Briggs v. Board of Directors of Hinton Community School Dist., 62757

Citation282 N.W.2d 740
Decision Date29 August 1979
Docket NumberNo. 62757,62757
PartiesIn re the Matter of the Termination of the Administrator's Contract of Thomas J. Briggs. Thomas J. BRIGGS, Principal, Appellant, v. BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF the HINTON COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Appellees.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Iowa

Phillip S. Dandos, Sioux City, and Mohummed Sadden, South Sioux City, Neb., for appellant.

Maurice B. Nieland, of Kindig, Beebe, Rawlings, Nieland & Killinger, Sioux City, for appellees.

James L. Sayre, of Dreher, Wilson, Adams & Jensen, Des Moines, for amicus curiae Iowa Association of Elementary School Principals.

Considered by REYNOLDSON, C. J., and LeGRAND, REES, McCORMICK, and McGIVERIN, JJ.

REYNOLDSON, Chief Justice.

This appeal involves the termination of a school administrator's contract and our first consideration of revised section 279.24, The Code 1977.

Administrator Thomas J. Briggs was elementary principal for Hinton Community School District for fourteen years prior to his termination at the close of school year 1977-78. As he had more than two years' tenure, he was a non-probationary administrator entitled to section 279.24 protections.

March 29, 1978, the Hinton board of directors voted to consider termination of Briggs' continuing contract. Thereafter all procedures mandated by section 279.24 were followed. A hearing officer was appointed who held a reported evidentiary hearing. May 17, 1978, the officer issued his proposed decision that "just cause" for contract termination had not been established. He suggested in the alternative that Briggs be placed on probationary status for the ensuing school year. Pursuant to the statutory option the board then voted to review the proposed decision and a private hearing was held. Following the hearing the board unanimously rejected the hearing officer's proposed decision. It issued its own findings of fact, conclusions of law and decision, holding there was just cause for terminating Briggs' contract.

Briggs timely petitioned for review in district court. The court held the board's decision to terminate Briggs' contract for just cause was supported by substantial evidence when that record was reviewed as a whole. It affirmed the board action.

Briggs' appeal to this court raises a single issue. He contends trial court erred in finding the board's decision to terminate his contract for just cause was supported by substantial evidence in the record made before the board when that record is reviewed as a whole. We disagree and now affirm the district court decision.

I. Just cause.

Section 279.24 requires that "(the) notice (of consideration of contract termination) shall state the specific reasons to be used by the board . . . which for all administrators except superintendents shall be for just cause." While in this context we have had no occasion to define "just cause," two recent cases defining the 1973 code terminology "good cause" provide guidance. In Hartman v. Merged Area VI Community College, 270 N.W.2d 822, 826-28 (Iowa 1978), we applied the ejusdem generis rule to link the phrase "any good cause" with preceding statutory language, "incompetency, inattention to duty, (or) partiality." In Johnston v. Marion Independent School District, 275 N.W.2d 215, 216 (Iowa 1979), we held a teacher's attainment of mandatory retirement age was not a ground for "good cause" discharge.

In both Hartman and Johnston, the boards failed to effect timely notice pursuant to section 279.13, The Code 1973, detailing the usual termination procedures, and attempted to rely on a teacher "discharge" statute. See § 279.24, The Code 1973. Following amendatory acts, the 1977 and 1979 Iowa Codes simply employ the phrase "just cause" in all the contract termination statutes and the discharge statutes, for both teachers and administrators. Cf. Board of Education v. Youel, 282 N.W.2d 677, 680 (Iowa 1979) (teacher discharge). The term therefore must now include legitimate reasons relating to the district's personnel and budgetary requirements, See Hagarty v. Dysart-Geneseo Community School District, 282 N.W.2d 92 (Iowa 1979), as well as faults attributable to the administrator or teacher. We limit this discussion to the latter facet of the phrase.

Decisions from other jurisdictions reflect some light on the "just cause" requirement. It has been said that

"just cause" or "good cause" cannot be reduced to a legal certainty. . . . The grounds upon which it is based must be reasonable, and there should not be an abuse of the conferred right. It must be a fair and honest cause or reason, regulated by good faith on the part of the party exercising the power.

