Briggs v. State
| Decision Date | 12 April 2010 |
| Parties | Troy BRIGGS v. STATE of Maryland. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Allison Pierce Brasseaux, Asst. Public Defender (Elizabeth L. Julian, Acting Public Defender, Baltimore, MD), on brief for Petitioner.
Gary E. O'Connor, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Douglas F. Gansler, Atty. Gen. of Maryland, baltimore, MD), on brief for Respondent.
ARGUED BEFORE BELL, C.J., HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE, ADKINS, BARBERA and JOHN C. ELDRIDGE (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.
In 2001, Troy Briggs ("Petitioner"), was convicted in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County of distribution of cocaine. Maryland Code (2002, 2009 Supp.), § 5-608(c) of the Criminal Law Article,1 provides a mandatory sentence, for offenders in Petitioner's situation, if the court finds that, among other things, the offender has been convicted twice previously, on separate occasions, for certain offenses involving controlled dangerous substances. Petitioner had two prior convictions for possession with intent to distribute cocaine. These were offenses involving controlled dangerous substances, they had taken place three weeks apart, and each offense had been charged in a separate statement of charges.2 The court concluded that § 5-608(c) therefore applied to Petitioner and imposed the sentence that § 5-608(c) mandates.
Petitioner argues that this sentence was illegal. He explains that § 5-608(c) only applies when a defendant has been previously convicted of two offenses, one of which was "committed after there has been a charging document filed for the preceding crime." Accordingly, Petitioner claims that when he committed his second offense on July 17, 1990, an adequate charging document for his first offense on June 25, 1990, had not yet been filed. He acknowledges that the State filed a statement of charges in the District Court for his first offense before he committed his second offense, but he also points out that he could not have been tried in the District Court on the statement of charges. The State ultimately filed a criminal information in the Circuit Court for Petitioner's first offense, but not until after Petitioner committed the second offense.
Petitioner argues that the criminal information filed in the Circuit Court, not the statement of charges filed in the District Court, constituted the "charging document" for his first offense because the District Court did not have jurisdiction to decide his case on the merits. The criminal information filed in the Circuit Court, which did have jurisdiction to decide his case on the merits, was not filed until after Petitioner committed his second offense. Accordingly, Petitioner argues that § 5-608(c) did not apply to him and that he should not have received the enhanced sentence mandated by § 5-608(c). The Circuit Court and the Court of Special Appeals both rejected this argument, concluding that the statement of charges was a "charging document" under § 5-608(c). Similarly, we conclude that the statement of charges was a "charging document" under that statute. We shall therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
This case originated in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, where Petitioner was charged with distribution and possession of cocaine. He was convicted of distribution of cocaine on May 7, 2001, and was subsequently sentenced to a term of 25 years incarceration without the possibility of parole pursuant to former Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol., 2001 Supp.), Article 27, § 286(d), now codified without relevant changes as Maryland Code (2002, 2009 Supp.), § 5-608(c) of the Criminal Law Article. Petitioner later filed a Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence, and the Circuit Court denied that motion. Petitioner noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed the Circuit Court's judgment in an unreported opinion on March 20, 2009. Petitioner subsequently submitted a petition for certiorari to this Court, which we granted. Briggs v. State, 409 Md. 44, 972 A.2d 859 (2009).
Petitioner's conviction in the present case was not his first. On June 25, 1990, Petitioner was arrested for possession with intent to distribute cocaine ("Offense One"). He was arrested that same day, a statement of charges was filed in the District Court for Baltimore City the following day, and a criminal information was filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City two months later, on August 28, 1990. Petitioner was convicted of Offense One in the Circuit Court on May 10, 1991. Petitioner was also arrested for possession with intent to distribute cocaine ("Offense Two") on July 17, 1990. Petitioner was arrested that same day, a statement of charges was filed the next day, and a criminal information was filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City two months later, on September 12, 1990. Petitioner was also convicted of Offense Two in the Circuit Court on May 10, 1991.
The conviction that led to this appeal occurred almost exactly ten years later. On May 7, 2001, Petitioner was convicted of distribution of cocaine, an offense that he committed on March 15, 1999. The trial court held a sentencing hearing and, on April 10, 2002, imposed a sentence of 25 years incarceration without the possibility of parole. This sentence was based on the trial court's determination that Petitioner was a third-time offender under § 5-608(c), which provides mandatory penalties for individuals who had previously committed two prior offenses involving controlled dangerous substances. The trial court explained:
Well, for purposes of my decision today it's dictated by the statute, § 5-608(c). The sentence must be a term of incarceration for 25 years without the possibility of parole. So I mean, I don't have an option on that.
Six years later, Petitioner filed a motion challenging his sentence. He argued that the trial court's decision to impose a mandatory sentence pursuant to § 5-608 was illegal because he had not been previously convicted on "separate occasions," as required by the statute. Under the statute, convictions occur on "separate occasions" if "the second or succeeding crime is committed after there has been a charging document filed for the preceding crime." § 5-608(c)(4) of the Criminal Law Article; see also McGlone v. State, 406 Md. 545, 553-61, 959 A.2d 1191, 1195-1200 (2008) (). The statement of charges for Offense One was filed in the District Court before Petitioner committed Offense Two. The criminal information for Offense One, however, was filed in the Circuit Court after Petitioner committed Offense Two. Petitioner argued that the criminal information, not the statement of charges, was the "charging document" for Offense One because it was the document filed in the court with jurisdiction over Petitioner's case. Accordingly, Petitioner concluded that he "did not commit Offense Two until after a charging document was filed for Offense One, thereby making Petitioner ineligible for sentencing under § 5-608(c)."
The Circuit Court in the present case denied Petitioner's motion, concluding that the statement of charges filed for Offense One was a "charging document" for purposes of § 5-608(c)(4). The court explained:
Petitioner appealed the Circuit Court's judgment to the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed. The intermediate appellate court agreed with the Circuit Court that the statement of charges filed in the District Court for Offense One was a "charging document" for purposes of § 5-608(c)(4). The Circuit Court explained that "the function of the `charging document' requirement in the enhanced sentencing statute is not to sort out the respective trial responsibilities of the circuit and district courts but to put potential repeat offenders on notice as to the perils of recidivism." The court also noted that the statute refers "not to `the charging document' but to `a charging document,' recognizing, by the use of the indefinite article, the variety of the items referred to." Finally, the court stated that "what is absolutely dispositive ... is the definition of `charging document' provided by the Court of Appeals in the Maryland Rules of Criminal Procedure." The court quoted both Rule 4-102(a) (2009), which includes "a statement of charges" within the definition of a "charging document," and Rule 4-102(j), which states that a "`statement of charges' means a charging document...." The court also noted that Maryland Code (2001, 2008 Repl.Vol.), § 1-101 of the Criminal Procedure Article, includes "a statement of charges" within its definition of a "charging document."
Petitioner has presented the following questions for our review:
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