McKane, 78 Hun, 154, 28 ... Hendrie & Bolthoff Mfg ... Supply Co., 133 F. 267, 68 C. C. A. 19; 23 Cyc. 1074, ... decision. O'Brien v. People ex rel. Kellogg ... Switchboard & Supply Co., 216 Ill. 354, 75 ... ...
  • City of Cleveland v. Bright
    • United States
    • Ohio Court of Appeals
    • November 5, 2020
    ...benefit the order was made are civil contempts. Local Union 5760 , 172 Ohio St. at 82, 173 N.E.2d 331, citing O'Brien v. People, ex rel. , 216 Ill. 354, 368, 75 N.E. 108 (1905). "The distinction is usually based on the purpose to be served by the sanction." State ex rel. Corn v. Russo , 90 ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT