Brigham City v. Stuart

• Decision Date: 22 May 2006
• Docket Number: No. 05-502.,05-502.
• Citation: 164 L. Ed. 2d 650,547 U.S. 398,126 S. Ct. 1943
• Parties: BRIGHAM CITY, UTAH <I>v.</I> STUART et al.
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

547 U.S. 398

126 S. Ct. 1943

164 L. Ed. 2d 650

BRIGHAM CITY, UTAH

v. STUART et al.

No. 05-502.

Supreme Court of United States.

Argued April 24, 2006.

Decided May 22, 2006.

Responding to a 3 a.m. call about a loud party, police arrived at the house in question, heard shouting inside, proceeded down the driveway, and saw two juveniles drinking beer in the backyard. Entering the yard, they saw through a screen door and windows an altercation in the kitchen between four adults and a juvenile, who punched one of the adults, causing him to spit blood in a sink. An officer opened the screen door and announced the officers' presence. Unnoticed amid the tumult, the officer entered the kitchen and again cried out, whereupon the altercation gradually subsided. The officers arrested respondents and charged them with contributing to the delinquency of a minor and related offenses. The trial court granted their motion to suppress all evidence obtained after the officers entered the home on the ground that the warrantless entry violated the Fourth Amendment, and the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed. Affirming, the State Supreme Court held that the injury caused by the juvenile's punch was insufficient to trigger the "emergency aid doctrine" because it did not give rise to an objectively reasonable belief that an unconscious, semiconscious, or missing person feared injured or dead was in the home. Furthermore, the court suggested the doctrine was inapplicable because the officers had not sought to assist the injured adult but had acted exclusively in a law enforcement capacity. The court also held that the entry did not fall within the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement.

Held: Police may enter a home without a warrant when they have an objectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury.

Because the Fourth Amendment's ultimate touchstone is "reasonableness," the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions. For example, one exigency obviating the requirement is the need to render emergency assistance to occupants of private property who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385, 392. This Court has repeatedly rejected respondents' contention that, in assessing the reasonableness of an entry, consideration should be given to the subjective motivations of individual officers. Because the officers' subjective motivation is irrelevant, Bond v. United States, 529 U. S. 334, 338, n. 2, it does not matter here whether they entered the kitchen to arrest respondents and gather evidence or to assist the injured and prevent further violence. Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U. S. 32, 46, and Florida v. Wells, 495 U. S. 1, 4, distinguished. Relying on this Court's holding in Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U. S. 740, 753, that "an important factor to be considered when determining whether any exigency exists is the gravity of the underlying offense for which the arrest is being made," respondents further contend that their conduct was not serious enough to justify the officers' intrusion into the home. This contention is misplaced. In Welsh, the "only potential emergency" confronting the officers was the need to preserve evidence of the suspect's blood-alcohol level, an exigency the Court held insufficient under the circumstances to justify a warrantless entry into the suspect's home. Ibid. Here, the officers were confronted with ongoing violence occurring within the home, a situation Welsh did not address.

The officers' entry here was plainly reasonable under the circumstances. Given the tumult at the house when they arrived, it was obvious that knocking on the front door would have been futile. Moreover, in light of the fracas they observed in the kitchen, the officers had an objectively reasonable basis for believing both that the injured adult might need help and that the violence was just beginning. Nothing in the Fourth Amendment required them to wait until another blow rendered someone unconscious, semiconscious, or worse before entering. The manner of their entry was also reasonable, since nobody heard the first announcement of their presence, and it was only after the announcing officer stepped into the kitchen and announced himself again that the tumult subsided. That announcement was at least equivalent to a knock on the screen door and, under the circumstances, there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment's knock-and-announce rule. Furthermore, once the announcement was made, the officers were free to enter; it would serve no purpose to make them stand dumbly at the door awaiting a response while those within brawled on, oblivious to their presence. Pp. 403-407.

