Brierley v. City

• Decision Date: 21 October 2016
• Docket Number: No. 20150760,20150760
• Citation: 390 P.3d 269
• Parties: Chelse Marie BRIERLEY, Petitioner, v. Layton CITY, Respondent.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

390 P.3d 269

Chelse Marie BRIERLEY, Petitioner,

v.Layton CITY, Respondent.

No. 20150760

Supreme Court of Utah.

Filed October 21, 2016

Russell S. Pietryga, Mark W. Brown, Salt Lake City, for petitioner.

Gary R. Crane, Marlesse D. Jones, Layton, for respondent.

Justice Pearce authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Durrant, Associate Chief Justice Lee, Justice Durham, and Justice Himonas joined.

On Certiorari to the Court of Appeals

Justice Pearce, opinion of the Court:

INTRODUCTION

¶1 Two Layton City police officers investigating a hit-and-run accident entered a private residence with neither permission nor a warrant. While there, they discovered evidence linking Chelse Marie Brierley to the accident. Brierley moved to suppress that evidence, arguing Layton City (City) had obtained it in violation of her Fourth Amendment rights. The City argued that the officers were in the process of obtaining a search warrant at the time they entered the house and that the evidence should therefore be admitted under the inevitable-discovery exception to the exclusionary rule. The district court granted Brierley's suppression motion, concluding that the City had failed to demonstrate that it would have inevitably discovered the challenged evidence by lawful means.

¶2 The City sought interlocutory review by the Utah Court of Appeals, which reversed the district court's ruling. See Layton City v. Brierley , 2015 UT App 207, 357 P.3d 1018, cert. granted , 363 P.3d 523 (Utah 2015). The court of appeals evaluated the City's inevitable-discovery argument using four factors enunciated in United States v. Souza , 223 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 2000). The court of appeals held that the officers would have inevitably discovered the evidence resulting from the warrantless search if they had obtained a lawful warrant and reversed the district court's suppression order. Brierley , 2015 UT App 207, ¶ 23, 357 P.3d 1018.

¶3 We granted Brierley's petition for a writ of certiorari. We conclude that the City failed to meet its burden of proving that we should apply the inevitable-discovery exception in this case. We reverse the decision of the court of appeals, affirm the district court's order granting Brierley's suppression motion, and remand for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND¹

¶4 On September 30, 2013, two City police officers received a report of a hit-and-run accident. Dispatch informed the officers that a blonde woman driving a black SUV had been spotted leaving the scene of the accident. Dispatch provided the officers with the SUV's license plate number and the home address of the registered owner.

¶5 When Sergeants Joseph and Dixon arrived at the address, they saw a black SUV parked in an open garage and a blonde woman standing nearby. As the officers approached the garage, the woman stepped out to greet them. In response to questions, the woman identified herself as the housekeeper, denied that she had been driving the SUV, and told the officers that she thought that the homeowner's daughter—Brierley—had pulled the car into the garage.

¶6 The housekeeper also told the officers that she was afraid the SUV might be on fire. At least one officer, Joseph, accompanied the housekeeper into the garage to check on the vehicle. Joseph smelled steam coming from the vehicle and saw that the front end was damaged, but he concluded that there was no danger of combustion.

¶7 The officers further questioned the housekeeper, who related that she had been inside the house when she heard a loud noise. As she went to investigate, she saw Brierley come into the house through the garage and go downstairs toward her bedroom. The housekeeper told the officers that Brierley "looked like she was in a bad way." The housekeeper clarified that Brierley looked to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs.

¶8 The housekeeper invited the officers to come inside the house to speak with Brierley. The officers declined because, according to Dixon's testimony, they did not "feel that [they] had enough to actually enter the residence at that time without any exigent circumstances." Joseph told the housekeeper that he needed to speak with Brierley. The housekeeper went downstairs to see if she could get Brierley to speak with the officers.

¶9 While the housekeeper was downstairs, Joseph entered the backyard and banged on a window in an unsuccessful attempt to make contact with Brierley. The officers then decided that they needed legal advice on how to proceed. Dixon called a Layton City Attorney and, apparently based on that conversation, the officers decided that they needed to obtain a warrant.

