Briggs v. Chesapeake Volunteers in Youth Services

• Decision Date: 18 October 1999
• Docket Number: No. Civ.A. 2:99cv748.,Civ.A. 2:99cv748.
• Citation: 68 F.Supp.2d 711
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia
• Parties: Edward A. BRIGGS, Jr., Plaintiff, v. CHESAPEAKE VOLUNTEERS IN YOUTH SERVICES, INC., Defendant.

68 F.Supp.2d 711

Edward A. BRIGGS, Jr., Plaintiff, v. CHESAPEAKE VOLUNTEERS IN YOUTH SERVICES, INC., Defendant.

No. Civ.A. 2:99cv748.

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Norfolk Division.

October 18, 1999.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Hughes Kennedy Reveley, Jr., Halbert T. Dail & Associates, P.C., Chesapeake, VA, for plaintiff.

William McCardell Furr, Timothy McConville, Willcox & Savage, Norfolk, VA, for defendant.

ORDER AND OPINION

FRIEDMAN, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on the defendant's motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment. The Court heard argument in this matter and took it under advisement. Upon careful consideration of the parties' arguments and the evidence before the Court, the Court hereby GRANTS the defendant's motion for summary judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The plaintiff, Edward Briggs, is an employee of the Chesapeake Volunteers in Youth Services, Inc. (CVYS). CVYS is a non-profit corporation providing community service opportunities and other services to individuals, specifically juveniles, who are involved in proceedings before the Chesapeake Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Courts. See Undisputed Facts Paras. 2, 3 and 4, and Pl's Memo. at p. 1.

The basis of the plaintiff's claim in this case is simple — he alleges that he has completed over 1000 hours of overtime for the CVYS and has not been compensated. As a result, the plaintiff filed this action in Chesapeake Circuit Court in April 1999 seeking $30,000.00 in damages and other relief. On May 20, 1999, the defendant removed the case to this court based on federal jurisdiction over the Fair Labor Standards Act claim (FLSA). On July 29, the defendant moved to dismiss or for summary judgment in this case, and attached affidavits regarding the organization and funding of the CVYS.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The central issue in this matter is whether the FLSA covers the plaintiff's employment with the CVYS. In support of their conflicting positions, the parties have submitted opposing affidavits purportedly establishing the funding of CVYS, its organizational structure and the extent of its oversight by governmental agencies. The defendant's affiant is Jim Crowley, the Executive Director of the CVYS, and the supervisor of the plaintiff, Mr. Briggs. The plaintiff filed an affidavit on his own behalf disputing the organization, purpose and funding of the CVYS as explained by Crowley. Because the defendant and the plaintiff in this case submitted affidavits, and the Court did not exclude matters outside of the pleadings, it is appropriate to convert consideration of the defendant's motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment, as is suggested in the alternative by the defendant.

Summary judgment should be granted where it appears that the pleadings, depositions and answers, and other documentary evidence show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56. To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must demonstrate that there are specific and material facts in dispute which create a genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the moving party, disposition by summary judgment is appropriate." United States v. Lee, 943 F.2d 366, 368 (4th Cir.1991).

ANALYSIS

I. The Coverage of the FLSA

The FLSA extends coverage to employees by two means: (1) individually, if the employee is engaged in commerce or the production of goods for commerce, and (2) through their employer, if the employer is an enterprise engaged in interstate commerce or the production of goods for commerce. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). The FLSA requires that all employers covered by the Act compensate their employees at the rate of one and one-half normal wages for time worked in excess of the normal 40-hour work week. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). Due to the remedial and humanitarian purposes of the FLSA, its terms are liberally construed and its exemptions are narrowly construed. Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 105 S.Ct. 1953, 85 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985); Murray v. R.E.A.C.H. of Jackson Cnty., Inc., 908 F.Supp. 337 (W.D.N.C.1995).

Employees seeking compensation based on the FLSA have the burden of proving that the FLSA applies to their employer/employee relationship and that the activities in question constitute "employment" under the FLSA. See Davis v. Food Lion, 792 F.2d 1274, 1276 (4th Cir. 1986). Once this initial burden is met, the burden shifts to the employer to establish whether one of the specific exemptions under the FLSA applies. See Johnson v. City of Columbia, 949 F.2d 127, 129-30 (4th Cir.1991) (en banc).

