Briggs v. Goodwin
| Citation | 712 F.2d 1444 |
| Decision Date | 08 July 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 80-2269,80-2269 |
| Parties | John BRIGGS, et al., Appellants, v. Guy GOODWIN, et al. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Robert Boehm, Washington, D.C., Morton Stavis, Hoboken, N.J., Cameron Cunningham, East Palo Alto, Cal., Brady Coleman, Austin, Tex., Jack Levine, and Philip J. Hirschkop, Alexandria, Va., were on the Supplemental Memorandum for appellants.
Robert F. Muse and Jacob A. Stein, Washington, D.C., were on the Petition for Rehearing and Supplemental Memorandum for appellees.
Before GINSBURG, Circuit Judge, and BAZELON and MacKINNON, Senior Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge BAZELON.
The allegations in this case raise troubling issues of law: Appellant Briggs alleges that appellee Goodwin, a United States Attorney, knowingly gave false sworn testimony before a district court, which resulted in a violation of appellant's constitutional rights. Appellee asserts entitlement to absolute immunity from civil liability arising from his testimony. This court rejected that claim. Thereafter the Supreme Court decided Briscoe v. LaHue 1 and we granted rehearing to reconsider the issue in light of that decision. Upon such reconsideration, we are compelled to the conclusion that Briscoe entitles appellee to absolute immunity as a witness.
The factual background and procedural history in this case have been fully detailed in our earlier opinions, Briggs v. Goodwin, 698 F.2d 486 (D.C.Cir.1983) ("Briggs II "); Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 10 (D.C.Cir.1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 904, 98 S.Ct. 3089, 57 L.Ed.2d 1133 (1978) ("Briggs I "); only a brief review is required here.
The case arises out of a grand jury proceeding in which several grand jury witnesses, including appellant Briggs, were represented by the same counsel. 2 In response to rumors that some of the grand jury witnesses were government informants, the witnesses filed a motion in district court to compel the government to disclose whether any government informants were among the witnesses represented by group counsel. At the hearing on the motion, appellee Goodwin, who was the prosecutor in charge of the grand jury investigation, took the stand and was asked under oath whether any of the witnesses represented by group counsel were government informants. Goodwin answered, "No." Appellant Briggs alleges that Goodwin's response was false, that Goodwin knew it to be false, and that the allegedly false statement caused Briggs to share defense strategy with an informant, who passed it back into the hands of the government. Briggs sued Goodwin, inter alia, for damages arising out of violation of Briggs's sixth amendment rights. Goodwin asserted absolute immunity on two grounds: 1) as a prosecutor, and 2) as a witness. The district court refused to dismiss the case on either ground, but agreed to certify the question of prosecutorial immunity for interlocutory appeal.
In a 2-1 decision, this court rejected Goodwin's prosecutorial immunity claim. Briggs I, 569 F.2d 10 (D.C.Cir.1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 904, 98 S.Ct. 3089, 57 L.Ed.2d 1133 (1978). Applying the "functional" test outlined in Imbler v. Pachtman, 3 the court found that at the time of the statement Goodwin was operating in his investigatory role. 4 In that capacity, he was not entitled to the absolute immunity conferred on prosecutors acting as advocates, but only to the qualified immunity provided for police and other government officials acting as investigators. 5
For a variety of reasons, 6 Briggs I also reached the question of witness immunity, despite the district court's refusal to certify the issue for interlocutory appeal 7 and the failure of the parties to brief it. 8 On this issue, the Briggs I panel held that Goodwin's statement was not the testimonial act of a witness in the traditional sense, and that the protection of absolute witness immunity should not apply. 9 The majority went on at some length to explain that even if Goodwin had been a witness, common law witness immunity might not protect government officials whose perjured testimony infringed constitutional rights. 10 The case was remanded for the district court to determine Goodwin's entitlement to a qualified immunity based upon good faith.
On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for Goodwin. 11 In the instant appeal, we reversed on the ground that factual issues remain in dispute. Briggs II, 698 F.2d 486 (D.C.Cir.1983). Thereafter, the Supreme Court decided Briscoe; we thereupon ordered supplemental briefing and granted rehearing to reconsider the issue of witness immunity.
