Brigham v. Peter Bent Brigham Hospital

• Decision Date: 30 December 1903
• Docket Number: 1,620.
• Citation: 126 F. 796
• Parties: BRIGHAM v. PETER BENT BRIGHAM HOSPITAL et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

126 F. 796

BRIGHAM v. PETER BENT BRIGHAM HOSPITAL et al.

No. 1,620.

United States Circuit Court, D. Massachusetts.

December 30, 1903

Charles A. Snow, for complainant.

Lewis S. Dabney and Arthur I. Hill, for defendant hospital.

J. S Thorndike, for defendants E. I. Codman and H. H. Johnson.

COLT Circuit Judge.

This bill is brought by one of the heirs at law and next of kin of Peter B. Brigham, who died May 24, 1877, leaving a will which was duly admitted to probate October 17, 1877. By the fourteenth clause of his will, the testator gives his entire residuary estate, subject to the payment of certain annuities and legacies, to his executors in trust for the purpose of founding a hospital in Boston, to be called the Brigham Hospital, for the care of sick persons in indigent circumstances residing in the county of Suffolk. The executors were directed to hold the estate for purposes of accumulation for a term of 25 years, and at the expiration of that period to procure the formation of a corporation for the administration of the charity, and turn over to the corporation the unexpended balance, after payment of the annuities and legacies.

The bill seeks to have the provisions of the will in favor of the hospital declared void on the ground that they conflict with the rule against perpetuities. If this ground proves untenable, it asks that these provisions be declared invalid as to any excess of property above $1,500,000, for the reason that no charitable corporation such as was contemplated by the testator had the capacity, under the laws of Massachusetts existing at the time the gift vested, to hold property above that amount. The case was heard on demurrers to the bill for want of equity.

Before a more specific reference to the provisions of the will, it is important to call attention to some general principles which have an important bearing on the paramount issue raised by the bill.

The validity of this charitable gift depends upon the law of Massachusetts, where it appears the testator was domiciled and the lands situated. Jones v. Habersham, 107 U.S 174, 179, 2 Sup.Ct. 336, 27 L.Ed. 401; Loring v. Marsh, 6 Wall. 337, 355, 18 L.Ed. 802.

Provisions in a will directing accumulations for charitable objects for a period longer than allowed by the rule against perpetuities are not invalid, and will be upheld. Odell v. Odell, 10 Allen, 1; St. Paul's Church v. Attorney General, 164 Mass. 188, 41 N.E. 231; Perry on Trusts Sec. 738.

A gift in trust for a charity not existing at the date of the gift, and the beginning of whose existence is uncertain, or which is to take effect upon a contingency that may possibly not happen within a life or lives in being and 21 years afterwards, is valid, provided there is no gift of the property meanwhile to or for the benefit of any private person or corporation. Odell v. Odell, 10 Allen, 1, 7; Russell v. Allen, 107 U.S. 171, 172, 2 Sup.Ct. 327, 27 L.Ed. 397; Jones v. Habersham, 107 U.S. 174, 2 Sup.Ct. 336, 27 L.Ed. 401; Ould v. Washington Hospital for Foundlings, 95 U.S. 303, 24 L.Ed. 450, Hayes v. Pratt, 147 U.S. 557, 13 Sup.Ct. 503, 37 L.Ed. 279; Inglis v. Sailor's Snug Harbour 3. Pet.99, 7 L.Ed. 617; Attorney General v. Bishop of Chester, 1 Bro.C.C. 444; Attorney General v. Lady Downing, 1 Dick. 414, Ambl. 571; Attorney General v. Bowyer, 3 Ves.Jr. 714; Henshaw v. Atkinson, 3 Madd. 306; Sinnett v. Herbert, L.R. 7 Ch.Ap.Cas. 232; Chamberlayne v. Brockett, L.R. 8 Ch.Ap.Cas. 206; Re Gyde, Ward v. Little, 79 L.t. (N.S.) 261.

Where the intention in favor of charity is absolute, and the gift and constitution of the trust are immediate, and the only thing which is postponed or made dependent for its execution upon a future uncertainty is the particular form or mode of charity to which the testator wishes the property to be applied, the gift is vested, and not contingent. It is not subject to a condition precedent, and therefore it is not within the rule against perpetuities. The rule against perpetuities is a rule against remoteness, or the remote vesting of an estate, and where the estate vests immediately the rule has no application. Cases above cited-- especially Chamberlayne v. Brockett, L.R. 8 Ch.Ap.Cas. 206, 212; Re Gyde, Ward v. Little, L.T. (N.S.) 261; also Gray's Rule against Perpetuities, Secs. 607, 678.

