Brigham v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n, 11869
| Decision Date | 08 June 1970 |
| Docket Number | No. 11869,11869 |
| Citation | 24 Utah 2d 292,470 P.2d 393 |
| Parties | d 292 Scott BRIGHAM, by Frank E. Brigham, Guardian Ad Litem, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MOON LAKE ELECTRIC ASSOCIATION, Inc., a Utah corporation, Defendant and Respondent. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
Denis R. Morrill, Gerald R. Miller, Kenneth W. Yeates, of Mulliner, Prince & Mangum, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant.
Stephen B. Nebeker, James L. Wilde, of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker, Salt Lake City, for defendant and respondent.
Scott Brigham, a lad of ten years, sues for personal injuries occasioned when he came in contact with defendant's high tension wire.
The defendant is a power company furnishing electricity to residents of northeastern Utah and northwestern Colorado. One of defendant's poles supporting a pair of electric wires charged with 7200 volts had fallen down so that the wire slanted downward from the standing poles almost to the ground where the fallen pole was located.
Scott, his father, two brothers, and a neighbor boy were searching for Indian arrowheads in an isolated part of the state. Scott was following his fifteen-year-old brother, whose forehead came in contact apparently with the grounded wire, since the brother was not hurt as he passed thereunder. Scott asked if they were electric wires, and the brother said, 'No.' In going under the wire, Scott reached up and touched the charged wire and was severely injured.
On trial the jury found the defendant to be negligent and Scott to be contributorily negligent and further found that the negligence of each was a proximate cause of the injury. Judgment was entered for the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed, alleging three grounds of error:
1. That under the circumstances the defendant was strictly liable;
2. That contributory negligence is not a defense to strict liability; and
3. That the evidence did not warrant the submission to the jury of the question of contributory negligence.
We will discuss the claims in the order made.
A high tension transmission wire is one of the most dangerous things known to man. Not only is the current deadly, but the danger is hidden away in an innocent-looking wire ready at all times to kill or injure anyone who touches it or comes too near to it. For the average citizen there is no way of knowing whether the wire is harmless or lethal until it is too late to do anything about it. Therefore, a high degree of duty is upon one who transmits electricity in high tension wires to see that no harm befalls a person rightfully in proximity thereto when that person is himself guilty of no wrongdoing. In other words, the highest degree of care must be used to prevent harm from coming to others.
This does not mean that one who supplies electricity to the public is strictly liable without regard to fault, 1 as may be the case of one who keeps a wild and ferocious animal. The reason for the distinction lies in the use to which the dangerous thing is to be put. Our civilization could not exist without electricity, and those who supply it are benefactors to mankind. Therefore, the high degree of care required may be said to be reasonable care in view of the great potential danger involved. The amount of care to avoid negligence always varies with the risk of harm which is known or under the circumstances ought to be known to exist. 2 We, therefore, reject the contention of the plaintiff that the defendant in this case is absolutely liable to the plaintiff regardless of negligence.
Since the defendant is not an insurer of the safety of those who may be injured by coming in contact with its electric wires, it is proper for the jury to pass on the question of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff herein. 3
Since the jury found contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, under the prior rulings of this court we are required, on appeal, to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. 4 However, it is not correct to say that a case must be reversed even though it may appear to us that the defendant was negligent and the plaintiff not contributorily negligent as matters of law. The following provision is found in Article VIII, Section 9, of the Utah Constitution:
* * * In equity cases the appeal may be on question of both law and fact; in cases at law the appeal shall be on questions of law alone. * * *. 5
Wherever it is said that we can reverse a trial court if the facts as established by the evidence will not sustain the verdict, it is meant that the court committed an error of law in ruling or failing to rule as he did. This court on appeal cannot reverse a trial court on the facts of a law case but only if there be an error of law.
In the instant case the theory of plaintiff was one of strict liability on the part of the defendant to which contributory negligence would not be a defense. However, the plaintiff requested and caused to be given an instruction to the jury regarding the issue of negligence on the part of the plaintiff. Since the plaintiff requested such an instruction, the trial court cannot be reversed for giving it.
No motion was made nor instruction requested for a directed verdict, and while the court could have granted one of his own motion if the evidence in the case was such that it would not sustain a verdict, still it is not reversible error in such a case for the trial court to fail to do so. 6
No motion for a new trial was made by plaintiff, and so the trial court was not given an opportunity to correct the verdict rendered by the jury. An appellate court ought not to do that which was not requested of the trial court. The recent case of Price v. Sinnott, 460 P.2d 837, 841 (Nev.1969), states the law:
* * * It is solidly established that when there is no request for a directed verdict, the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict is not reviewable. (Citations omitted.) A party may not gamble on the jury's verdict and then later, when displeased with the verdict, challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support it.
In the case of Christensen v. Stuchlik, 91 Idaho 504, 427 P.2d 278, 280, 281 (1967), the court said:
The failure of the appellant here to present to the trial court a motion for directed verdict not only foreclosed the trial court from consideration of his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, but under decisions interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, such failure precludes the appellate court from reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict. * * *
In the case of Law v. Smith, 34 Utah 394, 98 P. 300 (1908), this court held:
* * * If the evidence, therefore, is without conflict, and is such that no conflicting inferences are permissible, or if such be the case, if, when all of the evidence together with the inferences to be deduced therefrom, when most favorably considered in favor of the plaintiff, still lacks some essential element in making out his case, the question as to what the verdict shall be is one purely of law for the court to pass on. The same would be true if the defendant under like circumstances failed in proving some essential element necessary to make out a defense. In the one instance the court would direct a verdict against the plaintiff; in the other against the defendant. In either case the question would be one of law, which would have to be applied to the uncontroverted facts.
* * * If a request to direct a verdict is made, the trial court is required to grant or refuse it. * * * If the court errs in directing or in refusing to direct a verdict under such circumstances, the error is one of law which is reviewable by this court * * *. This court, no more than the trial court, examines into the evidence for the purpose of weighing it, or for the purpose of determining whether under the evidence certain facts are established or not; but we have recourse to it only for the purpose of determining what the result shall be when the law is applied to the undisputed or conceded facts upon which the trial court passed in either directing or refusing to direct a verdict. * * *
* * * (I)n case a party desires to challenge the verdict of a jury upon the ground that the verdict is not sustained by the evidence, he must do so by a motion for a new trial, unless during the trial he raised the legal question involved by a motion for a nonsuit or for a directed verdict. Unless he has presented either a motion for a nonsuit or for a directed verdict, the trial court has had no opportunity to pass upon the legal sufficiency of the evidence during the trial, and cannot do so unless a motion for a new trial upon the ground of the insufficiency of the evidence is presented to it. When, however, a motion for a nonsuit or a motion for a directed verdict has been made and ruled upon, the court has had the opportunity to pass upon the legal sufficiency of the evidence precisely the same as upon a motion for a new trial, and hence the latter motion, for the purposes of a review, may be dispensed with. * * *
The reasons behind the rule which prevents an appellate court from reversing a law case solely because the evidence does not support the verdict are (1) its function is only to review the action of the trial court, and it does not and cannot review the actions of the jury itself, and (2) it does not review issues on appeal which were not raised below except to affirm the trial court. 7
On appeal, the burden is upon the appellant to convince us that the trial court committed error and not that the appellant should have won the case. We are unable to find any reversible error in any of the rulings made by the trial judge, and we decline to do for the plaintiff that which he never requested of the lower court.
The judgment is affirmed. No costs are awarded.
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