Briscoe v. LaHue.
Briscoe involved a civil suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a police officer who allegedly gave perjured testimony that led to the plaintiff's criminal conviction. All parties to the suit agreed that the common law affords lay witnesses absolute immunity from civil suits based on their testimony. 12 The case presented the issue of whether the same immunity applies to police and other government witnesses testifying in their official capacity. 13 Absolute witness immunity is traditionally justified as a response to two concerns: 1) intimidation, and 2) self-censorship. Without the protection of immunity, witnesses with important information may be dissuaded from coming forward to testify because of the potential for civil liability arising out of their participation in a judicial proceeding. 14 Even after taking the stand, witnesses may be inhibited by the risk of liability from speaking freely for fear of making honest errors that might subject them to suit. 15 Absolute immunity has therefore been justified in order that "those involved in judicial proceedings be 'given every encouragement to make a full disclosure of all pertinent information within their knowledge.' " 16
The plaintiffs in Briscoe, and the dissenting opinions, 17 offered several reasons why these concerns apply with less force to government witnesses such as police officers than to lay witnesses. First, police officers have a professional interest in obtaining prosecutions that is likely to counterbalance their hesitation to testify. Second, the financial burden of defending a civil suit is less of a concern for police officers, whose defense in suits alleging constitutional violations in the performance of their jobs is ordinarily undertaken by the government. In such suits generally, police officers are entitled to qualified, not absolute, immunity. Third, "perjured testimony by police officers is likely to be more damaging to constitutional rights than such testimony by ordinary citizens, because the policeman in uniform carries special credibility in the eyes of the jurors." 18 For this reason, cross-examination may be less effective in discrediting the perjured testimony of police officers than that of lay witnesses. Finally, the need for close cooperation between prosecutors and police officers reduces the likelihood of prosecutions for perjury, thereby undermining the sanction on which the law relies to compel immunized witnesses to speak the truth. 19
Briscoe explicitly considered these concerns and found that they did not justify excluding official witnesses from the protection of absolute witness immunity. 20 The Court said that the police officer functions like "any other witness." 21 Moreover, the Court added, without absolute immunity, the potential for litigation against official witnesses "might undermine not only their contribution to the judicial process but also the effective performance of their other public duties." 22 Thus, the Court held that the public interest in "protecting the judicial process," 23 which had justified affording judges, prosecutors and lay witnesses the protection of absolute immunity, also justified granting that protection to police officers when they take the witness stand.
In Briggs I, this court denied Goodwin witness immunity because his testimonial act differed from that of a witness in the usual sense. The court found that Goodwin's brief statement on the stand "was prompted by, and directly incidental to" his involvement in managing and administering an investigation. 24 "To the extent that [Goodwin's] one word answer is viewed as a testimonial act, it was one occasioned by, and critical to, appellant's discharge of that responsibility." 25
We find it difficult to distinguish Goodwin's testimonial act from those of police officers in situations falling within the rationale of Briscoe. Testimony by a police officer will very often involve challenges to his conduct while performing investigatory tasks. A police officer who has been integrally involved in an investigation that culminates in a criminal prosecution has a clear interest in the outcome of the trial. In such a situation, the police officer has professional and personal interests in his testimony that are closely analogous to Goodwin's interest in the testimony out of which this suit arises. Briggs I explicitly found Goodwin to be operating not as a prosecutor but as an investigator. 26 We decided that in that role his immunity should resemble that of a police officer involved in an investigation. Briscoe informs us that that immunity is absolute for statements made on a witness stand. Briscoe therefore compels the conclusion that when Goodwin made his sworn statement from the witness stand, 27 he enjoyed absolute immunity.
The fact that Briscoe involved statements at a trial whereas this case involves statements at a hearing on a motion during the grand jury phase of an investigation is not a distinction that allows a different result. Briscoe emphasized the concern that the absence of immunity would interfere with the ability of "judicial proceedings" 28 "to determine where the truth lies." 29...
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