The material portions of the fourteenth clause of the Brigham will are as follows:

'Fourteenth. All the rest and residue of my property and estate, of every kind and description, real, personal and mixed, of which I shall die seized or possessed, or to which I shall be entitled at the time of my decease, I direct my said Executors to take, hold, manage and invest, for the term of twenty-five years from the time of my decease, and to take the rents, interest, income and profits thereof and from the net income thereof to appropriate and pay as follows, that is to say:

'1. They shall pay to my sister, the said Sarah B. Jacobs, the sum of five hundred dollars in each and every month, during her natural life.

'2. They shall pay to my niece Sarah Jane Brigham Kendall the sum of two thousand dollars annually during her life, in equal quarter annual payments; and at her decease, they shall distribute the sum of thirty-two thousand dollars to and among her children or child, if any, who shall survive her. If she leave no child living at her decease, this legacy to her children shall lapse.'

Paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 contain bequests similar to paragraph 2. Then follow these provisions:

'My said Executors shall add the balance of said net income, that shall remain after making the payments aforesaid, to the principal of my said estate, so that the same may be accumulating for the term of twenty-five years aforesaid; and at the expiration of said term of twenty-five years from my decease, my said Executors shall set aside a sum or sums of money and may deposit the same in some safe trust company-- preference being given, other things being equal, to the Massachusetts Hospital Life Insurance Company, of said Boston-- which shall be sufficient to provide for the payment of such of the foregoing legacies and bequests, if any, as shall then be unfulfilled; or may provide for the payment of such unpaid legacies and bequests by the purchase of annuities for the unpaid legatees or otherwise, as my said Executors shall deem expedient; & after the payment, or provision for the payment, as aforesaid of all the foregoing bequests and legacies, the unexpended balances, if any, shall be paid to and for the use of the hospital hereinafter provided for.

'8. At the expiration of said term of twenty-five years from the time of my decease, my said Executors shall dispose of said rest and residue of my property and estate and of all the interest and accumulations which shall have accrued thereon, for the purpose of founding a hospital in said Boston, to be called the Brigham Hospital for the care of sick persons, in indigent circumstances, residing in the said county of Suffolk, in the following manner,-- that is to say: They shall procure the formation of a Corporation, to be called the 'Brigham Hospital' with suitable provisions as to officers, their powers and duties for control, direction, conduct and administration of the Corporation and the care and management of the funds in its charge; and upon the legal formation and organization of said Corporation, my said Executors shall transfer to it all the property and estate provided for it as aforesaid, to be by it used and employed for the purposes above declared:-- and I give, devise and bequeath said rest and residue of my property and estate accordingly.'

The reading of these provisions leaves no doubt as to the intention of the testator. His purpose is to found a hospital in the city of Boston for the benefit of sick persons in indigent circumstances. He executes this purpose by devising the property to his executors in trust, and directing them, after making certain specific payments, to transfer the residue to a corporation bearing his name, which they are to form for the purpose of administering the charity. There is nothing which is undisposed of. There is no resulting trust in favor of the heirs or next of kin. The property is not given over to them upon any contingency or the happening of any event. Since the testator intended to dedicate to charity the entire balance of his estate, after satisfying the annuities and legacies, it is the duty of the court to carry out this intention, if consistent with the rules of law.

The clause ends with the words, 'I give, devise and bequeath said rest and residue of my property and estate accordingly ' These words, read in the light of the whole clause, and especially of the first paragraph, show a direct and absolute gift to charity of the entire residue of the estate after making certain payments. The trust for charitable purposes is constituted immediately upon the death of the testator, and is not conditional upon the formation of the hospital. The testator meant that the beneficial interest in the original fund, and in the accumulations as they accrued, which were not otherwise disposed of, should vest at once in the charity. The directions as to the hospital are simply the mode or instrument or machinery adopted by him to carry into effect his charitable purpose. The formation of the corporation was not a condition precedent to the constitution of the gift, under well-settled law. The gift will be upheld, although the corporation may never be...