Briggs v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 18 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 20-1172-SAC-GEB |
| Citation | 526 F.Supp.3d 962 |
| Parties | Casey BRIGGS, Plaintiff, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
Arthur E. Rhodes, Dustin L. DeVaughn, DeVaughn James Injury Lawyers, Wichita, KS, for Plaintiff.
Craig W. West, Jeremy E. Koehler, Foulston Siefkin LLP, Wichita, KS, for Defendant.
Plaintiff has brought this diversity action under Kansas law seeking an insurance recovery pursuant to breach of contract and equitable estoppel principles. This case is before the court upon plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment and defendant's motion for summary judgment.
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(a). In applying this standard, the court views the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Spaulding v. United Transp. Union, 279 F.3d 901, 904 (10th Cir. 2002). Such a showing may be made with citation "to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, ... affidavits or declarations, stipulations ..., admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c)(1)(A). An issue of fact is "genuine" if "there is sufficient evidence on each side so that a rational trier of fact could resolve the issue either way." Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 670 (10th Cir. 1998). The moving party may demonstrate an absence of a genuine issue of material fact by pointing out a lack of evidence for the other party on an essential element of that party's claim. Adams v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 233 F.3d 1242, 1246 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Adler, 144 F.3d at 671 ).
Plaintiff and defendant seek summary judgment upon plaintiff's breach of contract claim. Plaintiff contends that an insurance contract with defendant was breached when defendant refused to pay plaintiff Uninsured Motorist (UIM) and Personal Injury Protection (PIP) benefits.
The facts asserted by the parties are largely uncontroverted for the purposes of the motions before the court. Plaintiff and his mother, Janice Briggs, were registered owners of a 2007 Honda Civic. The Civic was insured under a policy issued by defendant. On March 2, 2020, plaintiff was injured in a two-vehicle collision while he was a passenger in a different vehicle which was owned and driven by a person named Harrington. Harrington's insurer tendered the policy limits of $25,000 to plaintiff for plaintiff's injuries. In this lawsuit, plaintiff seeks UIM and PIP benefits under the policy covering the Civic owned by plaintiff and his mother.
The "named insureds" under the policy are Calvin Briggs (plaintiff's father) and Janice Briggs (plaintiff's mother). When the policy for the Civic was obtained, plaintiff and his parents believed that plaintiff was merely being added as an insured to the various State Farm policies issued to his parents. Plaintiff, however, is not listed in the policy as a "named insured." He is listed as the primary or principal driver or operator of the Civic. It is the only vehicle plaintiff drove regularly.
At the time of the collision, plaintiff's parents owned two houses, one located on Delano Street in Wichita, Kansas, and one located on Cedar Crest Street, in Wichita, Kansas. The two houses are approximately 1.5 miles apart. In or around 2015, plaintiff's entire family (his parents, his sister and plaintiff) lived at the Delano address. About that time, plaintiff's father inherited the house at the Cedar Crest address. Plaintiff's parents moved there and, because they wanted the Delano address to remain occupied, they asked their children to remain at the Delano address. Otherwise, plaintiff and his sister would have moved to the Cedar Crest address. For five years or so, plaintiff and his sister have lived rent-free at the Delano address. There has been no intention to change this arrangement.
Plaintiff's voter registration lists the Delano Street address. His parents’ voter registration lists the Cedar Crest Street address. Plaintiff receives State Farm correspondence at the Delano Street address. His parents receive State Farm correspondence at the Cedar Crest Street address. An accident report for the collision lists plaintiff's address as on Delano Street.
Plaintiff was 29 years old at the time of the accident. Plaintiff receives mail at both houses, medical bills at the Delano address and bank statements at the Cedar Crest address. Plaintiff pays for internet access at the Delano address. His sister pays for utilities there. She pays for her own vehicle insurance premiums.
Plaintiff's parents pay the mortgage and a home improvement loan for the Delano address. There is no mortgage for the Cedar Crest address. They also pay for the maintenance and repairs for both homes.
Plaintiff has keys for both houses. He spends significant time at the Cedar Crest address. He is there almost daily, eating, lounging, doing homework and occasionally spending the night. Plaintiff's parents go to the Delano address whenever they want or need to, and own clothing, furnishings, kitchen items and other objects contained there. They regularly use the washer, dryer and refrigerator at the Delano address. The family members share maintenance chores for both houses.
Defendant's underwriting file refers to plaintiff and his sister as members of their parents’ "household."
The UIM portion of the policy defines "insured" as:
"Resident relative" is defined in the policy as:
The PIP portion of the policy defines "insured" as:
"Resident relative" under the PIP provisions means:
"You" in the policy means:
the named insured or named insureds shown on the Declarations Page and the spouse of any named insured.
The terms "resident" and "household" are not defined in the policy.
"If the facts are admitted, it is the province of the court to determine whether they come within the clear and unambiguous terms of a policy of insurance." Clark v. Prudential Ins. Co., 204 Kan. 487, 464 P.2d 253, 256 (1970). This may be done pursuant to a motion for summary judgment. Id. "To be ambiguous the contract must contain provisions or language of doubtful or conflicting meaning, as gleaned from a natural and reasonable interpretation of its language." Id. This construction is done in light of the facts of the case. Id. at 258. Ambiguous terms are construed against the defendant as drafter of the policy. Brumley v. Lee, 265 Kan. 810, 963 P.2d 1224, 1226 (1998). "If a policy of insurance is clear and unambiguous, the words are to be taken and understood in their plain, ordinary and popular sense, as an average or reasonable person with ordinary understanding would construe them, when used to express the purpose for which they were employed in the policy." Clark, 464 P.2d at 257.
If the contract is unambiguous, the court determines the parties’ intent by the language of the contract alone; but if a contract is ambiguous, the court may consider extrinsic evidence to construe it. Short v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kansas, Inc., 56 Kan.App.2d 914, 441 P.3d 1058, 1061 (2019).
The parties agree that the contractual issue presented to the court as to the recovery of UIM benefits is whether plaintiff is a "resident relative" under the policy.1 "Resident relative" is defined in the policy as a relative of a named insured by blood, marriage or adoption who "resides primarily with" the named insured. It is undisputed that the "named insured" are plaintiff's parents.
Plaintiff contends that "resident" and "resides primarily with" are ambiguous terms and suggests that plaintiff and his parents resided at both houses as part of an integrated living arrangement. Plaintiff, however, does not cite authority from Kansas which supports his claim of ambiguity. Nor do the cases plaintiff cites from other state...
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