Briggs v. Goodwin
| Decision Date | 01 December 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. 75-1578,75-1578 |
| Citation | 569 F.2d 1,186 U.S.App.D.C. 170 |
| Parties | John BRIGGS et al., Appellants, v. Guy GOODWIN, Individually and as Attorney for the Department of Justice, et al. (Stafford, et al.) |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Doris Peterson, New York City, with whom Nancy Stearns, Morton Stavis, New York City, and Philip J. Hirschkop, Alexandria, Va., were on the brief, Jack Levine, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellants.
R. John Seibert, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., with whom Robert L. Keuch and Benjamin C. Flannagan, IV, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellees. George W. Calhoun, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., also entered an appearance for appellees.
Before McGOWAN, ROBINSON and WILKEY, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by SPOTTSWOOD W. ROBINSON, III, Circuit Judge.
During the summer of 1972, Guy Goodwin, an attorney in the Department of Justice, together with United States Attorney William H. Stafford, Jr. 1 and Assistant United States Attorney Stuart J. Carrouth for the Northern District of Florida, conducted therein grand jury proceedings at which appellants, 2 among others, were subpoenaed to appear. On motion by newly-retained counsel for appellants, 3 the District Judge responsible for those proceedings called Goodwin to the witness stand and inquired as to whether any of the "witnesses represented by counsel (were) agents or informants" of the Government. 4 Goodwin's sworn answer "(n)o, Your Honor" 5 is alleged to have been a knowing falsehood, 6 and its consequences to have been violative of various of appellants' constitutional rights. 7
For redress of those consequences, appellants sued the three prosecutors and Claude Meadow, an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 8 "individually and in their official capacities," 9 in the District Court here. Each appellant sought a declaratory judgment, $50,000 in compensatory damages and a punitive award of $100,000. 10 Goodwin, whose official residence was then in the District of Columbia, 11 was served personally and the others, each of whom resided in Florida, were served by certified mail. 12 The Florida defendants seasonably requested transfer of the litigation to the Northern District of Florida 13 or, alternatively, dismissal for improper venue and insufficiency of process. 14 The District Court denied the former motion but granted the latter, 15 and the question on appeal is whether this action may be entertained in the District of Columbia. We hold that it may.
The propriety of venue in the District of Columbia is measured by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), 16 which in pertinent part provides:
A civil action in which a defendant is an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof acting in his official capacity or under color of legal authority, . . . may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought in any judicial district in which (1) a defendant in the action resides . . . .
The summons and complaint in such an action shall be served as provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure except that the delivery of the summons and complaint to the officer or agency as required by the rules may be made by certified mail beyond the territorial limits of the district in which the action is brought.
This litigation, against four federal officials, was commenced in the district wherein one of them officially resided. 17 The complaint alleges constitutional depredations wrought by activities "in (their) official capacity or under color of legal authority." 18 The suit thus fits within the ostensible coverage of Section 1391(e). Appellees suggest a gloss upon the statutory language, however, excepting from its purview any case in which a money judgment may be returned against a federal officer, and to this suggestion the District Court apparently acceded. 19 Our examination of the genealogy of the "Congressional English" 20 just set forth leads us to decline appellees' invitation.
The progenitor of Section 1391(e) was H.R. 10089, 21 a bill "(t)o permit a civil action . . . against an officer of the United States in his official capacity . . . in any judicial district . . . where a plaintiff in the action resides." 22 Asked for comments on the bill, the Department of Justice expressed reservations about its utility. 23 It explained that most suits against public officials, such as those seeking "damages from him personally for actions taken ostensibly in the course of his official duty but which the plaintiff claims are in excess of his official authority," were "against (him) in his individual capacity," 24 and therefore outside the scope of the proposed legislation. On the other hand, the Department continued, any litigation "against a Government official . . . in his official capacity would be the equivalent of a writ of mandamus" 25 which, by virtue of a historical anomaly, no federal court outside the District of Columbia could then issue. 26 Since H.R. 10089 would have conferred no mandamus jurisdiction and would not have applied to actions against officials "individually," the Department doubted whether its enactment "would serve any useful purpose." 27
H.R. 12622 28 was drafted to meet these and other 29 criticisms. Its first section extended mandamus jurisdiction to all of the federal district courts. 30 Its second section broadened the prior venue proposal to include suits directed at a federal official's activity whether characterized as occurring "in his official capacity" or "under color of legal authority." 31 The purpose of the new bill was "to provide readily available, inexpensive judicial remedies for the citizen who is aggrieved by the workings of Government, 32 but who would previously have been compelled 33 to sue in the District of Columbia by the pre-existing venue provisions, which were deemed "contrary to the sound and equitable administration of justice." 34 And the House Report specifically noted that "(t)he venue problem also arises in an action against a Government official seeking damages from him for actions which are claimed to be without legal authority but which were taken by the official in the course of performing his duty." 35
The House passed H.R. 12622 36 but the Senate adjourned before any action was taken on it. So, in the next Congress, it was reintroduced as H.R. 1960, 37 comments were again solicited, and again the Department of Justice asked that portions of the bill be "clarified." 38 Some proffered clarifications were adopted, 39 but notably the Department's suggestion that the venue provision be changed to "eliminate( ) suits for money judgments against officers" 40 was not. Rather, both the House and Senate committees rejoined with the observation that the "venue problem" which the bill sought to rectify was as troublesome in damage suits against officials as in other sorts of civil litigation. 41
This colloquy between the Department of Justice and the legislative draftsmen demonstrates the legislature's comprehension and resolution of the issue before us. The conscious addition by Congress of language designed to extend Section 1391(e) to suits for damages against federal officials acting under color of legal authority, coupled with its adherence to that language despite highly respectable protest, 42 manifests beyond peradventure an intent to broaden venue in just such suits. Our duty is to hearken to the will of Congress as expressed, and the statutory mandate is clear.
We realize, of course, that other courts have entertained divergent views on the relation of Section 1391(e) to damage actions against federal officials. 43 We acknowledge also that in Relf v. Gasch 44 we spoke to the subject in a manner that, in retrospect, seems susceptible of conflicting interpretations, but Relf does not clash with the result reached here. That case involved the propriety of a transfer of litigation to another district "for the convenience of parties . . . (and) in the interest of justice," 45 and the complaint hinted that some defendants might be subject to liability not only for activities under color of legal authority but also for others of a purely personal character. 46 Those possibilities could not have been explored in the transferee district, for neither Section 1391(e) nor any other provision gave venue there, 47 and as a prerequisite to transfer "(v)enue must be proper in the transferee district" 48 for every defendant and on every claim for relief. 49 Moreover, a transfer is conditioned as well on the amenability of all defendants "to the process of the federal court in the transferee district at the time the action was originally filed" 50 and, apart from the inefficacy of process available in that district for any defendant sued only in a purely personal role, 51 the fact that some defendants had left federal service prior to institution of suit "increase(d) the likelihood" that they were not subject to process emanating from the transferee court. 52 Consequently we remanded the case in order that the District Court might, by allowing amendments to the complaint, be afforded a reasonable opportunity to decide these weighty questions bearing on its power to transfer. Clearly, our presumption in Relf that actions brought against persons who just happen to be, or to have been, federal officials are not within the ambit of Section 1391(e) is by no means incompatible with our present holding that venue for damage actions against those who inflict injury under color of legal authority is governed by that section.
To the extent, then, that the District Court held that Section 1391(e) furnishes no basis for venue here, it was in error. That does not end the matter, however, for the order appealed from is predicated also upon...
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