Briggs v. Morales
| Decision Date | 28 February 2020 |
| Docket Number | 7:19-CV-5012 |
| Parties | TELLY BRIGGS, Plaintiff, v. DANIEL MORALES, in his individual and official capacity, RYAN WISNIESKI, in his individual and official capacity, CHAD OSTMEYER, in his individual and official capacity, and CITY OF IMPERIAL, NEBRASKA, a Political Subdivision of the State of Nebraska, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nebraska |
The plaintiff, Telly Briggs, brings this action, alleging in his amended complaint civil rights violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest, use of excessive force, refusal of access to counsel, interference with a civil child custody matter, and conspiracy to violate the plaintiff's civil rights, as well as a claim that the City failed to train or supervise its law enforcement officers. The individual defendants, Daniel Morales, Ryan Wisnieski, and Chad Ostmeyer are City of Imperial police officers. The individual defendants have moved to dismiss most, but not all, of the plaintiff's claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Filing 9. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant the defendants' motion in part and deny it in part.
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must set forth a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This standard does not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an unadorned accusation. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). For the purposes of a motion to dismiss a court must take all the factual allegations in the complaint as true, but is not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The facts alleged must raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence to substantiate the necessary elements of the plaintiff's claim. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545. The court must assume the truth of the plaintiff's factual allegations, and a well-pleaded complaint may proceed, even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and that recovery is very remote and unlikely. Id. at 556.
The plaintiff and Shaina Musick have a son, born in 2011. Filing 7 at 5. The plaintiff and Musick's relationship came to an end, and later, a temporary custody order was entered giving physical custody of their son to Musick. The plaintiff was allowed parenting time with his son every other weekend. Id. The plaintiff alleges that his parenting relationship with Musick has been contentious, and they often disagreed about the plaintiff's rights regarding information concerning their son's health and well-being. Id. The plaintiff alleges that Imperial city police officers regularly oversee the exchange when he picks up his son. On these occasions, the officers attempt to harass and intimidate the plaintiff by standing close to him and exhibit a menacing demeanor, tap their gun holsters, and otherwise attempt to needlessly escalate a difficult situation. Id. The plaintiff alleges that at some point, Musick began dating defendant Chad Ostmeyer, who is an Imperial police departmentsergeant (filing 7 at 4), and that Musick was dating Ostmeyer when the subsequent events unfolded that resulted in the plaintiff's arrest. Filing 7 at 9.
The plaintiff and Musick's custody dispute was set for trial in late January 2016. On January 2, the plaintiff arrived to pick up his son for his regularly scheduled parenting time. Filing 7 at 5. Musick handed him a bag of pills and told him that their son had strep throat. According to the plaintiff, his son was sick the entire weekend, coughing violently and vomiting in bed. Id. When the plaintiff returned his son to Musick, they argued about the plaintiff's right to be informed about his son's physical well-being. Filing 7 at 6.
Over the course of the next two days, the plaintiff made multiple telephone calls to Musick, all of which went unanswered, to see how his son was doing. Id. On January 6, the plaintiff attempted to confront Musick in person to see how his son was doing. He found Musick at her friend's house and tried to catch Musick's attention as she backed out of her friend's driveway. Id. Musick did not stop, no words were exchanged, and according to the plaintiff, Musick was smiling as she drove away. Id. The plaintiff left and returned home.
A few hours later, the plaintiff heard a knock on his door. Id. The plaintiff had recently been threatened by a former friend that he and a trained mixed-martial arts fighter were going to come to the plaintiff's house and "light-up" the plaintiff and his roommate. Id. Not expecting anyone, and not knowing who was knocking, the plaintiff picked up a shotgun before opening his door. Filing 7 at 6-7. When he opened the door, the plaintiff saw defendant Daniel Morales. Filing 7 at 7. Morales was an Imperial city police officer-in-training, filing 7 at 3, and was in full uniform, filing 7 at 7. When Morales saw the plaintiff's shotgun, he immediately drew his service weapon and began yelling for theplaintiff to put the shotgun down, which the plaintiff did. Id. Morales then ordered the plaintiff out of his house and down the front steps. Upon reaching his bottom step, Morales order the plaintiff to both "get down on the ground" and to "take a seat." When the plaintiff attempted to sit down on his front steps, Morales grabbed him, threw him to the ground and placed his knee in the plaintiff's back. Id. The plaintiff was recovering from a recent back surgery to repair a herniated disc. Id.
The plaintiff asked Morales who he was and why he was at the plaintiff's house, but Morales did not respond to the plaintiff's questions. Filing 7 at 8. Instead, after pinning the plaintiff to the ground, Morales started asking the plaintiff questions about his earlier encounter with Musick. Id. Morales handcuffed the plaintiff and told him he was under arrest for disturbing the peace of Musick earlier that day. Id. Morales pulled the plaintiff up after handcuffing him, jerked down on the handcuffs causing injury to the plaintiff's wrists, and threw the plaintiff onto the hood of Morales' police cruiser. Filing 7 at 9.
The plaintiff alleged that before going to the plaintiff's house, Morales met with Ostmeyer and Musick, and that Ostmeyer directed the investigation, arrest, and subsequent filing of charges against the plaintiff. Id. Morales claimed that probable cause for the plaintiff's arrest came from Musick's complaint, and that Morales went to the plaintiff's house intending to arrest him. Id. The plaintiff was charged with disturbing the peace, terroristic threats, and the use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, all in connection with Musick's complaint and his encounter with Morales. He was found not guilty of all charges. Filing 9 at 10. The plaintiff was, however, convicted of assault on an officer, obstructing a police officer, and two counts of criminalmischief for conduct occurring after and apart from his encounters with Musick and Morales. Id.
The plaintiff's amended complaint asserts six claims for relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Count 1: Unlawful arrest and imprisonment in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and conspiracy.
Count 2: Excessive use of force in violation of the Fourth Amendment and conspiracy.
Count 3: Municipal liability regarding the failure to train or supervise its police officers, resulting in the violation of the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights.
Count 4: Refusal of access to counsel in violation of Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
Count 5: Municipal liability regarding intentional interference with the plaintiff's civil child custody matter in violation of the plaintiff's substantive due process rights.
Count 6: Municipal liability for engaging in a scheme that offends any sense of justice in violation of the plaintiff's due process rights.
1. CLAIMS IN COUNTS 1, 3, & 6.
The defendants assert that the plaintiff's claims in Counts 1, 3, and 6 are barred pursuant to the rule in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), which provides:
[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid,a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. . . . Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. But if the district court determines that the plaintiff's action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit.
The defendants argue that because the plaintiff was convicted of certain charges, and those convictions have not been reversed, or otherwise pardoned or expunged, the plaintiff's § 1983 claims regarding the charges for which he was acquitted are not cognizable and must be dismissed. Filing 10 at 5-7. The defendants argue that success in the plaintiff's § 1983 action regarding the charges on which he was acquitted would necessarily imply the invalidity of his existing convictions on other charges. The defendants' argument is fourfold, and essentially relies on the premise that the acquitted and convicted charges all stem from the same occurrence. The four factors the defendants point to...
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