Briggs v. Phebus
| Decision Date | 07 August 2013 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO: 12-2145 |
| Parties | WILLENE BRIGGS ET AL. v. WILLIAM PHEBUS ET AL. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
Before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine (Rec. Doc. 56), Intervenor's Memorandum in Support (Rec. Doc. 61) and Defendants' opposition thereto (Rec. Doc. 63). Plaintiffs' motion was set for hearing on July 31, 2013, and this matter is set for trial by jury on May 5, 2014. The Court, having considered the motions and memoranda of counsel, the record, and the applicable law, finds that Plaintiffs' motion should be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part for the reasons set forth more fully below.
This action arises out of allegations of civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 et seq., as well as state law survival, wrongful death, emotional distress, and negligenceclaims.1 Plaintiffs allege that their son/brother, Cjavar "Dee Jay" Galmon ("Mr. Galmon") was shot and killed by Deputy William Phebus ("Deputy Phebus") on August 11, 2012, outside of a club ("Club 41") in Tangipahoa Parish. (See generally, Compl., Rec. Doc. 1, pp. 1-6, ¶¶ 3-46) Plaintiffs contend that the shooting was unprovoked and occurred during a situation which did not necessitate the use of deadly force. (Compl., Rec. Doc. 1, p. 3, ¶¶ 13 - 17) Plaintiffs assert that after the shooting occurred, Deputy Phebus and the other officers at the scene did not render life-saving emergency care to Mr. Galmon, did not allow the medical professionals who witnessed the shooting to administer care to Mr. Galmon, and did not seek other emergency assistance for Mr. Galmon. (Compl., Rec. Doc. 1, p. 4, ¶¶ 22 - 25) Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Galmon's mother, Plaintiff Willene Briggs ("Ms. Briggs") and Mr. Galmon's sister, Plaintiff Kim Brumfield ("Ms. Brumfield"), arrived to the scene of the shooting shortly after it occurred, and that they both witnessed their son/brother suffering physical pain and dying on the ground.
(Compl., Rec. Doc. 1, pp. 4-5, ¶¶ 27 - 30) Plaintiffs report that neither Ms. Briggs nor Ms. Brumfield were allowed to render any assistance and/or comfort to Mr. Galmon. (Compl., Rec. Doc. 1, pp. 4-5, ¶¶ 27 - 30)
On August 21, 2011, Ms. Briggs and Ms. Brumfield filed the instant suit naming Sheriff Daniel Edwards ("Sheriff Edwards") and Deputy Phebus as Defendants. (Rec. Doc. 1) Following the initial complaint, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. (Rec. Doc. 5) The Court dismissed Plaintiffs' claims without prejudice because Plaintiffs failed to affirmatively negate the existence of primary beneficiaries as is required when inferior beneficiaries assert survival and wrongful death claims. (Rec. Doc. 7). The Court granted Plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint to remedy this deficiency, and on November 26, 2012, Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint. (Rec. Doc. 8). On February 20, 2013, Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint wherein they added two additional plaintiffs, Mr. Galmon's siblings, Mr. Allen Briggs ("Mr. Briggs") and Ms. Kendra Pendleton ("Ms. Pendleton"), as well as an additional Defendant, Deputy Phebus and Sheriff Edwards' liability insurer, Columbia Casualty Company ("Columbia"). In their Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs assert a direct action against Columbia pursuant toLouisiana Revised Statute § 22:1269.2
Plaintiffs seek damages against Deputy Phebus, Sheriff Edwards, and Columbia, on Mr. Galmon's behalf as well as on their own behalves. Specifically, Ms. Briggs seeks relief on her own behalf under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for civil rights violations and under Louisiana's wrongful death statute, Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.1, and on Mr. Galmon's behalf under Louisiana's survival action statute, Louisiana Civil Code article. 2315.2. In addition, Ms. Briggs and Ms. Brumfield seek to recover on their own behalves for the mental anguish and distress caused by viewing Mr. Galmon's suffering and death under Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.6.
On April 26, 2013, Mr. Galmon's father, Carl Galmon, moved to intervene. Magistrate Judge Karen Wells Roby granted his motion, and Carl Galmon filed his complaint on April 30, 2013. (Rec. Doc. 28) Carl Galmon seeks damages against Deputy Phebus and Sheriff Edwards on his own behalf under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for civil rights violations, under Louisiana's wrongful death statute, Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.1, and under LouisianaCivil Code article 2315.6 for the mental anguish and distress caused from viewing Mr. Galmon's suffering and death at the scene of the incident. In addition, Carl Galmon seeks damages on Mr. Galmon's behalf under Louisiana's survival action statute, Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.2.
On May 22, 2013, Defendants moved for leave to file a third party complaint against Marquis Martin a/k/a Macquis Martin a/k/a Macquas Martin ("Martin"). (Rec. Doc. 36) Defendants allege that Martin is at least partially liable in this matter because Martin's actions on the evening in question allegedly led to the incident wherein Mr. Galmon was fatally wounded. Defendants allege that, on the evening that Mr. Galmon was shot outside of Club 41, there was a shooting at another nearby club ("Spur Station"). Shortly after the Spur Station shooting, there was a disturbance at Club 41 to which officers responded. When officers, including Deputy Phebus, arrived at the scene, a woman pointed out that Martin had a gun. Defendants allege that when they tried to apprehend Martin, he fled. When officers caught Martin, Defendants aver that Mr. Galmon tried to assist Martin, despite being told to stand back, and was wounded when Deputy Phebus's firearm accidentally discharged. Plaintiffs opposed the motion, and Magistrate Judge Roby held oral argument on June 26,2013.3 On July 9, 2013, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion in limine. (Rec. Doc. 56) Intervenor Carl Galmon filed a memorandum in support of Plaintiffs' motion on July 18, 2013. (Rec. Doc. 61) Defendants filed their opposition to the motion on July 23, 2013. (Rec. Doc. 63).4
Plaintiffs and Intervenor seek to exclude the following evidence: (1) any evidence or testimony concerning the criminal background and/or prior actions of Martin5 or the Spur Station shooting, (2) any testimony or evidence concerning the grand jury proceeding regarding Deputy Phebus or the results of such proceedings, and (3) any testimony or evidence from the Louisiana State Police report(s) concerning the Club 41 incident or the Spur Station shooting that is not based on direct knowledge of the author of the report.
Plaintiffs argue that any evidence regarding Martin's actions at the Spur Station on the evening of the incident or anyevidence of Martin's criminal background should not be admitted to suggest that the events occurring prior to the incident at Club 41 were in any way related to Deputy Phebus's shooting of Mr. Galmon. Plaintiffs urge that such evidence should be excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and Carter v. Hewitt, 617 F.2d 961, 972 (3d Cir. 1980) because it is "prejudicial and lacking in probative value." (Rec. Doc. 56-1, p. 2.) As to the grand jury proceedings regarding Deputy Phebus, Plaintiffs rely on Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York v. Talbot, 234 F.2d 425, 428 (5th Cir. 1956) to argue that if "a no true bill is returned [after a grand jury proceeding], the evidence is inadmissible." (Rec. Doc. 56-1, p. 3.) Finally, Plaintiffs contend that the police report is largely composed of hearsay, which is not admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 802 unless there is some exception that applies. Plaintiffs argue that there is no such exception for information contained in police reports, as noted in State v. Perkins, 97-1119 (La. App. 3 Cir. 6/17/98), 716 So. 2d 120, 127. Therefore, while Plaintiffs do not oppose any evidence that provides opinions or factual findings that would support the statements in the report, Plaintiffs maintain that the report itself is inadmissible.
Intervenor Carl Galmon supports the assertions made byPlaintiffs and adds to certain points in his memorandum. Carl Galmon argues that any evidence concerning Martin's background and any evidence from the Spur Station is irrelevant to the Defendants' argument that Deputy Phebus unintentionally fired his weapon at Mr. Galmon. Carl Galmon also asserts that such evidence is highly prejudicial and only serves to "tar [Mr.] Galmon with any faults they can dredge on [Martin]." (Rec. Doc. 61, p. 2) Carl Galmon further alleges that evidence of the grand jury's decision not to charge Deputy Phebus is opinion evidence and must be excluded. Moreover, the grand jury decision is prejudicial because it is possible for a layman juror in the present case to believe that the grand jury decision carries more weight than it truly does. Additionally, Carl Galmon argues that Federal Rules of Evidence 402 and 403 both prohibit the introduction of a grand jury decision. Finally, Carl Galmon contends that the police report is inadmissible hearsay, thus must be excluded to the extent that statements within the report are not covered by an exception to the hearsay rules. Carl Galmon asserts, however, that such determinations concerning the police report would be best made at trial or during pre-trial rulings.
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs'/Intervenor's attempt to exclude all evidence relating to Martin and the Spur Stationshooting is premature. Defendants contend that a motion in limine may be dismissed "as premature due to ongoing discovery which could altogether moot the issue of relevance." Lewis v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., No. 02-cv-1665, 2003 WL 21219870, *2 (E.D. La. May 20, 2003) (Zainey, J.) Defendants argue that such evidence "could very well be relevant," but Martin has yet to be deposed, and it is unclear whether any evidence about Martin or the Spur Station shooting will be relevant and/or prejudicial.
Defendants...
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