Briggs v. Connecticut
Citation | 64 L.Ed.2d 862,447 U.S. 912,100 S.Ct. 3000 |
Decision Date | 09 June 1980 |
Docket Number | No. 79-6383,79-6383 |
Parties | Linwood H. BRIGGS v. State of CONNECTICUT |
Court | United States Supreme Court |
The Due Process Clause forbids the use for impeachment purposes of evidence that a defendant remained silent after receiving the Miranda warnings at the time of his arrest. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976). At petitioner's criminal trial, the prosecutor repeatedly brought before the jury the fact that petitioner had not furnished police officers with his alibi at the time of his arrest. Respondent concedes, and the Supreme Court of Connecticut agreed, that such use of petitioner's post-arrest silence violated petitioner's constitutional rights. Nevertheless, the court sustained the conviction, over Justice Bogdanski's dissent, on the ground that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. I share Justice Bogdanski's "unreasonable" belief that the violation of petitioner's rights was not constitutionally harmless. A finding of harmless error on this record, in my view, can be nothing other than a means of avoiding the requirements of the Constitution in order to sustain the conviction of a defendant the court believed was factually guilty.
Petitioner's defense was that he was in the company of his wife and was nowhere near the scene of the alleged crimes at the time they were committed. Petitioner's wife testified to that effect, and petitioner's testimony corroborated hers. On cross-examination, the prosecutor repeatedly forced petitioner to admit that he had not given his story to the police after receiving Miranda warnings. The cross-examination which the Connecticut Supreme Court held to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt was as follows:
[the date petitioner was arrested] that you were home from 6:45 to 8:55 in the morning?
179 Conn. 328, 334, n. 1, 426 A.2d 298, 302, n. 1 (1979).
As if this colloquy did not sufficiently prejudice petitioner before the jury, the prosecutor called a police officer in rebuttal, who testified as follows:
Id., at 334-335, n. 2, 426 A.2d at 302, n. 2.
The repeated, cumulative impermissible references to petitioner's constitutionally protected silence were obviously designed to imply that his defense was fabricated. The prosecutor knew very well that the defendant had remained silent after receiving Miranda warnings, and his questions were designed to hammer that fact home to the jury.
In holding that these repeated constitutional violations were harmless error, the Connecticut Supreme Court purported to apply a standard that has been adopted by several federal courts, namely, " '[w]hen there is but a single reference at trial to the fact of defendant's silence, the reference is neither repeated nor linked with defendant's exculpatory story, and the exculpatory story is transparently frivolous and evidence of guilt is otherwise overwhelming, the reference to defendant's silence constitutes harmless error.' " Id., at 336, 426 A.2d, at 303, quoting State v. Zeko, 177 Conn. 545, 555, 418 A.2d 917, 922 (1979). Accord, Chapman v. United States, 547 F.2d 1240, 1250 (CA5), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 908, 97 S.Ct. 1705, 52 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977); Leake v. Cox, 432 F.2d 982, 984 (CA4 1970). Even on the assumption that this was the appropriate standard, it is plain that the violations in this case...
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State v. Johnson
... Page 858 ... 440 A.2d 858 ... 185 Conn. 163 ... STATE of Connecticut ... Lindsay B. JOHNSON ... Supreme Court of Connecticut ... Argued June 4, 1981 ... Decided Aug. 4, 1981 ... Page 859 ... Levy, 15 N.Y.2d 159, 256 N.Y.S.2d 793, 204 N.E.2d 842, cert. denied, 381 U.S. 938, 85 S.Ct. 1770, 14 L.Ed.2d 701 (1965). State v. Briggs, 179 Conn. [185 Conn. 178] 328, 338-39, 426 A.2d 298 (1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 912, 100 S.Ct. 3000, 64 L.Ed.2d 862 ... Page 866 ... (1980); ... ...
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