Briggs v. Anderson
| Decision Date | 16 July 1986 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 84-2540,84-2573,SERVICES-DIVISION,s. 84-2540 |
| Parties | 40 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 883, 39 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 36,011, 42 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 36,799, 104 Lab.Cas. P 34,784 Cedell BRIGGS and Linda Nimmer on behalf of themselves, individually and on behalf of females and black persons similarly situated as classes; John Lewellen, Thomas Broughten and Homer Winstead, on behalf of themselves individually and on behalf of black persons similarly situated as a class; DeLaney Fleming, Ezekiel Kinchen, Melvin Clayton, Rose Phillips, Janie Allen, Bonnie Brown, Brenda Jackson and Rose White, Appellants, v. Brady ANDERSON, individually and as surrogate or Acting Director of the Department of Human Services; Elmer Zielsman, individually and as Acting Director of the Office of Aging; Dr. Robert Rankin, individually and as Commissioner of Mental Health Services; Dick Powell, individually and as Commissioner of Youth Services; Henrietta Jenkins, individually and as Commissioner of Mental Health Developmental Disabilities Services; E. Russell Baxter, individually and as Commissioner of Rehabilitation Services; Barrett Toans, individually and as Commissioner of Social Services; and Frankie Wallingsford, individually and as Director of the Office of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention, Appellees. Janie ALLEN, Bonnie Brown, Rose Phillips and Charles H. Dale, Appellants, v. STATE OF ARKANSAS, DEPARTMENT OF HUMANOF YOUTH SERVICES a/k/a Department of Social Services Division of Juvenile Services, Dick Powell, Bill Beabers, Betty McGetrick and June Wilcoxson, Appellees. Brenda JACKSON and Rose White, Appellants, v. Brady ANDERSON, individually and as surrogate or Acting Director of the Department of Human Services; Elmer Zielsman, individually and as Acting Director of the Office of Aging; Dr. Robert Rankin, individually and as Commissioner of Mental Health Services; Dick Powell, individually and as Commissioner of Youth Services; Henrietta Jenkins, individually and as Commissioner of Mental Health Developmental Disabilities Services; E. Russell Baxte |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Richard Quiggle and John Walker, Little Rock, Ark., for appellants.
Kay J. Jackson Demailly, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, Ark., for appellees.
Before HEANEY, Circuit Judge, HENLEY, Senior Circuit Judge, and McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge.
Appellants in these consolidated employment discrimination actions contest the district court's 1 decertification of two of three classes, dismissal of the remaining class, and dismissal of their individual claims. We affirm in part, reverse in part and remand in part with directions.
This case represents the consolidation of several individual and class claims of employment discrimination based on race or sex or both under 29 U.S.C. Sec. 206(d), 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1981, 1983 and 1985, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Secs. 2000e et seq. Appellants are several employees and former employees of the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS), and its agencies, the Division of Youth Services (DYS) and the Division of Rehabilitation Services (DRS). The appellees are DHS, DYS, DRS and several officials of those agencies.
Appellants and appellees stipulated to the following definitions for three potential classes:
1. All Black applicants for employment with the Division of Rehabilitation Services between July 26, 1975 and August 30, 1982.
2. All Black and female employees of the Department of Human Services who have been denied promotions between April 15, 1976 and August 30, 1982.
3. All Black employees of the Division of Youth Services who have been terminated between July 1, 1977 and August 30, 1982.
After trial, the court issued lengthy findings of fact and conclusions of law which discussed in detail all claims. The court decertified the applicant class (class one above), but found in favor of applicant plaintiffs Walter Jaudon and Johnny Clark Watson. The court also decertified the termination class (class three above), but found in favor of termination plaintiff Dale Charles. Finally, the court dismissed the promotion class (class two above) and all remaining individual claims. Appellants now attack the court's judgment on several grounds.
