Bright Data Ltd. v. BI Sci. (2009)

Docket Number2020-2118,2020-2181,2021-1664,2021-1667
Decision Date30 August 2023
PartiesBRIGHT DATA LTD., Plaintiff-Cross-Appellant v. BI SCIENCE (2009) LTD., Defendant-Appellant BI SCIENCE INC., Defendant
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Federal Circuit

This disposition is nonprecedential.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas in No. 2:18-cv-00483-JRG, Chief Judge J Rodney Gilstrap.

ROBERT M. HARKINS, JR., CHERIAN LLP, BERKELEY, CA, ARGUED FOR PLAINTIFF-CROSS-APPELLANT. ALSO REPRESENTED BY KORULA T CHERIAN; RONALD WIELKOPOLSKI, WASHINGTON, DC; COLBY DAVIS ALLEN & OVERY LLP, WASHINGTON, DC.

MICHAEL A. CHARISH, CHARISH LAW GROUP PC, NEW YORK, NY, ARGUED FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. ALSO ARGUED BY WILLIAM MILLIKEN, STERNE KESSLER GOLDSTEIN & FOX, PLLC, WASHINGTON, DC. ALSO REPRESENTED BY JOHN CHRISTOPHER ROZENDAAL,.

Before PROST, SCHALL, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.

PROST Circuit Judge

Bright Data Ltd. ("Bright Data")[1] sued BI Science (2009) Ltd. and BI Science Inc. (individually or collectively, "BI Science")[2] for patent infringement in the Eastern District of Texas. The district court entered final judgment that: (1) incorporated all terms of the parties' mediated settlement agreement; (2) incorporated all terms of the arbitration award (the product of an arbitration that followed the district court's enforcement of the settlement); and (3) held claim 108 of U.S. Patent No. 9,241,044 ("the '044 patent") invalid as indefinite. J.A. 3. BI Science appeals, arguing that the district court erred by finding an enforceable agreement. Bright Data cross-appeals the district court's determination that claim 108 of the '044 patent is invalid as indefinite. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Bright Data brought claims of patent infringement- asserting the '044 patent and U.S. Patent No. 9,742,866 ("the '866 patent")-and false advertising against BI Science.[3] J.A. 656-83; see also Am. Compl., Luminati Networks Ltd. v. BI Sci. Inc., No. 2:18-cv-00483 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 19, 2019), ECF No. 28. BI Science, a company headquartered and with its principal place of business in Israel, moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. J.A. 727-32. The district court denied that motion, determining that it had specific personal jurisdiction over BI Science based on its purposeful contacts with Texas and the direct relationship between those contacts and its alleged infringement and false advertising. J.A. 858-68.

After its motion to dismiss was denied, BI Science answered and counterclaimed for declaratory judgment of invalidity. Answer to Am. Compl. and Countercl. ¶¶ 109114, Luminati Networks Ltd., No. 2:18-cv-00483 (E.D. Tex. May 28, 2019), ECF No. 85. Subsequently, as part of claim construction, claim 108 of the '044 patent was determined to be invalid as indefinite. J.A. 1373-74, 1410. This determination was later incorporated into the district court's final judgment, J.A. 3, and is the subject of Bright Data's cross-appeal.

Following its claim construction order, the district court noted its "opinion that th[e] case could benefit from renewed mediation efforts" and ordered the parties to conduct a mediation session within ten days. J.A. 1449. Nineteen days later, on February 23, 2020, the parties filed a joint motion to stay and notice of settlement, which (1) stated "[t]he Parties hereby notify the Court that all matters in controversy between the Parties have been settled, in principle," (2) requested a thirty-day stay "so that appropriate dismissal papers may be submitted," and (3) was signed by counsel for Bright Data and BI Science. J.A. 1474-75. The district court granted the joint motion to stay and cancelled the hearing set for the following day. J.A. 1477. The next day, the mediator also filed a report indicating that mediation had "resulted in settlement of all claims." J.A. 1478.

Bright Data moved to enforce the settlement about a month after the joint notice of settlement was filed. J.A. 1479-95. BI Science opposed with arguments related to why its performance should be excused. J.A. 1547-54. At a hearing on the motion to enforce, BI Science argued for the first time that there was no binding agreement between the parties. The district court disagreed, determining that "[i]t's clear that the major points were agreed to and a meeting of the minds was reached at the time the Court was informed of the settlement." J.A. 1694. And since "that resolution includes at a minimum a binding provision that any unresolved issues . . . would be resolved by binding arbitration," the court instructed the parties to either work together to resolve, or submit to arbitration to resolve, any outstanding issues related to the settlement terms. J.A. 1693-94.

