Briggs v. Mason
| Decision Date | 19 January 2023 |
| Docket Number | 357863 |
| Parties | ROBERT BRIGGS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VANESSA MASON and RICHARD SALMI, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
UNPUBLISHED
Houghton Circuit Court LC No. 21-017597-AV
Before: Riordan, P.J., and Markey and Redford, JJ.
Defendants Vanessa Mason and Richard Salmi, appeal by leave granted the circuit court's opinion and order affirming a judgment of possession entered by the district court under the summary proceedings act (SPA), MCL 600.5701 et seq., in favor of Robert Briggs, who had purchased the real property at issue, a house, from Daniel Small by land contract. As part of the SPA litigation, the district court denied motions for summary disposition, for relief from judgment, and for determination of an interest in land that were all filed by defendants, who started renting the property under a lease with Small, now deceased, a few years after the land contract was executed. Facing eviction, defendants filed this appeal. We reverse and remand for a trial in the district court to determine whether Briggs abandoned the land contract.
On September 1, 2011, Small and Briggs entered into a land contract. Small agreed to sell his house to Briggs for $28,000 plus interest. Under the land contract, Briggs was required to make monthly payments of $200 for 72 months culminating in a balloon payment for the remaining balance. Briggs also agreed to maintain insurance on the property and to pay the real estate taxes. Upon full payment of the land contract, Small was required to convey legal title to the house to Briggs pursuant to a general warranty deed. The land contract was recorded with the Houghton County Register of Deeds (register of deeds).
On September 29, 2014, Small entered into a rental agreement with defendants. Under the contract, Small rented the house-previously sold to Briggs by land contract-to defendants. The rental agreement contained the following provisions:
After one year, assuming all things are in accordance, the landlord [Small] agrees to sell said property to either or both tenants for the price of $28,000.00 less all monies accumulated from rent and deposit for one year ($3,900.00) for a sum total price of $24,100.00 at same percent (%) landlord is being charged on his current mortgage (currently 4.9%).
On September 21, 2020, Briggs served defendants with a demand for possession of the property for nonpayment of rent. The demand indicated that defendants owed $2,206.99 in rent. On November 10, 2020, Briggs filed his SPA complaint in the district court against defendants seeking possession of the house. The complaint alleged that defendants owed $2,206.99 for back taxes. A copy of the Small-to-Briggs land contract was attached to the complaint.
Defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8), claiming that Small had died intestate in February 2018[1] and that Briggs did not own the property. Defendants noted that on September 21, 2020, they had filed with the register of deeds an affidavit of interest in land relative to the property. Defendants maintained that there was no evidence that Briggs had paid the 72 monthly installments required by his land contract or that Briggs had a deed for the house titled in his name. Briggs filed a response to the motion and claimed ownership and a right to possession under the land contract.
On December 9, 2020, the district court held a hearing on Briggs's complaint for possession and defendants' motion for summary disposition. The district court asked Briggs to tell the court about the case. Briggs informed the district court that he, as vendee, had a land contract with Small covering the property. Briggs indicated that the land contract was executed in 2011 and was recorded with the register of deeds that same year. Documentary evidence supports these claims. In 2012, after his wife became terminally ill, Briggs spoke with Small about Briggs's renting out the house. They reached an agreement that Small's son would live at the property, that in exchange, the land contract payments, the taxes, and the insurance "would be [considered] paid," and that Briggs could not charge Small's son "any more than that." Briggs was unsure whether Small or Small's son would pay the taxes and insurance. Briggs claimed that he and Small reduced this agreement to writing. According to Briggs, the written agreement was in storage, and he had been going through boxes trying to locate it. Briggs stated that the agreement had not been filed with the register of deeds.
Further, in 2018, Briggs received a delinquent tax bill for the property. He called the Houghton County Treasurer (county treasurer), who purportedly informed him that there was a payment arrangement for the delinquent taxes which would take the property out of foreclosure. But Briggs then received another delinquency notice from the county treasurer. When he called the county treasurer, he was told that the delinquent taxes had to be paid by August 31, 2020, to prevent the property's foreclosure. Briggs asserted that he paid the delinquent taxes. He learned from Calumet Township that defendants were living in the house. Briggs claimed that he tried numerous times to contact defendants because he had no knowledge that they had been living in the house. He indicated that he had never been informed that Small's son no longer lived at the house. Briggs stated that at one point defendant Mason told Briggs that she owned the house. When defendants did not contact Briggs after he demanded possession of the property for nonpayment, Briggs sued for possession in the district court.
Briggs informed the district court that he did not have any contact with Small after 2013 and that he had no knowledge that Small had died in 2018 or that Small had entered into a rental agreement with defendants. According to Briggs, he never forfeited his land contract, and Small had never instituted any land contract forfeiture proceedings against him.
Defendant Mason testified that she had lived in the house since 2014 when she and defendant Salmi entered into the rental agreement with Small. Mason stated that defendants had to clean the house when they moved in because it was in "total disarray." She opined that the home appeared abandoned. Mason was told that the house had been vacant for two years. She was also informed that Briggs had a land contract for the property but that he had "just up and disappeared." Mason asserted that she had heard that Briggs's son could not locate Briggs and that the police were looking for him. According to Mason, she had no reason to believe in 2014 that Small did not own the house. Mason claimed that Small told her that he owned it. She had not gone to the register of deeds to do a title search. Mason testified that about a month after she and Salmi moved into the house, Small gave her a copy of his warranty deed for the property, which revealed his purchase and ownership of the house.
Mason testified that she had never been late in making a monthly rental payment.[2] Since 2014, she had paid approximately $20,000. She had also spent approximately $21,000 in repairing the property. Mason posited that she had regular contact with Small and learned about his death from Small's girlfriend. But Mason has not been in contact with Small's heirs.
Mason testified that the accumulation of unpaid taxes in 2018 was the result of Small's death. When Mason learned of the delinquent taxes, she made arrangements to pay them, but defendants were unable to pay them as arranged. Mason asserted that she currently had the financial resources to maintain the property going forward. Mason admitted that "up until recently" the rental agreement had not been recorded with the register of deeds. The rental agreement was attached to an affidavit of interest in land that defendants had filed with the register of deeds.
Defendants asked the district court to summarily dismiss Briggs's complaint. Defendants argued that because Briggs did not have a warranty deed giving him title to the property, he was not the owner of the house. Rather, the owner of the property was Small's estate. Defendants contended that the matter had to be "sort[ed] out" in probate court with respect to which individual or individuals now owned the property before there could be a determination of who had the right to possess the property. Briggs responded that he, and not defendants, had a land contract demonstrating a right of possession.
The district court found that although the case was "a God awful mess," it was not legally complicated. According to the district court, Briggs was within his rights to demand possession of the property. The district court explained that Briggs had a land contract for the property that was recorded with the register of deeds and that remained valid. The district court observed that Small had never instituted legal proceedings to have the land contract forfeited. And Briggs as the land contract vendee, had equitable title to the property and all the rights associated with that title. The district court stated that Briggs could pursue obtaining legal title and a warranty deed from Small's estate. The district court opined that defendants' rental agreement, because it was not notarized, could not technically be recorded with the register of deeds. The district court also took the position that Small had no authority to enter into the rental agreement with defendants in 2014 because he did not have the right to occupy the home at the time; he only held legal title to the property. Ruling from the bench, the district court denied defendants' motion for summary disposition and...
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