2005 UT 13, 122 P. 3d 506, reversed and remanded.

ROBERTS, C.J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. STEVENS, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 407.

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH

Jeffrey S. Gray, Assistant Attorney General of Utah, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney General, Kirk M. Torgensen, Chief Deputy Attorney General, and J. Frederic Voros, Jr. Deputy Attorney General McNulty argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. On the brief were Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney General Fisher, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, and Patricia A. Millett.

Michael P. Studebaker argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents.^*

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case we consider whether police may enter a home without a warrant when they have an objectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury. We conclude that they may.

I

This case arises out of a melee that occurred in a Brigham City, Utah, home in the early morning hours of July 23, 2000. At about 3 a.m., four police officers responded to a call regarding a loud party at a residence. Upon arriving at the house, they heard shouting from inside, and proceeded down the driveway to investigate. There, they observed two juveniles drinking beer in the backyard. They entered the backyard, and saw—through a screen door and windows—an altercation taking place in the kitchen of the home. According to the testimony of one of the officers, four adults were attempting, with some difficulty, to restrain a juvenile. The juvenile eventually "broke free, swung a fist and struck one of the adults in the face." 2005 UT 13, ¶ 2, 122 P. 3d 506, 508. The officer testified that he observed the victim of the blow spitting blood into a nearby sink. App. 40. The other adults continued to try to restrain the juvenile, pressing him up against a refrigerator with such force that the refrigerator began moving across the floor. At this point, an officer opened the screen door and announced the officers' presence. Amid the tumult, nobody noticed. The officer entered the kitchen and again cried out, and as the occupants slowly became aware that the police were on the scene, the altercation ceased.

The officers subsequently arrested respondents and charged them with contributing to the delinquency of a minor, disorderly conduct, and intoxication. In the trial court, respondents filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained after the officers entered the home, arguing that the warrantless entry violated the Fourth Amendment. The court granted the motion, and the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed.

Before the Supreme Court of Utah, Brigham City argued that although the officers lacked a warrant, their entry was nevertheless reasonable on either of two grounds. The court rejected both contentions and, over two dissenters, affirmed. First, the court held that the injury caused by the juvenile's punch was insufficient to trigger the so-called "emergency aid doctrine" because it did not give rise to an "objectively reasonable belief that an unconscious, semiconscious or missing person feared injured or dead [was] in the home." 122 P. 3d, at 513 (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, the court suggested that the doctrine was inapplicable because the officers had not sought to assist the injured adult, but instead had acted "exclusively in their law enforcement capacity." Ibid.

The court also held that the entry did not fall within the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. This exception applies, the court explained, where police have probable cause and where "a reasonable person [would] believe that the entry was necessary to prevent physical harm to the officers or other persons." Id., at 514 (internal quotation marks omitted). Under this standard, the court stated, the potential harm need not be as serious as that required to invoke the emergency aid exception. Although it found the case "a close and difficult call," the court nevertheless concluded that the officers' entry was not justified by exigent circumstances. Id., at 515.

We granted certiorari, 546 U. S. 1085 (2006), in light of differences among state courts and the Courts of Appeals concerning the appropriate Fourth Amendment standard governing warrantless entry by law enforcement in an emergency situation. Compare In re Sealed Case 96-3167, 153 F. 3d 759, 766 (CADC 1998) ("[T]he standard for exigent circumstances is an objective one"), and People v. Hebert, 46 P. 3d 473, 480 (Colo. 2002) (en banc) (considering the circumstances as they "would have been objectively examined by a prudent and trained police officer"), with United States v. Cervantes, 219 F. 3d 882, 890 (CA9 2000) ("[U]nder the emergency doctrine, `[a] search must not be primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence'" (quoting People v. Mitchell, 39 N. Y. 2d 173, 177, 347 N. E. 2d 607, 609 (1976)), and State v. Mountford, 171 Vt. 487, 492, 769 A. 2d 639, 645 (2000) (Mitchell test "requir[es] courts to find that...