Briggs v. American & Efird Mills, Inc., 258

• Decision Date: 14 January 1960
• Docket Number: No. 258,258
• Citation: 111 S.E.2d 841,251 N.C. 642
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: , 39 Lab.Cas. P 66,217 Lewis R. BRIGGS v. AMERICAN & EFIRD MILLS, INC.

Page 841

111 S.E.2d 841

251 N.C. 642, 39 Lab.Cas. P 66,217

Lewis R. BRIGGS v. AMERICAN & EFIRD MILLS, INC.

No. 258

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Jan. 14, 1960

Carpenter & Webb, Charlotte, for plaintiff-appellant.

Helms, Mulliss, McMillan & Johnston, Charlotte, for defendant-appellee.

RODMAN, Justice.

The question presented is this: Did the placing of another person in charge of defendant's Spun Fibers Division terminate Briggs' service with defendant?

The answer is to be found in the contract. When a contract is in writing and free from ambiguity, interpretation is for the court. 'When competent parties contract at arms length upon a lawful subject, as to them the contract is the law of their case. ' Suits v. Old Equity Life Insurance Co., 249 N.C. 383, 106 S.E.2d 579, 582; Barham v. Davenport, 247 N.C. 575, 101 S.E.2d 367.

When a court is called upon to interpret, it seeks to ascertain the intent of the parties at the moment of execution. To ascertain this intent, the court looks to the language used, the situation of the parties, and objects to be accomplished. Presumably the words which the parties select were deliberately chosen and are to be given their ordinary significance. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. Nello L. Teer Co., 250 N.C. 547, 109 S.E.2d 171; De Bruhl v. State Highway, 245 N.C. 139, 92 S.E.2d 553; Chambers v. Byers, 214 N.C. 373, 199 S.E. 398; Gilbert v. Waccamaw Shingle Co., 167 N.C. 286, 83 S.E. 337.

We examine the contract and allegations in the complaint in the light of these controlling rules. When we do so, it appears: Defendant's manufacturing operations are extensive; the Spun Fibers Division is a segment thereof; to supervise and direct its manufacturing operations, it desired a capable and experienced person; and to obtain such services defendant agreed to pay substantial compensation; each party regarded a fixed term for a number of years as best suited to accomplish the object of the contract, which was manifestly efficient and economical production of goods.

The parties recognized that conditions might arise which would cause a termination of the contract and cessation of plaintiff's services. If this cessation of services was due to plaintiff's physical disability, defendant obligated itself to 'maintain its performance under this contract throughout one year of such incapacity'; if the termination of plaintiff's services was due to his intentional wrong (fraud or dishonesty) no obligation rested on defendant to make payment; if, however, the company terminated Briggs' services (1) by a sale of its properties, or (2) because of 'disagreement with his policies and methods,' or (3) for any other cause, the company obligated itself to pay the employee two years' salary, and this irrespective of the time when the contract was terminated.

Without these provisions the company would not be obligated to pay when the employee was physically unable to serve; but in the event of a sale of its properties, it would be obligated to the employee for the agreed compensation for the remainder of his term, Woodley v. Bond, 66 N.C. 396, less what he could reasonably earn by other employment, Thomas v Catawba College, 248 N.C. 609...