The first issue on appeal is whether the court abused its discretion in decertifying the hiring and termination classes after trial and prior to a decision on the merits. See Roby v. St. Louis Southwestern Railway Co., 775 F.2d 959, 961 (8th Cir.1985) (). We, of course, do not give blanket approval to delay when, as here, grounds for decertification are known to the court prior to trial. However, in light of the trial court's duty to ensure that class representation is adequate and proper at all times during a class action, see General Telephone Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160, 102 S.Ct. 2364, 2372, 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982); Sessum v. Houston Community College, 94 F.R.D. 316, 322 (S.D.Tex.1982), we find that the timing of the decertifications was not error. 2 In any event, the delay in this case was harmless to the appellants. 3
The stipulated definition of the applicant class was as follows: "All Black applicants for employment with the Division of Rehabilitation Services between July 26, 1975 and August 30, 1982." Appellants contend that Walter Jaudon, who filed the original action in this somewhat jumbled mass of litigation, and Johnny Clark Watson, an intervenor in Jaudon's action, were proper representatives of this class.
The court decertified the applicant class for two reasons. First, the court noted that while Jaudon's complaint made class allegations, neither Jaudon nor Watson ever moved for class certification. In East Texas Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 405, 97 S.Ct. 1891, 1897, 52 L.Ed.2d 453 (1977), the Supreme Court observed that:
[e]ven assuming, as a number of courts have held, that a district judge has an obligation on his own motion to determine whether an action shall proceed as a class action, [citations omitted] named plaintiffs' failure to protect the interests of class members by moving for certification surely bears strongly on the adequacy of the representation that those class members might expect to receive.
Second, the court pointed out that Jaudon's action was allowed to be consolidated with Briggs (the lead case in this litigation) on the express condition that it proceed as an individual action. We have recognized that " " DeGraffenreid v. General Motors Assembly Division, St. Louis, 558 F.2d 480, 486 (8th Cir.1977) (citing Johnson v. Manhattan Railway Co., 289 U.S. 479, 496-97, 53 S.Ct. 721, 727-28, 77 L.Ed. 1331 (1933) ). We therefore cannot say that the court abused its discretion. The court found that neither Jaudon nor Watson could satisfy the class action requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a), and it properly decertified the applicant class.
The stipulated definition of the termination class was as follows: "All Black employees of the Division of Youth Services who have been terminated between July 1, 1977 and August 30, 1982." Appellants contend that Homer Winstead, Janie Allen, Dale Charles, Delaney Fleming, Sandy Savannah Carter and Melvin Clayton were proper representatives of this class.
"A fundamental requirement of representatives in a class action is that they must be members of the [classes] they seek to represent." Roby, 775 F.2d at 961. (Citations omitted.) As in Roby, testimony in this case revealed that Homer Winstead, Sandy Savannah Carter and Janie Allen were not members of the termination class. The court specifically found that Winstead retired outside of the relevant time frame, that Carter voluntarily resigned, 4 and that Allen voluntarily resigned and was not with Youth Services at the time. These findings are not clearly erroneous. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a); Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1512, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985).
Dale Charles filed an individual action and also intervened in Allen's action. In his individual action, Charles moved for class certification. When the court requested additional information, however, Charles abandoned his motion and filed a motion to consolidate with Briggs. His motion was granted and his action properly proceeded as an individual action only. See DeGraffenreid, 558 F.2d at 486. Therefore, as the plaintiff in that action Charles could not properly represent the termination class.
Charles, Fleming and Clayton were all intervenors in Allen's action. Neither Fleming nor Clayton ever filed EEOC actions or moved for class certification. While it is true that every class member need not file an EEOC action, it is also true that the class representative must have filed an EEOC charge in order to have standing to raise the appropriate issues for those class members who did not. See Allen v. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 788, 554 F.2d 876, 882 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 891, 98 S.Ct. 266, 54 L.Ed.2d 176 (1977); Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir.1968). Fleming and Clayton did not have standing...
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