Quick v. Southern Churchman Co., 171 Va. 403, 417, 199 S.E. 489, 494-95 (1938). Generally, the focus is on the ability and fitness of the employee to discharge the duties of his or her position, and the legislative purpose to protect the public against incompetent teachers and administrators, to assure proper educational qualifications, and to maintain high standards of performance. See Tudor v. University Civil Service Merit Board, 131 Ill.App.2d 907, 910, 267 N.E.2d 341, 343-44 (1971); Beebee v. Haslett Public Schools, 406 Mich. 224, 278 N.W.2d 37 (1979); New Mexico State Board of Education v. Stoudt, 91 N.M. 183, 186, 571 P.2d 1186, 1189 (1977); Powell v. Board of Trustees, 550 P.2d 1112, 1119 (Wyo.1976). See also Youel, 282 N.W.2d at 680-81.

Morrison v. State Board of Education, 1 Cal.3d 214, 229, 461 P.2d 375, 386-87, 82 Cal.Rptr. 175, 186 (1969), provides criteria for testing whether out-of-school conduct will furnish "just cause" for discharge or loss of certificate including:

(T)he likelihood that the conduct may have adversely affected students or fellow teachers, the degree of such adversity anticipated, the proximity or remoteness in time of the conduct, the type of teaching certificate held by the party involved, the extenuating or aggravating circumstances, if any, surrounding the conduct, the praiseworthiness or blameworthiness of the motives resulting in the conduct, the likelihood of the recurrence of the questioned conduct, and the extent to which disciplinary action may inflict an adverse impact or chilling effect upon the constitutional rights of the teacher involved or other teachers.

(Footnotes omitted.) Morrison supported our decision in Erb v. Iowa State Board of Public Instruction, 216 N.W.2d 339, 343 (Iowa 1974).

Probably no inflexible "just cause" definition we could devise would be adequate to measure the myriad of situations which may surface in future litigation. It is sufficient here to hold that in the context of teacher fault a "just cause" is one which directly or indirectly significantly and adversely affects what must be the ultimate goal of every school system: high quality education for the district's students. It relates to job performance including leadership and role model effectiveness. It must include the concept that a school district is not married to mediocrity but may dismiss personnel who are neither performing high quality work nor improving in performance. On the other hand, "just cause" cannot include reasons which are arbitrary, unfair, or generated out of some petty vendetta.

Against that backdrop, it seems apparent the allegations against Briggs were directed to his competence and duty performance as elementary principal. The allegations, if supported by substantial evidence, were sufficient to justify the discharge.

II. Substantial evidence.

The statutory standards of review in section 279.24 governing dismissal of school administrators are nearly identical to those in section 17A.19(8) of the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act. Both statutes provide, Inter alia, that the reviewing court shall grant appropriate relief if substantial rights of the petitioner or administrator have been prejudiced because the agency or board action is unsupported by substantial evidence in the record made before the agency or board when that record is reviewed as a whole. Thus we may look to administrative agency cases for assistance in determining our scope of review. Youel, 282 N.W.2d...

To continue reading

Request your trial
58 cases
  • Van Arkel v. Warren County
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa
    • April 12, 2005
    ...arbitrary, unfair, or generated out of some petty vendetta.'" Lockhart, 577 N.W.2d at 847 n. 1 (quoting Briggs v. Bd. of Dirs. of Hinton Cmty. Sch. Dist., 282 N.W.2d 740, 743 (Iowa 1979)). Van Arkel asserts Defendants' stated reasons for his termination do not constitute "just cause" as req......
  • Iowa City Community School Dist. v. Iowa City Educ. Ass'n
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Iowa
    • December 21, 1983
    ...practices of these parties, or raising any claim to that effect. Our prior decisions hold to the contrary. In Briggs v. Board of Directors, 282 N.W.2d 740, 743 (Iowa 1979), affirming the discharge of an administrator employed fourteen years and discharged for incompetence over a five-year p......
  • Winans v. Iowa Dept. of Educ.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa
    • September 9, 2005
    ...cause cannot include reasons which are arbitrary, unfair, or generated out of some petty vendetta." Briggs v. Bd. of Dirs. of Hinton Comm. Sch. Dist., 282 N.W.2d 740, 743 (Iowa 1979). Additionally, "the term [just cause] therefore must now include legitimate reasons relating to the district......
  • Board of Ed. of Ft. Madison Community School Dist. v. Youel
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Iowa
    • August 29, 1979
    ...cause" under section 279.15 encompasses other grounds as well. We pointed this out in Briggs v. Board of Directors of the Hinton Community School District et al., 282 N.W.2d 740, 742 (Iowa 1979), where we The term (just cause) therefore must now include legitimate reasons relating to the di......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT