Briggs v. Smith
| Decision Date | 26 September 2013 |
| Docket Number | NO. 31,036,31,036 |
| Parties | TIMOTHY BRIGGS and DEBORAH BRIGGS, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. RONALD SMITH and MARLENE SMITH, Defendants-Appellee |
| Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
This memorandum opinion was not selected for publication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OTERO COUNTY
Charles E. Hawthorne, Ltd.
Charles E. Hawthorne
Ruidoso, NM
for Appellants
Law Office of Mark A. Reeves
Mark A. Reeves
Alamogordo, NM
for Appellees
{1} In this case, we affirm the district court's determination that an assignment of interest in real property was both legally invalid and fraudulent, but reverse its order awarding attorney fees. We also determine that the district court's denial of Plaintiffs' motion for a new trial was correct.
{2} Deborah Ras and Ronald Smith were single persons living together when they bought a piece of property pursuant to a real estate contract dated October 9, 2001. Eventually, the property was paid off, and a warranty deed to Deborah Ras and Ronald Smith was delivered to her, but not ever recorded. Deborah Ras later married Timothy Briggs and took his last name. Ronald Smith continued to live on the property in a separate mobile home.
{3} This case revolves around a document that is dated December 2004 and purports to be drafted by Ronald Smith to relinquish his interest in the property. The document was witnessed by "Timothy D. Briggs" who, at that time, was Deborah's husband. On that document, under a signature of "Ronald W. Smith," is a handwritten notation of "Marlene Smith[,] wife."
{4} In 2010, Timothy Briggs and Deborah Briggs (Plaintiffs) instituted a quiet title suit for the property in question. The quiet title complaint asserted that Deborah is the owner of the property in fee simple by virtue of the real estate contract,1 and the relinquishment document was an assignment of Ronald Smith's interest in the property. The complaint further alleged that the original contract was paid in full, and a warranty deed was issued from the sellers of the property to both Deborah Ras and Ronald Smith and tendered from escrow. The complaint also alleged that Ronald Smith "paid nothing toward[] the purchase or maintenance of the [p]roperty" and requested that the district court declare Plaintiffs as owners of the property. The complaint named Ronald Smith and Marlene Smith (Defendants), although it referred only to Ronald and alleged no action on Marlene's part connecting her to the property.
{5} Defendants answered, denying that there had been any "assignment" signed by them and asserting an interest in the property while counter-claiming for fraud and requesting partition or sale of the land. It is not disputed that Marlene did not know Ronald Smith in 2004 when the relinquishment document was allegedly signed. Tothe extent that other facts are needed to explain our decision, they will be discussed below as needed.
{6} Defendants prevailed at trial. The district court found that the relinquishment document was fraudulent and awarded them a half interest in the property and ordered its sale, also giving them attorney fees. Plaintiffs filed this appeal.
{7} As a preliminary matter, we suggest that Defendants' brief does not conform with the form requirements required of briefs filed in our appellate courts, Rule 12305 NMRA, and both parties' briefs could have profited from closer adherence to the briefing requirements of Rule 12-213 NMRA.
{8} Plaintiffs contest the district court's decision in three respects: (1) its finding that the relinquishment document was fraudulent, (2) the district court's ruling that the document insufficiently described the subject matter of the "assignment" was not supported by substantial evidence, and (3) the attorney fees were not warranted. We address each in turn, in the process determining that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs' motion for a new trial.
{9} Plaintiffs' brief invites us to conduct a substantial evidence review concerning the district court's finding that the appearance of Marlene Smith's name on therelinquishment was fraudulent. "Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind would find adequate to support a conclusion." Landavazo v. Sanchez, 1990-NMSC-114, ¶ 7, 111 N.M. 137, 802 P.2d 1283. "[We] will not disturb findings, weigh evidence, resolve conflicts[,] or substitute [our] judgment as to the credibility of witnesses where evidence substantially supports findings of fact and conclusions of law of the [district] court." Sternloff v. Hughes, 1978-NMSC-032, ¶ 23, 91 N.M. 604, 577 P.2d 1250. We therefore review with deference the district court's decision that clear and convincing evidence supported its finding that the relinquishment document was fraudulent because of "inter alia, Defendant [M]arlene Smith's alleged signature appearing on this writing."
{10} The district court's unfortunate use of the Latin phrase, "inter alia," injects some ambiguity into what seems to be a finding based on no more than the impossibility of Marlene Smith signing a document some four years before she even knew Ronald Smith. However, the evidence, with all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom, is viewed in the light most favorable in support of the findings and the prevailing party. Weidler v. Big J Enters., Inc., 1998-NMCA-021, ¶ 30, 124 N.M. 591, 953 P.2d 1089 ("In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, ourt views the evidence in a light most favorable to the prevailing party and disregards any inferences and evidence to the contrary." . As we describe below, there was substantial evidence to support this findings of fact, and we find support for the district court's conclusion.
{11} Plaintiffs argue that the only evidence that indicated how Marlene Smith's name appeared on the document was Ronald Smith's testimony that he did not know her in 2004. This is inaccurate. Marlene also testified that she did not sign the document and did not know Ronald until some three or four years later. Alternatively, Deborah Briggs testified that Ronald prepared the document on her computer on the day it was signed, although she did not watch him do it. Timothy Briggs testified that Ronald had approached them in December 2004, outside of their house, said that he wanted to give them a wedding gift, and gave them the relinquishment, which they then signed and witnessed. Clearly, there was no evidence presented that Marlene had signed the document.
{12} The district court could have concluded that, if the document was drafted, signed, witnessed, and tendered to Plaintiffs by Ronald Smith alone, Marlene Smith's signature was not on it at the time it was executed. No evidence was presented at trial that it was not a signature. The absence at trial of an alternative explanation also supports the finding that it was not Marlene's signature and, hence, was fraudulent. The facts presented to the district court at trial support the conclusion that there wasno legitimate reason for Marlene's signature to appear on the document, and the district court acceptably relied on these facts in finding that Marlene's signature was fraudulent, stating that "whoever prepared this document . . . reached a bit too far by adding that signature." Supporting another more general aspect of possible fraud, Ronald further testified on cross-examination that he had not signed the document, and the signature on it did not match a signature he acknowledged to be his on a bank document shown to him by Plaintiffs' counsel. Again, the district court's possible determination that Ronald was more credible than Plaintiffs is not something we disturb on appeal.
{13} Problems with the relinquishment were apparent from the earliest moments in this case. Yet, Plaintiffs seem to have ignored such warnings. Plaintiffs had been on notice since Defendants' answer that both Defendants denied signing the document and alleged fraud in its preparation. The document had been attached as an exhibit to Plaintiffs' complaint, and it was admitted as evidence at trial. Given Plaintiffs' testimony about its provenance and Defendants' opposing testimony that the signatures were not theirs, the district court was free to resolve the facts as it believed them most credible. The origin of the document and the signatures were resolved within the district court's purview. The appearance after the trial of evidence that Marlene Smith's signature was a notation by Plaintiffs' counsel's legal assistant, aswe discuss below, is of no consequence to this calculus. We believe substantial evidence existed at trial from which the district court could determine by clear and convincing evidence that the relinquishment document was fraudulently created.
{14} Related to Plaintiffs' dissatisfaction with the district court's findings is the late-appearing matter of the source of Marlene Smith's name on the document. Although largely apocryphal to the finding of fraud, aspects of the district court's ruling and the parties' discussion of the evidence are illustrative of why the district court ruled correctly and bear discussion here.
{15} Having eschewed any concern for its authenticity that may have arisen from Defendants' denial that they had signed anything and their allegation of fraud, Plaintiffs proceeded to trial and lost. Plaintiffs promptly filed a motion for a new trial,...
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