Bright v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.
| Decision Date | 07 September 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 83-5417,83-5417 |
| Citation | 756 F.2d 19 |
| Parties | Warren Lloyd BRIGHT, Paul M. Shelton and William Ralph Whittaker, Plaintiffs- Appellants, v. FIRESTONE TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Hal Gerber, argued, Gerber, Gerber & Agee, James H. Mathis, Memphis, Tenn., Joe C. Hailey, Selmer, Tenn., for plaintiffs-appellants.
William H. King, Jr., argued, David H. Worrell, Jr., McGuire, Woods & Battle, Richmond, Va., J.N. Raines, Memphis, Tenn., for defendant-appellee.
Before ENGEL and KENNEDY, Circuit Judges, and WISEMAN *, Chief Judge.
Plaintiffs appeal from denial of their motion for a new trial following a jury verdict for defendant. Plaintiffs are the fathers and representatives of three young men killed in a car accident in Selmer, Tennessee. Decedent Randall Bright had acquired a Corvette on July 3, 1978. On the night of July 3, Bright showed the Corvette to a group of people socializing and drinking beer in a radio station parking lot. Bright allowed decedent Donald Whittaker to drive the Corvette, with Bright and decedent Randall Shelton as passengers. The accident occurred in the early morning hours of July 4. There were no witnesses. The car left the road, turned one hundred and eighty degrees, and struck an embankment with great force, killing all three occupants.
The two rear tires on the Corvette were Firestone 500 tires manufactured by defendant. The front two Firestone 500's, which were original equipment on the Corvette, had become worn out and were replaced by another brand before Bright acquired the car. Plaintiffs brought suit against Firestone, claiming that the accident was caused by separation of the tread in the right rear tire. The case proceeded to trial on three theories of liability: negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty. After seven days of testimony the District Court submitted all issues to the jury, which returned verdicts for the defendant and against each plaintiff. The District Court denied plaintiffs' motion for a new trial, and plaintiffs appeal.
The plaintiffs' first argument is that the District Court erred in holding that contributory negligence is a defense to strict liability. Defendant denies that the District Court ever made such a ruling. The plaintiffs' contention is apparently based on a discussion, which took place before voir dire, concerning the admissibility of evidence that the driver of the Corvette had been drinking. The District Court indicated that it would follow its ruling in a previous case in which "the court did allow proof on those issues, but the point is that you have got to look at the various claims and defenses and contentions of the parties." App. at 110.
Six days before, the plaintiffs had amended their complaints so as to remove the negligence claim. They argue that the District Court's indication that evidence concerning alcohol would be admissible must have meant that the District Court considered such evidence of the driver's contributory negligence relevant to the strict liability claim, since there was no negligence claim in the case at the time. Immediately before the trial commenced, however, the plaintiffs reinstated their negligence claims. Plaintiffs assert that they only reinstated their negligence claim because of the Court's indication that it would allow evidence of contributory negligence whether or not the negligence claim was pursued.
Plaintiffs' argument concerning their reason for reinstating the negligence claims is disingenuous, as the record clearly shows that the reason they reinstated the negligence claims was that without the negligence claims no punitive damages could be allowed. App. at 112-117. Since the case was tried in part on a negligence theory, evidence that the car's driver was intoxicated was clearly admissible. Plaintiffs do not claim to have even objected to its admissibility at trial.
Even disregarding the negligence claims, the District Court's statement cannot be considered a ruling that contributory negligence is a defense to strict liability. The District Court did not even refer to contributory negligence. The Court merely indicated that the evidence would be admitted if found relevant to any of the issues in the case. Evidence that the car's driver was intoxicated could be relevant to the issue of causation, which is an element of a strict liability cause of action. Browder v. Pettigrew, 541 S.W.2d 402 (Tenn.App.1976).
Plaintiffs' next contention is that the jury's verdict demonstrates "passion, prejudice, or unaccountable caprice." Plaintiffs do not point to anything that would suggest that the jury was subject to improper influences or carried away by emotion, however. Instead, they engage in a discussion of the evidence supporting their case. That there was evidence favoring the plaintiffs is no reason for concluding that the jury must have been carried away by passion or prejudice or it would not have found for defendant. See Alessio v. Crook, 633 S.W.2d 770 (Tenn.App.1982). There was sufficient evidence to support a verdict for defendant. There was evidence from which the jury could reasonably have concluded that the driver was intoxicated, that the car was traveling 120 miles per hour, that the tire was worn in places down to the steel belt, and that the tire had been seriously damaged by underinflation. The jury may have concluded that the tire was not defective, or it may have concluded that the accident was caused not by a defect in the tire, but by some unrelated cause such as a worn tire or an intoxicated driver in combination with excessive speed.
Finally, plaintiffs contend that the District Court erred in refusing to allow introduction as evidence certain parts of the report of the Moss Committee, a subcommittee of the Committee of the House of Representatives on Interstate and Foreign Commerce...
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