The FLSA defines employer as "any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee and includes a public agency." 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). An employee is defined as "any individual employed by an employer." Id. at § 203(e)(1). The FLSA only applies to businesses which constitute an "enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce." 29 U.S.C. § 203(s). The FLSA defines enterprise as "the related activities performed ... by any person or persons for a common business purpose." 29 U.S.C. 203(r)(1).

II. Whether CVYS is an Enterprise Subject to the FLSA

In this case, Briggs does not suggest that he is personally engaged in interstate commerce or in the production of goods for commerce in his position at CVYS. Furthermore, it is undisputed that CVYS is a non-profit organization involved with advising and cooperating with the Chesapeake Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court on matters regarding laws relating to children and domestic relations, and providing the court with volunteer workers to promote programs assisting youths impacted by divorce, domestic violence, etc. See Statement of Undisputed Facts ¶¶ 2-4; see also 2nd Affidavit of Crowley ¶ 4 (dated Aug. 24, 1999) (stating that CVYS is a tax exempt non-profit organization).

Numerous courts have held that non-profit agencies are not covered by the FLSA unless it is shown that the nonprofit organization engages in commercial activities in competition with other commercial enterprises. Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 471 U.S. 290, 295-99, 105 S.Ct. 1953, 85 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985) (developing the economic reality test to determine whether a non-profit organization is actually engaged in ordinary commercial activities); Joles v. Johnson Cnty. Youth Serv. Bureau, Inc., 885 F.Supp. 1169, 1174-75 (S.D.Ind.1995) (finding that non-profit organization providing services to troubled youth was not engaged in business purpose under the FLSA); Wagner v. Salvation Army, 660 F.Supp. 466 (E.D.Tenn. 1986) (holding that Salvation Army was not an enterprise under the FLSA since it did not engage in commercial activities). The focus of the court's inquiry is whether the non-profit agency is primarily engaged in competition in the public with ordinary commercial enterprises. Tony & Susan Alamo, 471 U.S. at 295-99, 105 S.Ct. 1953.

There is no evidence in this case that CVYS in any way competes with other commercial ventures, or charges its clients for services. See Crowley Affidavit. Instead, the CVYS receives funding through grants and local fund-raising.¹ Id. Based on the undisputed description of the activities and purpose of the CVYS, the Court cannot find that the CVYS is an enterprise as defined by the FLSA. Instead, the Court finds based on the undisputed facts that the CVYS is strictly involved in eleemosynary activities, such as assisting at-risk youths in finding a positive direction for their lives. The CVYS is not operated for a "business purpose," and therefore, the CVYS is not an enterprise as defined by the FLSA.² See Murray, 908 F.Supp. at 340 (finding that shelter for victims of domestic violence was not an enterprise under the FLSA, and granting summary judgment); Wagner, 660 F.Supp. at 468 (granting summary judgment upon finding that division of the Salvation Army employing the plaintiff, the lodge, was not an enterprise engaged in commerce).

III. Whether CVYS is a "Public Agency"

Rather than relying on its enterprise status, Briggs claims that CVYS is a "public agency," and therefore, is covered by the FLSA. Briggs insists that CVYS's funding and ties to the Chesapeake courts and the City of Chesapeake makes it a public agency, or political subdivision of either the courts or the City, and therefore, subject to the terms of the FLSA.

The FLSA originally only applied to private sector employees. However, in 1974, Congress amended the FLSA to include within its definition of employers any "public agency." 29 U.S.C. § 203(d); see Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 105 S.Ct. 1005, 83 L.Ed.2d 1016 (1985) (reinstating the extension of the FLSA to state and local governments). The FLSA defines public agency as "the government of the United States; the government of a State or political subdivision thereof; any agency of the United States ..., a State, or political subdivision of a State; or any interstate governmental agency." 29 U.S.C. 203(x). The Supreme Court has explained that a political subdivision is an entity "(1) created directly by the state so as to constitute departments or administrative arms of the government or (2) administered by individuals who are responsible to public officials or to the general electorate." See NLRB v. Natural Gas Utility Dist. of Hawkins Cnty., Tenn., 402 U.S. 600, 604-05, 91 S.Ct. 1746, 29 L.Ed.2d 206 (1971) (finding that Utility District was political subdivision subject to terms of National Labor Relations Act); Benshoff v. City of Virginia Beach, 9 F.Supp.2d 610, 619 (E.D.Va. 1998) (Doumar, J.) (quoting NL...