After arbitration, the district court entered final judgment that fully incorporated the settlement agreement and arbitration award. J.A. 3. The judgment also incorporated the court's indefiniteness determination on claim 108 of the '044 patent. Id. BI Science timely appealed. Bright Data timely cross-appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).

DISCUSSION

BI Science raises two issues on appeal. First, it argues that the district court erred by denying its motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Second, it argues that the district court erred by finding a binding agreement between the parties. As for the cross-appeal, Bright Data raises a single issue. It argues that the district court's indefiniteness determination as to claim 108 of the '044 patent was erroneous. We address these issues in that order:

(1) personal jurisdiction; (2) existence of an enforceable agreement; and (3) indefiniteness. I

Because jurisdiction is a threshold matter, we address it first. Unlike with subject-matter jurisdiction, a party can consent to personal jurisdiction. Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702-04 (1982). BI Science dedicated significant briefing to its argument that the district court erred by denying BI Science's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. See Appellant's Br. 21-38; Appellant's Reply Br. 24-31. But BI Science also acknowledged that if we affirm the district court's determination that a binding settlement agreement was formed, then the district court had personal jurisdiction over BI Science for purposes of enforcing that settlement agreement-i.e., it had consented to personal jurisdiction at least to that extent. Oral Arg. at 0:40-57.[4]For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the district court's determination that there was an enforceable agreement. As a result, we need not reach BI Science's personal-jurisdiction arguments related to the underlying lawsuit.[5]

II

We apply the law of the regional circuit, here the Fifth Circuit, when reviewing a district court's enforcement of a settlement agreement. Panduit Corp. v. HellermannTyton Corp., 451 F.3d 819, 825 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Under Fifth Circuit law, "[a] district court may summarily enforce a settlement agreement if no material facts are in dispute, and in such circumstances we review the district court's order for abuse of discretion only." In re Deepwater Horizon, 786 F.3d 344, 354 (5th Cir. 2015) (footnote omitted); cf. Haggart v. United States, 943 F.3d 943, 947 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ("[W]e join the majority of our sibling courts in holding that a district court's decision whether to summarily enforce a settlement agreement is reviewed for an abuse of discretion."). When the district court's enforcement of a settlement agreement does depend on resolution of factual disputes, its factfindings are reviewed for clear error. Sundown Energy, L.P. v. Haller, 773 F.3d 606, 614 (5th Cir. 2014).

BI Science argues that any finding by the district court that there was a meeting of the minds related to the settlement agreement was clearly erroneous. Appellant's Br. 39. Considering the record before the district court and the positions taken before it, we discern no error.

When Bright Data moved to enforce the settlement against BI Science, it represented that "[a] full and complete set of terms was reduced to writing and agreed upon by both sides and confirmed in writing," and it attached that writing as an exhibit. J.A. 1482. Additionally, Bright Data presented a detailed factual narrative about mediation and the parties' resulting seventeen-term agreement. J.A. 1482-85. In opposition, BI Science did not contest Bright Data's position that there was an agreement between the parties, nor did it challenge Bright Data's factual narrative. Instead, BI Science's arguments were premised on the existence of an agreement; it asked that performance under the settlement be either excused or delayed. J.A. 1549-50. BI Science did contend, in support of its excuse or delay arguments, that the operative agreement was not the final or formal version of the settlement. J.A. 1550 n.3; J.A. 1552. Still, regardless of this characterization of the agreement's formality, one would search in vain for any hint that BI Science did not consider itself bound or did not intend to bind itself to the agreement when it filed this opposition.

When the district court held a hearing on the motion to enforce BI Science argued for the first time that the mediated settlement "by itself is not a fully binding settlement" and that it did not "contain[] all the material elements and requirements needed to form a completely binding settlement agreement." J.A. 1659-60. However, its attorney also affirmed that he had knowingly participated in the filing of the joint notice of settlement representing that all matters were resolved, J.A. 1658-59-the precise type of notice the district court noted BI Science's counsel had "signed off on . . . probably hundreds of times...

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