¶10 The housekeeper testified that she returned from the basement to the sound of the officers pounding on the front door. She opened the door and told the officers that Brierley had told her to tell them that Brierley was not at home. The officers then asked the housekeeper if she could give them Brierley's father's phone number so they could seek his permission to enter the home. The housekeeper returned into the house to get the number and left the front door open.

¶11 Dixon stepped through the open door and announced to the housekeeper that no one would be allowed to leave. Dixon told the housekeeper that she was welcome to let Brierley know that the officers were in the process of obtaining a search warrant. The housekeeper returned downstairs to speak with Brierley. Dixon stayed inside.

¶12 While Dixon was speaking with the housekeeper, Joseph walked to his motorcycle to retrieve his tablet to draft a search warrant request. When Joseph returned to the front door, he saw that Dixon had moved inside. Joseph joined Dixon in Brierley's home. Once inside, Joseph placed his tablet on a table and began drafting a warrant request.² While Joseph was typing the search warrant application, Brierley came upstairs with the housekeeper. Dixon asked Brierley to step outside to discuss the situation, and the two went to the garage. While in the garage, Dixon obtained evidence from Brierley, including incriminating statements, the results of a blood-alcohol test, and information retrieved from a driver license check.

¶13 The City charged Brierley with driving under the influence, driving on a denied license, and leaving the scene of a property-damage accident. Brierley moved to suppress all evidence discovered after the officers entered the house, arguing that the warrantless entry violated her Fourth Amendment rights. The City argued that the inevitable-discovery exception to the exclusionary rule applied because the officers were in the process of obtaining a warrant when they entered the house.

¶14 The district court concluded that the inevitable-discovery exception, which allows for the admission of illegally obtained evidence if it would have inevitably been discovered absent the police misconduct, did not apply in this case. The district court ruled,

Whether Sergeant Joseph's warrant request would have actually been granted and whether the same evidence would have inevitably been discovered remains [too] speculative to justify application of the inevitable discovery doctrine. This Court concludes that to apply the inevitable discovery doctrine under the facts of this case would significantly weaken Fourth Amendment protections.

The district court also noted that application of the exception would provide "no deterrent at all" to future warrantless entries. The district court granted Brierley's motion, ordering that "all evidence obtained in this matter following the warrantless entry into [Brierley's] home" be suppressed.

¶15 The City sought interlocutory review of the district court's suppression order. The court of appeals granted the City's petition. See Layton City v. Brierley , 2015 UT App 207, ¶ 9, 357 P.3d 1018. On review, the court of appeals concluded that the City had established the applicability of the inevitable-discovery exception to the warrantless search. Id. ¶¶ 17–18. The court of appeals evaluated the exception using four factors the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals enumerated in United States v. Souza , 223 F.3d 1197, 1204 (10th Cir. 2000). These factors examined (1) the steps the officers had taken toward getting a warrant before entering; (2) the strength of the probable cause showing; (3) whether officers eventually obtained a warrant, albeit after the entry; and (4) whether officers "jumped the gun" in an attempt to overcome a lack of probable cause. Brierley , 2015 UT App 207, ¶ 16, 357 P.3d 1018 (citing Souza , 223 F.3d at 1204 ).

¶16 The court of appeals concluded that the first two factors weighed in favor of the City; that the third factor weighed "against the City, but not strongly"; and that testimony of the officers suggested the fourth factor weighed in favor of the City. Id. ¶¶ 17–20. "Taking these factors together," the court of appeals concluded that "the City met its burden to show by a preponderance that the evidence would have been discovered by lawful means." Id. ¶ 21. Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed the district court's suppression order and remanded for further proceedings. Id. ¶ 23.

¶17 We granted Brierley's petition for a writ of certiorari. We reverse.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶18 On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of appeals, not that of the district court, and we afford no deference to the court of appeals' decision. See State v. Strieff , 2015 UT 2, ¶ 12, 357 P.3d 532, rev'd on other grounds , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 2056, 195 L.Ed.2d 400 (2016). "The correctness of the court of appeals' decision turns on whether that court accurately reviewed the trial court's decision under the appropriate standard of review." State v. Tripp , 2010 UT 9, ¶ 23, 227 P.3d 1251 (citation omitted). "A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is reviewed for correctness, including its application of the law to the facts." Id. We review for correctness because the application of the exclusionary rule presents a "law-like" mixed question that...